The methods and goals of the
scientific enterprise may tell us little about human thought in general,
just as the symbolic systems constructed appear to differ radically from
natural languages in their formal and semantic properties. If so, the
picture that has guided the most important work on these topics in the
last century may be seriously
misconceived. (Chomsky: Language and Thought, 1993; p.35) |
First, simulations and realizations belong to different categories of modeling. Simulations are metaphorical models that symbolically "stand for" something else. Realizations are literal, material models that implement functions. Therefore, accuracy in a simulation need have no relation to quality of function in a realization. Secondly, the criteria for good simulations and realizations of a system depend on our theory of the system. The criteria for good theories depend on more than mimicry, e.g. Turing Tests. Lastly, our theory of living systems must include evolvability. Evolution requires the distinction between symbolic genotypes [types of language entities], material phenotypes [tokens of language entities], and selective environments [situations of communicative language use]. Each of these categories has characteristic properties that must be represented in artificial life (AL) models.21For cognitive models of natural language processing the systems theoretical view suggests to accept natural language discourse as analyzable and empirically accessible evidence for tracing such processes. Thus, natural language discourse might reveal essential parts of the particularly structured, multi-layered information representation and processing potential to a system analyzer and model constructor in rather the same way as this potential is accessible to an information processing system trying to understand these texts. There is an important difference, however, in dealing with the natural language material which is part of an information processing system and its analyzer on the one hand, and also part of an information system engaged in processing its discourse environment on the other. Distinguishing between the object-modeler relation and the system-environment relation is to be active in and part of different information processing situations of which only the latter-and not the former-can be said to be directly accessible to the modeler via attunement. It is this lack of being properly attuned to the semiotic principles underlying natural language understanding systems which prompts cognitive linguists to fall back on situations they are attuned to, namely natural language understanding whose formal abstractions they believe to be provided by principled IL representations of language competence . But whereas in communicative language understanding one can-and even has to-take the semiotics of signs and the constitution of meanings for granted and beyond questioning (i.e. signs and meanings are meant to be understood, no matter whether fully or only partially, whether correctly or even wrongly), the purpose of modeling that very process (i.e. how structures become signs, meaning is constituted, and language understood) must not. Trying to understand (conditions of possible) understanding of signs and meanings cannot rely on the simulative processing of (symbol) structures whose representational status is declared by drawing on a pre-established semantics (known by the modeler, made accessible to the model, but not at all compulsory for the system modeled). Instead, modeling processes of meaning constitution or understanding will have to realize that very function in an implemented and operational information processing system which is able to render some structure-in a self-organizing way-representational of something else, and also allows to identify what that structure is to stand for. This is-very briefly-what establishes a symbol or sign-meaning relation whose semantics is a way of representing this relation in an overt and intelligible sense to other (natural and/or artificial) semiotic cognitive information processing (SCIP) systems. The notions of discourse situation and of language game will serve to mediate the dynamics of semiosis and the procedural approach to model SCIP systems as based upon natural language discourse.
n- | Fn | Tn=|Zn| | 100·[(Fn)/(Tn)] | An=m ·|Fn-1| | 100·[(Fn)/(An)] |
grams | (fact.occurr.) | (theor.possib.) | percent | (act.possib.) | percent |
1 | 31 | 31 | 100,000 | 31 | 100,000 |
2 | 817 | 961 | 85,015 | 961 | 85,015 |
3 | 10.175 | 29.791 | 34,154 | 25.327 | 40,174 |
4 | 54.470 | 923.521 | 5,898 | 315.425 | 17,268 |
5 | 164.045 | 28.629.151 | 0,572 | 1.688.570 | 9,715 |
6 | 357.632 | 887.503.681 | 0,040 | 5.085.395 | 7,032 |
7 | 634.767 | 27.512.614.111 | 0,002 | 11.086.592 | 5,725 |
Size of test-corpus : | 3.648.326 | (signs) | 502.587 | (words) |
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B E H I N D | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |||||
0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |||||
0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |||||
0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |||||
0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |||||
0 | 0 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |||||
0 | 0 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |||||
0 | 0 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |||||
R | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | L | |||
I | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | E | |||
G | \bigtriangledown | |||||||||||||||||||||||
H | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | F | |||
T | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | T | |||
0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |||||
0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |||||
0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |||||
0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |||||
0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |||||
0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |||||
0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |||||
0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |||||
I N F R O N T |
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1. | take that meaning point's label as a start, | |
2. | stack labels of all its neighboring points by their decreasing distances, | |
3. | instantiate DDS-tree with head or root node being the starting point's label. The process continues to | |
4. | take label from top of stack as next daughter node, | |
4.1 | list labels of all its neighbors, | |
4.2 | intersect list with nodes in tree, | |
4.3 |
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5. | link daughter to identified mother node, and | |
6. | repeat 4. either | |
6.1 | until 2. is empty, or | |
6.2 |
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7. | to end. |
Figure Figure |
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In addition to the types of constraints defined above there are many others that are more specialized and less common. A question that arises is: What purpose is served by having a large variety of constraints to choose from? A basic reason is that, in general setting, information may be viewed as a constraint on a variable. ( Zadeh 1997, p. 117)However, as has been shown above, constraints can not only be induced by predicative expressions of truth-functional propositions but may also be induced by word meanings, provided these are modeled by procedurally determined weighted dependency relations in SHS data derived from natural language discourse analyzed in a fuzzy linguistic manner. Taking the concept of a generalized constraint to hold likewise for the levels of sentence meanings (proposition) as well as for word meanings (DDS), then the TFIG notational format introduced may be translated to X @ {zn} where X is a variable which takes values zi Î áS ñ with S Í U. A semiotically generalized constraint on values of X is expressed by X ddsi S where DDSi relates zi to S in a specifying way by restricting SHS procedurally in generating the DDS-graph tree structure) from meaning point zi as its root, and zn as its discrete variables whose values define different sub-graphs (dependency paths ) which constrain S in a perspective way.
| (19) |