
Polarity sensitivity in attitude predicates: the case of *hope*

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Polarity items (PIs) historically include modals like PPI *must* (Iatridou & Zeijlstra 2013) and NPI *need* (van der Wouden 1997), but not their main verb equivalents (e.g., *have to*, *need to*). This work introduces attitude predicates, i.e. lexical predicates with modal-like content, into the domain of PIs with novel observations from a case study on *hope*: Obs (i) *hope* with a finite complement clause (CC) is anti-licensed by clausemate *not* (1a), but Obs (ii) the judgment improves with a nonfinite CC (1b).

- (1) a. I don't { think / assume / #hope } that Gary will win.
b. I don't { want / promise for / (?)?hope for } Gary to win.

I propose a mechanism to explain (i) and (ii) using two ingredients. First, I assume Anand & Hacquard's (2013) analysis of *hope* as having an uncertainty condition whereby x believes p possible but not certain (2a), and asserting both that x believes p possible (2b) and x 's preference for p over $\neg p$ (2c), where $>_{DES_{x,w}}$ is an ordering induced by their desires. Negating *hope* thus results, in principle, in the negation of $((2b) \wedge (2c))$, with three logical possibilities: $\neg(2b)$, $\neg(2c)$, $\neg(2b) \wedge \neg(2c)$.

- (2) $[\text{hopes } p]^{w,g} = \lambda x :$ (Anand & Hacquard (2013), simpl.)
a. $\underline{DOX_{x,w} \cap p \neq \emptyset} \wedge \underline{DOX_{x,w} \setminus p \neq \emptyset}$. (uncertainty felicity cond.)
b. $\underline{\exists w' \in DOX_{x,w} : [\text{p}]^{w',g} = 1} \wedge$ (doxastic assertion)
c. $p >_{DES_{x,w}} \neg p$ (preference assertion)

Second, the type of CC affects which assertion component $((2b)/(2c))$ is promoted to main assertion: a finite CC promotes the doxastic one (2b) while a nonfinite CC promotes the preference one (2c; Jackendoff 1985, Grano 2019), evidenced by (3). Negating *hope* favors the interpretation with negation of the main assertion.

- (3) A: Do you think he's coming? B: I hope {(that) he does / ??for him to}.

The infelicity of (1a) thus results from the clash between negation of the promoted doxastic assertion ($\neg(2b)$) and the presupposition (2a), both underlined. This contradiction causes *hope*'s PPIhood (Obs (i)). In contrast, (1b) with a nonfinite CC raises no clash: negating the promoted preference component ($\neg(2c)$) doesn't contradict the presupposition, hence (relative) acceptability, explaining Obs (ii).

References: • Anand & Hacquard (2013). Epistemics and attitudes. *S&P* 6(8). • Grano (2019). Belief, intention, and the grammar of persuasion. In *Proceedings from the Annual Meeting of the CLS* 54. • Iatridou & Zeijlstra (2013). Negation, polarity, and deontic modals. *LI* 44(4). • Jackendoff (1985). Believing and intending: Two sides of the same coin. *LI* 16(3). • van der Wouden (1997). *Negative contexts: Collocation, polarity and multiple negation*.