Finale
Sociology of Cinema And Dissenting Views And Visions of Modernities:
Recollecting the "Fragments" of the 20th Century Modern Nation(s)

Phalke's searching and questioning "I" on his meandering path between obligations to the 'outer world' and his 'inner world' was a modern individual who factually broke with "caste" in terms of the Brahminhood assigned to him and his actions. He passionately followed his own vocation by engaging himself as a "craftsman" and "financially struggling artist" in his 'cinema of tTruth'[1]. He experienced the power of the discharging tensions present in his worldly and ideological environments. Still Phalke adhered to what he felt was right. His unwavering moral sentiment was not ready to yield to the orthodox pressures, nor was he prepared to balance the different social roles - photographer, father, husband, 'colonial citizen', 'patriot', debtor - as he was expected according to the modern codes of social conduct which strictly allotted them either to the 'public', or to the 'private' sphere.

His 'scientific mind' and strong will fuelled Phalke's energies to live according to his beliefs and passions as a cine-artist and a 'citizen of the world'. His ethical stance of commitment to *satya/* truth/ Truth which was partially inspired by the *Gita* fusing with his urge to express himself in the 'world of unmediated beauty', i.e. photography, his complete stand against all types of *pardah* ('duality'), and his democratic humanism revolted against being compelled to exist in private seclusion as much as it revolted against conforming to the world 'as it was'. Phalke felt morally repelled to continue an existence that should consist of just two alternatives: to live in hypocrisy, or in a state of mental and psychological fragmentation. The film pioneer went public in the cinema. Saraswatibai and his children came along, and had to learn to manage their lives on a shoestring budget.

The multifaceted *Indianness* of Phalke's cinema revealed itself as a holistic social vision of the 'good life' and the 'morally better society'. Hence, it was not simply because the medium he used was new that Phalke's cinematic Indianness was dissonant from the dominant visions as propelled by the politics of identity. It was a dissensus on the inner qualities of the conception of Indianness itself. What I discussed as the unique and even revolutionary impact of Phalke's cinema, was its potential to inspire humane compassion in the spectator who was involving her-/ himself emotionally, morally and rationally in that "life-like" and "moving" spectacle. This had been possible due to Phalke's cinematic treatment, for instance, his creative use

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[1]) Translated into English and denoted in the script form, the meaning of *satya* as represented in Phalke's early cinema, had actually to be something like 'tTruth', i.e. a synthesis of the individual 'truth' and 'Truth' as the concept of larger 'cosmological' order. It were to be 'tTruth' because the individual was the starting point and retained comparatively more weight than the abstract, transcendental Truth.

of the 'democratising' capacity of the two-dimensional photography in arranging persons in the frame in a manner that accentuated their 'equality'[2] (standing side by side, or vis-à-vis). This 'democratising' effect was supplemented by rendering an individual and humane touch to the characters of the main protagonists Harishchandra and Vishwamitra. The 'meeting of the eyes' between the spectator and the film character brought a novel kind of intimacy into this relationship. By means of the innovative beginning of the film in the royal garden itself without the prologue in the *Indrasabha* the King and the sage were 'liberated'. They ceased to be mere puppets in the hands of the celestial players in their rivalry on the status of *Brahmin* or *Kshatriya* sagehood. In the film Harishchandra and Vishwamitra were transformed into 'fellow beings' whereas usually they had been re-presented as antagonists, if not, as had been the case in Khadilkar's and Dixit's plays, as *irreconcilable* antagonists due to the alleged offence of Vishwamitra against *chatur varna*.

Phalke's 'cinema of tTruth' countered the essentials of hegemonic Indian nationalism in those days, i.e. Brahminic Hinduism. It countered the systematic, strict and eternal subordination of man to a fixed hierarchical system that was founded on the denial of social space to individuality in order to grow and unfold itself according to the dynamics that emerged from man's socialising capacities and urges.

Whereas the conception of 'man' and 'society' in Brahminic Hinduism became one of an unquestioned and unquestionable submission of man to that rigid system, to which he can only succumb with his whole body, mind and 'heart', in Phalke's cinematic representation it is possible for the involved spectator to experience emotional bonds with the struggling individual. The spectator is even encouraged to 'forget' about the larger framework of the *varna* system, and interest him-/ herself in the individual actions and sentiments of the protagonist. Phalke's 'cinema of tTruth' could therefore contribute to a shift in the perception, away from abstract and hereditary loyalties to an interest in the fellow human being's doings[3].

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[2]) The movie camera as the re-creator of social and political hierarchies through low angle shots etc. came much later. It was only in the first half of the 1930s that Leni Riefenstahl brought this potential of the film medium to perfection to cinematically aestheticise a highly questionable social-cultural and political hero worship (as in her famous film TRIUMPH OF THE WILL on the Nazi party rally "Einheit und Stärke", 'Unity and Strength', held at Nuremberg in 1934).

[3]) It is inherent to this capacity of the cinema that it can also motivate the spectator to that 'peeping Tom' gaze.

This cinema opened up a space for thinking, feeling, and moralising on the individual's place in society which was tentatively anti-authoritarian in a triple sense:

1. It focussed on the individual, her 'inner' and 'outer' world;
2. It highlighted the inter-subjective dimensions of the social world;
3. It highlighted the specific actions of individuals in their conduct with others, and was particularly interested in working out the contradictions of the 'inner' and 'outer worlds' in a pictorial and thrilling cinematic idiom.

As a standpoint, this focus of attention on the film character as the spectator's 'fellow' was more likely to ignore an authoritarian imposition to leave this perspective in favour of that of the State authority, the nation (state), the Church, the hegemonic public morality, or the *chatur varna*. It has the potential to resist vindication of violence against the Other of the respective authoritarian institution's making.

This ability of an individual to focus on her fellows, and imaginatively take their point of view, to 'see' what motivated their actions, I understand as a "fragment" in the sense of Chatterjee (1994, see below). This "fragment" of the human mind and heart that participated in modernity was under constant attack by the dominant authorities.

The potential of the cinema to instigate 'anarchic behaviour' (cf. Hiley 1993b), i.e. a shift of a subject's loyalty away from the established one, was understood and countered by these very authorities from the beginning. Their censoring of what they defined as the cinema's dangerous views (in the double sense of the word) was an important aspect in the formation of public morality in the modern societies of the 20th century. I have already raised this issue and discussed it in terms of the loyalty that the modern (colonial) subjects were expected to show (Act 1 and Act 4). Here I am concentrating on the effects that this authoritarian standpoint vis-à-vis the cinema were likely to furnish in the sphere of the emotions and the individual morality of spectators. These arguments will be interlaced at due place with the following main line of argumentation on the "fragments of modernity" in the modernisms in 'the East' and in 'the West'.

This Finale discusses Phalke's early cinema as an amazing contribution to the general contemporary discourses on modernity and modernism in the 'East' and in the 'West'.

In my argumentation RAJA HARISCHANDRA re-presented the 'spirit' of a variant of Indian modernism that became political practice in the 1920s. It

is present in *satya* of *satyagraha*, a peculiar and multifaceted moral attitude that played a major role in the Indian political struggles. It is essential to my argument that certain contradictions and tensions that were already congenital to the kind of modernism that Phalke's early cinema reflected (on) for instance, its atmospheric message of a universal humanism with an 'Indian face' but a 'Western soul' - in the 1920s resulted into various splits in the Indian social movements which were irreconcilable (like the one between Ambedkar and Gandhi as popular leaders). The quality of these competing variants of Indian modernism can be recollected from understanding the reasons that necessitated splitting.

Historically I am referring to the times which, for reasons of orientation I am marking by the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, the end of World War I, the Jallianwalla massacre, the first All-India Trade Union Congress, the Rowlatt Agitations, and the Mahad *satyagraha* under the leadership of 'Babasaheb' Ambedkar.

The period between 1912 and 1918 - the 'spirit' of which was contained in Phalke's two RAJA HARISCHANDRA films - can be seen as strongly formative to the most important developments in Bombay's public spaces and spheres during the 1920s. However, it is beyond the scope of this book to go deeper into a thorough analysis of the features and the quality of the daily life, and how it was experienced. What I am suggesting here is to cast a fresh look at Phalke's early cinema, and recognise it as a source that 'inspired' (indirectly or directly) some of the most radiant popular movements struggling for better lives, and, at times, also striving for their respective *kind* of Indian modernity, and, sometimes, also achieving it.

By means of probing into some of the salient features of the antagonism between 'Babasaheb' Ambedkar and 'Mahatma' Gandhi, I will work out a matrix of the main characteristics of their respective idea(l)s of Indian modernism, their conception of 'man', of the individual, and of society, and how these idea(l)s were linked to their respective *satyagraha* strategies and intertwined with 'Western' idea(l)s. Both these 'organic intellectuals' were well aware of the contradictions and tensions which they were confronting and which they were handling according to their respective worldview. The discursive and comparative manner in which I am juxtaposing the two positions of Ambedkar and Gandhi denotes one level of my discussion of modernity and the competing variants of modernism in India. Another level of my discussion will be the relationship between 'Indian modernity', and respectively, modernism(s), and discourses in the West.

The exposition of this 'East-West'-network of modernist idea(l)s will reflect more pointedly the main contradictions and tensions of modernity and modernisms around 1900, which are epitomised in Phalke's early cinema. Useful to an understanding of the similarities and the differences, how they were conceived and how they were experienced, was the distinction as Miriam Hansen has highlighted concisely in her elucidating analysis "America, Paris, the Alps: Kracauer (and Benjamin) on Cinema and Modernity" (1995). Hansen's conceptions of 'modernity' and 'modernism' became consequential for the theoretical design of this last chapter. It is as much a resume of the findings of my preceding social-historical explorations into a history of 'lost' experiences of Indianness, as it is meant to motivate two shifts in our theoretical and methodological outlook while dealing with phenomena located in the modern Indian public spheres. The first one is that within the framework of my sociology of cinema experiences in Indian cinema cultures could be tapped as an immensely rich source for studies on how the materiality of daily lives intertwined with daily life perceptions and spilled into, or was related to social action.

Secondly, kinds of 'Indian modernity' and variants of 'Indian modernism' have to be included in the ongoing international discourses which are exploring alternative traditions of modernity. Defining my own position on the theorisation of 'modernity'/ 'modernism', there is nothing that I could add to Hansen's sensitive and well-founded differentiation which I am citing here in a selective manner by following her main line of argumentation.

Hansen shares the point made by Marshall Berman's "All that is solid melts into air: The experience of modernity"[4], that "there is more than one modernity - and that modernism can, and should, be used in the plural" (Hansen 1995, 364). All the more so, since it has been the hegemonic modernism that engineered the physical destruction as well as the deletion of the 'memories' of alternative traditions of modernity. Nevertheless, Hansen argues in favour of maintaining a balance in the critique of "hegemonic modernism" in so far as the critics do not reproduce the hegemonic or dominant logic of "epistemic totalitarianism":

"For one thing, it reduces the contradictory and heterogeneous aspects of the twentieth-century modernisms to the claims of one dominant paradigm or, rather, the positions of a particular, canonical set of modernist intellectuals. For another, this attack collapses the discourse of modernism with the discourses of modernity, however mediated the two my be. That is, the critical fixation on hegemonic modernism to some extent undercuts the effort to open up the discussion of modernism from the traditional preoccupation with artistic and intellectual movements and to understand the latter as inseparable

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[4]) 1982/ 1988, reprint, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

from the political, economic, and social processes of modernity and modernization, including the development of mass and media culture. In other words, the attack on hegemonic modernism tends to occlude the material conditions of everyday modernity which distinguish living in the twentieth century from living in the nineteenth, at least for large populations in western Europe and the United States.

If we want to make the juncture of cinema and modernity productive for the present debate, we need to grant twentieth-century modernity the same attention toward heterogeneity, nonsynchronicity, and contradiction [...] Still, if we seek to locate the cinema within the transformations of the life-world specific to the twentieth century, in particular the first half, we cannot conflate these transformations with, say, the tabula rasa visions imposed upon them in the name of an aesthetics and ideology of the machine" (ibid., 364-365).

Yet, in our context of discussing the triangle of Indian modernity/ modernism, cinema and identities, Hansen's framework has to be slightly changed. In order to keep the transparency of my argumentation, I have to employ the concepts 'Indian modernity' and 'Indian modernism', which might appear as if I am countering Hansen's argumentation. However, when I am employing the concepts 'Indian modernity' and 'Indian modernism' it is for reasons of scrupulously marking differences in the spaces of the projects of 'modernity' and 'modernism', and those of the public spheres in Bombay around 1900. In its basic outlook, Hansen's reflections are logically kept untouched.

"Caste" and (Indian) modernity

I am arguing that the heterogeneous and intrinsically contradictory nature of Indian modernism and modernity most clearly showed in modernists' views and visions of "caste". Although, for the various reasons analysed, Phalke's RAJA HARISCHANDRA was not explicitly and in an agitating manner interfering with the ongoing *brahmin-non-brahmin* conflict, at its time and location, with its dissenting spirit, it was a remarkable statement that resulted from Phalke's diagnosis that the state of complete moral crisis in which he saw India and Indians, could only be overcome by tearing down all the *pardahs* that separated and antagonised human beings and prevented them from living a free life that would accomplish itself in the service to their fellow human beings.

It might be least expected though most enticing that the cardinal features of the Indianness that was envisioned and reflected (on) in Phalke's RAJA HARISCHANDRA can be rediscovered in Ambedkar's famous and at its time highly controversial "Annihilation of caste (with a reply to Mahatma Gan-

dhi)" of 1936. This comprehensive analysis of "caste" which consequentially ended in the radical appeal to the Hindus to do away with it, was originally meant as a speech in his function as the invited president of the 1936 Annual Conference of the Jat-Pat-Todak Mandal of Lahore. Triggering off harsh reactions and arguments even before it was held, it could not be delivered. Ambedkar got his speech printed. It circulated in large numbers, and also provoked Gandhi to take his stand on the issues raised.

Visions of Indian modernity: Ambedkar's "The annihilation of caste" vs. 'the annihilation of Self' in Gandhi's vision

Ambedkar (excerpt from "Annihilation of caste", 1936):

"What is your ideal society if you do not want caste is a question that is bound to be asked of you. If you ask me, my ideal would be a society based on *Liberty*, *Equality* and *Fraternity*. And why not? What objection can there be to Fraternity? I cannot imagine any. An ideal society should be mobile, should be full of channels for conveying a change taking place in one part to other parts. In an ideal society there should be many interests consciously communicated and shared. There should be varied and free points of contact with other modes of association. In other words there must be social endosmosis. This is fraternity, which is only another name for democracy. Democracy is not merely a form of Government. It is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. It is essentially an attitude of respect and reverence towards fellowmen." (Ambedkar 1979/ 1989b, 57)

Gandhi (excerpt from his response to Ambedkar's "Annihilation of caste", 1936):

"Caste has nothing to do with religion. It is a custom whose origin I do not know and do not need to know for the satisfaction of my spiritual hunger. But I do know that it is harmful both to spiritual and national growth. Varna and Ashrama are institutions which have nothing to do with castes. The law of Varna teaches us that we have each one of us to earn our bread by following the ancestral calling. It defines not our rights but our duties. It necessarily has reference to callings that are conducive to the welfare of humanity and to no other. It also follows that there is no calling too low and none too high. All are good, lawful and absolutely equal in status. The calling of a Brahmin – spiritual teacher – and a scavenger are equal, and their due performance carries equal merit before God and at one time seems to have carried identical reward before man. Both were entitled to their livelihood and no more ... It would be wrong and improper to judge the law of Varna by its caricature in the lives of men who profess to belong to a Varna, whilst they openly commit a breach of its only operative rule. Arrogation of a superior status by and of the Varna over another is a denial of the law. And there is nothing in the law of Varna to warrant a belief in untouchability. (The essence of Hinduism is contained in its enunciation of one and only God as Truth and its bold acceptance of

Ahimsa as the law of the human family.)" (first published in *Harijan*, July 18, 1936, in: Ambedkar (1979/ 1989a, 83)

Ambedkar's analytical picture of the deplorable state of Indian society due to "caste", his sharp intellectuality and his scientific approach (being accentuated now and then by him) is indeed deeply rooted in the democratic and the enlightened traditions of the French Revolution (57-58). Factual knowledge and properly placed and logically organised reasoning meant a weapon to Ambedkar who himself hailed from the Mahar community. His formal education in India and in the USA, was only possible due to the generosity of one of India's enlightened Princes.

However, Ambedkar was never a blind follower of hegemonic Western modernism, nor of the myths that hallow Western modernity. His sparkling review of Bertrand Russell's *Principles of Social Reconstruction* of 1917 - which I will scrutinise in connection with my discussion of the inter-national links of Indian modernisms - shows Ambedkar as a subtly informed and reflective critic of any contradictory and unscientific judgement whether it might touch upon sociological or political issues in India, or in 'the West'.

Ambedkar knows no false compromises in claiming the human rights as his due and that of any Indian, irrespective of her/ his "caste". His worldview could not deny its anchoring in his experiences as a Mahar. But it equally resulted from his generally inquisitive mind, his ability to sense the inconsistency of unfounded conservative statements, and to counter them on the basis of his reason. There was also his quest to make out the usefulness of intellectual or spiritual exercises in triggering off some changes in the daily lives of the suppressed.

In the latter I see one of the important points of difference between Ambedkar and Gandhi. To the former, who is in this respect a true 'son of Enlightenment', it is the world of cognizance that should serve humankind to make their world a better world. Betterment is seen in an appropriate furnishing of a man's [sic] material environment for enabling his more *humane* worldly existence.

Gandhi's point of view is plain anti-materialism. It reduces the mental world to the spiritual, and the dwelling in it as the fulfilment of men's 'pursuit of happiness'. It was not knowledge and insight into the matter of things that were perceived as enlightening for their usefulness in making life more enjoyable. The ideal 'man' in most of Gandhi's views[5] has to shed

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[5]) It is difficult to refer to Gandhi's enormous output in writings and speeches in terms of consistency.

all his material and physical ambitions and needs, including his bodily self, in striving to become One with universal Truth:

"What is Truth? A difficult question; but I have solved it for myself by saying that it is what the voice within tells you. How then, you ask, different people think of different and contrary truths? Well, seeing that the human mind works through innumerable media and that the evolution of the human mind is not the same for all, it follows that what may be truth for one, may be untruth for another, and hence those who have made these experiments have come to the conclusion that there are certain conditions to be observed in making those experiments [...] It is because we have at the present moment everybody claiming the right of conscience without going through any discipline whatsoever that there is so much untruth being delivered to a bewildered world. And all that I can in true humility present to you is that Truth is not to be found by anybody who has not an abundant sense of humility. If you would swim on the bosom of the ocean of Truth you must reduce yourself to zero." (in: Kripalani 1995, 64-65)

This negation of the individual's physical and psychological being, propagates not only the absolute subordination to the Truth abstract, but it preaches a kind of Self-destruction focusing on man's reasoning Self, and his most basic instincts: living and caring for himself in co-operation with his fellow beings. Gandhi's idea(l) of Truth is a variant of that authoritarian standpoint which, as I have argued in the beginning of this chapter, Phalke's 'cinema of tTruth' had turned upside-down.

Authority enters in the form of a moral attitude with anti-materialism and anti-rationalism as its main traits. 'Man' had to reduce himself to a humble servant to Truth abstract, and it is only on this foundation that, according to Gandhi, public life can flourish. The idea(l) of public life in this worldview comes closest to its fulfilment not in any concrete or material achievement which would have its scale of standard in the quality of life as a whole but Gandhi's vision of society places her true all-encompassing purpose outside of society:

"'Not for Self [...] Public life would be much purer than it is if we would do everything in the name of King of kings and not for self but for posterity." (*Young India*, 11-11-26, in: Gandhi 1967, 55)

These standards of private and public morality being located in the transcendental, and in the anti-materialist and anti-rational, mark another cardinal difference with Ambedkar. What was Ambedkar's idea(l) of the "annihilation of caste", was Self-annihilation in Gandhi's idea(l). These polarities reveal the full breadth and also the diffuseness of Indian modernism, and

enable us to make out how tightly they were interconnected with contemporary modernisms in 'the West'.

It would not be correct, though, to assume Ambedkar's standpoint to be that of an anti-moralist[6]. Yet, his conception's standards are anchored in the very mundane world, and are erected as a counter-position to what he criticises in *dharma* as he finds it being defined in the *Vedas*:

"To put it in plain language, what the Hindus call Religion is really Law or at best legalized class-ethics. Frankly, I refuse to call this code of ordinances, as Religion. The first evil of such a code of ordinances, misrepresented to the people as Religion, is that it tends to deprive moral life of freedom and spontaneity and to reduce it (for the conscientious at any rate) to a more or less anxious and servile conformity to externally imposed rules. Under it, there is no loyalty to ideals, there is only conformity to commands. But the worst evil of this code of ordinances is that the laws it contains must be the same yesterday, today and forever. [...] I have, therefore, no hesitation in saying that such a religion must be destroyed and I say, there is nothing irreligious in working for the destruction of such a religion. Indeed I hold that it is your bounden duty to tear the mask, to remove the misrepresentation that was caused by misnaming this Law as Religion." (Ambedkar 1979/ 1989a, 75-76)

In Ambedkar's view, in Brahminic Hinduism there was no scope for true secularisation. The core reason for this is again assumed to be the crippling of individuality and subjectivity. The 'conscience' or the 'spirit' that he envisioned within his idea(l) of a 'better society' would be located in the individual. And she should freely and flexibly progress while acknowledging her fellow human beings as equals, and social co-operation as their common goal. Ambedkar's idea(l) of a modern individual's moral sentiment consisted of an informed 'concern' and spontaneous 'compassion' for others. This climate would motivate a blossoming of the individual's own inner capacities.

"The annihilation of caste" combines the analysis of "caste" with a meticulous study into its economic and sociological dimensions, and also with an enquiry into what Ambedkar saw as the ruinous effects of "caste" on the individual psyche. This he diagnosed as the root cause for the all-embracing paralysis that he saw in Indian society. Ambedkar did not simply believe in the individual but in her socialising and communicative needs and ambitions, and in the dynamics active between man's 'inner world' and the 'outer world'. Therefore, he saw the possibility to scientifically conceive of these interconnections, and to correct and guide behaviour which might not

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[6]) Although he nurtured a certain sympathy with Nietzsche's views.

be sound. Accordingly there should have been mutuality and freely unfolding dynamics in the growth of a healthy individual and society:

"Indifferentism is the worst kind of disease that can infect people. Why is the Hindu so indifferent? In my opinion this indifferentism is the result of Caste System which has made Sanghatan and co-operation even for a good cause impossible.
XII The assertion by the individual of his own opinion and beliefs, his own independence and interest as over against group standards, group authority and group interests is the beginning of all reform. But whether the reform will continue depends upon what scope the group affords for such individual assertion. If the group is tolerant and fair-minded in dealing with such individuals they will continue to assert and in the end succeed in converting their fellows. On the other hand if the group is intolerant and does not bother about the means it adopts to stifle such individuals they will perish and the reform will die out. [...] It is true that man cannot get on with his fellows. But it is also true that he cannot do without them. He would like to have the society of his fellows on his terms. If he cannot get it on his terms then he will be ready to have it on any other terms even amounting to complete surrender. This is because he cannot do without society. A caste is ever ready to take advantage of the helplessness of a man and insist upon complete conformity to its code in letter and in spirit. [...] XIII The effect of caste on the ethics of the Hindus is simply deplorable. Caste has killed public spirit. Caste has destroyed the sense of public charity. Caste has made public opinion impossible. A Hindu's public is his caste. His responsibility is only to his caste. His loyalty is restricted only to his caste. Virtue has become caste-ridden and morality has become caste-bound. There is no sympathy to the deserving. There is no appreciation of the meritorious. There is no charity to the needy. Suffering as such calls for no response. There is charity but it begins with the caste and ends with the caste. There is sympathy but not for men of other caste. Would a Hindu acknowledge and follow the leadership of a great and good man? The case of the Mahatma apart, the answer must be that he will follow a leader if he is a man of his caste [...] It is not a case of standing by virtue and not standing by vice. It is a case of standing or not standing by the caste." (Ambedkar 1979/ 1989a, 56-57)

Ambedkar could be countered by singling out cases of particular Hindus (like Phalke) who transgressed "caste" and acted in a creative and co-operative manner. However, what interests me here cannot be an enquiry into the validity of his theses - clearly influenced by behaviourist theories of those times - but an exploration of the essentials of Indian modernism. And I maintain that those core phenomena of modernity like 'identities', civil society/ public sphere, and (State) authority are crystallised in the discussions and social conflicts that are fought on the "caste" issue.

Ambedkar's main argument against "caste" as a social institution is that it hinders any *movement*, whether individual or social, psychological, or spiritual, or scientific.

The juncture of this diagnosis with Western discussions on modernity lies in the general idea(l) of '*movement*' that should rule in the social world and in the individual itself. 'Movement' is at the same time one of modernity's cherished ideologies attributing to the capitalist economy a note of a self-contained mechanism, and thus deleting the interests and goals of the capitalist mode of production. Its idealistic aspect is reflected in the demand for equal chances and more social mobility amongst the workforce - which had already been a slogan of the *Satyashodak Samaj*.

'Movement' in any form, of matter or of spirit, is according to the recent Western discourses on cinema, identities, and modern life (Charney and Schwartz 1995) central to Western conceptions of modernity at the beginning of the 20th century, and epitomized in the cinema as an experiential space of "moving images" (cf. Hansen 1991, also Williams 1989/ 1996, 107). A host of 'surface phenomena' of modern societies, like popular habits in the newly emerging spheres of consumption, were intrinsically linked to processes of the accelerated economic, political and cultural-sociological developments and their main motor, the productive forces unleashed by industrial capitalism. Most important, with reference to the public sphere of the cinema, was the spilling of 'mass production' into 'mass consumption'.
The 'spirit' of urbanity, the metropolis, was a recurrent signifier and theme in the world of letters, or of cinema. It stimulated a vivid public reflection in the print media, where freelancing intellectuals like Benjamin or Kracauer (cf. Hansen 1995) communicated their views and visions of modernity in the flourishing substantial 'feuilleton' of newspapers, or in the mushrooming magazines on art, philosophy, sociology, or psychology.

In the most recent analyses of the discourses on cinema and modernity around the turn of the 19th to the 20th century the texture made of the recurring technologies, signifiers, themes, symbols, myths ... which are reflected (on) in these - mostly European and American modernisms - are so tightly stitched into the fabric of 'the' Western societies, that one will first have to tear apart this patch-work in order to create some space for colonial modernisms like the Indian. However, if this 'Indian patch' would just be an *additional* one, it would create a wrong picture. Instead, one should be prepared to restart the whole weaving process with a new arrangement of the threads and colours used.

Consequently, I am beginning to tear apart the (Western) fabric of modernism and modernity which combines the colourful threads of the (Western) "rationalism" and "Enlightenment ethos" with the "progress in tech-

nology" and the releasing of "social" and "visual mobility", having, it seems, eliminated the emotional-moral dimension that I found to be so prominent in the public spheres of Indian making, from its own public life.

In the light of that rich scale which is constituted by Indian modernisms reaching from Gandhi's vision of the rule of Truth supreme, to Ambedkar's vision of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity in a society that has done away with "caste", I am suggesting to scan the current (1995) (Western) modernity discourses for the differences that they seem to have with the Indian ones. For, at least in our case of comparing 'Indian modernisms' and 'Western modernisms' on the plane of the public spaces/ spheres, one will find that the outward representation (i.e. the politics of nation) of the respective opposite Other (e.g. 'the rational' vs. 'the emotional-spiritual') will vanish to exist as a clearly demarcated entity. Because, inside of the nation (state), at crossroads (as it was the case in 1918), and in the circles of the organic intellectuals, one fought similar - imagined or real - paradoxical constellations, experienced similar anxieties and hopes, despite "caste" being a very particularly Indian daily life experience. However, the mental and emotional-moral *attitude* towards the social and the natural life that was caused by "caste" - according to Ambedkar a slavish leaning towards an abstract institution that removed the individual from her fellow being - will in the following be discussed as the modern 'public morality' and 'civic/ national sense'[7]. In a transformed and 'disguised' form, so my further argument goes, this 'public morality' in all modernising societies around 1900, eliminated from the hegemonic public sphere unmediated 'emotions' or individual morality uncontrolled by the dominant powers.

These dynamics of modern hegemonic *public morality* which tried to forge consensus, were as much active in 'the West' as they were in India. In order to work out the presence of the emotional-moral dimension in modernising Western societies, we will first look towards India again. I consider this a tried method to gain a deeper insight into the essence/ spirit of Western sociological phenomena.

While tearing the fabrics of the 'Western modernism' discourse, too stiff due to its self-centred weaving technique, one will 're-discover' "India" in "America", i.e. as an important dimension in the sphere of the discourses of modernity in the early 20th century. An "India" that actually marked a two-way flow of idea(l)s between the 'East' and the 'West' on the 'lost' emotional-spiritual dimension in human life. Expressed in Kracauer's words of

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[7]) I wish to highlight the active role that the subject is playing in the processes of formation of hegemonic consensus in a relatively free public sphere/ civil society.

1928, which I discovered through Hansen (1995), but which, in retrospect, appear as if they had somewhat been my secret motto throughout the work on this book:

"In an often-quoted passage of his semiautobiographical novel *Ginster*, Kracauer has the protagonist and his friend Otto debate questions of scientific methodology. While Otto proposes a method that emphasizes "secondary matters" (*Nebensachen*) and "hidden paths" (*Schleichwege*) so as to arrive at "scientifically cogent hypotheses", Ginster does not believe that the point is even to reconstruct an "original reality": "According to his theory, Columbus had to land in India; he discovered America. ... A hypothesis is valid only under the condition that it misses its intended goal, so as to reach another, unknown goal." The choice of example is no coincidence. The episode illustrates not only Kracauer's own approach to "reality" but also his peculiar engagement with "Amerika", with capitalist-industrial, mass-mediated modernity.
Kracauer's writings prior to the mid-1920s by and large participate in the period's culturally pessimistic discourse on modernity." (Hansen 1995, 368)

My theoretical-methodological outlook is not just that of a change in the standpoint of the researcher, though the flexibility to do so is one of its constitutive prerequisites.
By returning to Phalke's Indianness the design of how this discursive sociology of cinema can contribute to recollecting the dynamic heterogeneity of modernity will be completed. Its denotative features beyond a dualistic opposition of 'East' and 'West' will redeem the emotional-moral facets of modern lives as the "fragments of modernity".

The Indianness of Phalke's *cinesrishti* was fuzzy. It was in search of the individual, humane and honest man rejoicing at his familial and social relations, being a humble, devoted and loving servant to them. Its vision was that of a social and natural world where *satya* ruled. Phalke's *chalchitra mukhanatyakalaa* ('dramatic art of silent moving pictures') communicated in a restrained, and thus in a doubly 'silent' manner. In its content this new 'silent dramatic art of moving pictures' re-presented an interpretation of the Raja Harishchandra theme which drastically broke away from the prevailing iconography or main elements of views, of any enactment on stage. Due to its new visuality and montage it also broke away from narrative memories - all the more so, if these had (more or less explicitly) sided with the dominant Brahminic cause.
Phalke's film RAJA HARISCHANDRA, as well as his article series "*Bharatiya chitrapat*" were expressions of the strong desire to get close and embrace the Other, demolish *pardah*, i.e. all divisions prevalent between human beings, whether they have been established due to "caste", property, gender, "race", or due to collectively held ethics, or to individual morality. If at

all Phalke's "Indian moving pictures" were in consonance with politically focussed movements, it was so with the *Satyashodak Samaj* and the Servants of India Society.

In Bombay around 1900, it happened within the public sphere of the cinema, a space confined to the ruling élite and the colonial subjects, that RAJA HARISCHANDRA represented views and visions which show the colonial subject not just as the obvious bearer of any of the dominant national ideologies. Any standpoint like this proves unproductive in furnishing the complexity of the cognitive and the emotional-moral processes which made up for the dynamics of Phalke's early cinema juxtaposed to the larger context of the convulsions and the movements unleashed by the making of the manifold Indian histories of "modern life".

'Morality' with humanist features had not only been a prime constituent of the particular Indianness of Phalke's cinema but it had been lingering in the winds caused by the transformations going on in the psychological and collective identity constructions. And these realms, in which the Indian cultures of modernity unfolded, substantially overlapped with those in which the "Indian nation" was experientially imagined: in the modern theatre, in the world of art and of letters, and in the world of cinema.

Partha Chatterjee's paradigmatic *The Nation and its Fragments. Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (1994) has to be rethought for a second time. The study at hand provides strong confirmation of Chatterjee's argument that it was in the "inner" or the "spiritual domain" that the nationalist project(ions) came into their true *existence*. Understanding Phalke's cinema as what the political scientist termed the "inner" or the "spiritual domain", I argued that the spectator could, by the mediation of his visual sense, acquire an *experiential feeling* of the "imagined community": his/ her body was physically sharing this vision with the other viewers, he/ she could emotionally share or hide the tears or the laughter welling up, he/ she could morally share the overarching humanist spirit of Phalke's oeuvre. In short, the cinematic experience of whichever kind of Indianness could thus enter as one amongst a multiplicity of daily experiences of the 'modern life'.

What Chatterjee envisioned and himself qualified as the "new forms of the modern community [... and] of new forms of the modern state" (ibid., 112-13) which the historian might be able to extract from this kind of explorations of the "inner domain", could well be secured from the public sphere

of the early Indian cinema. Though occupied by colonial subjects, it was here that this remarkably radical dissensus emerged:

A *modern, democratic view* opposite to the ruling élite and their power that was stripped of any "caste" legitimisation. A view that also conceded to Vishwamitra, the sage his due right to protest and challenge political authority.

Phalke's film features Vishwamitra as the sage who, in the course of immersing himself in his *tapas*, has been unwittingly offended by Harishchandra. The sage re-acts. He feels extremely disturbed being prevented from continuing what the title card presents as the taming of "the three Powers". As it is the case with any of the other characters, Vishwamitra, too, is featuring a 'moody' individuality. And at the end of the film, he is the benevolent old man who heartily enjoys participating in the reunification of the family, himself behaving as if he were a member of this family. So intimate is his conduct. First he embraces Harishchandra, then the incoming Vasishtha and again the king. Finally he pats Rohit and carries the boy in his arms while going 'home'.

Views and visions, as well as the body language of RAJA HARISCHANDRA challenged "caste".

Chatterjee's "fragments" have therefore to be re-viewed and expanded by pushing its notion further into the inter-subjective "inner domains" of emotions, morality and psychology. Recognising this, it is not just the "inner domain", or the "spiritual", but more so the emotional-moral and psychological inner domains that define the base lines in the matrix that correlated kinds of Indianness to the Indian modernity between 1912 and 1918. One of these "fragments" was the cinema of RAJA HARISCHANDRA. Thus, to redeem the emotional-moral element of modernity is not to be equated with reasserting its set of values. It is rather to shed more light into the processes of constructing wrong dualisms which are part of the mythology of the dominant/ hegemonic modernity.

The complete theoretical design of recollecting the "fragments" and forming them into an alternative idea(l) of "community" and "the state" ruled by "the spiritual" (as suggested by Chatterjee), supplemented by "the emotional" and "the moral" (as suggested here) might still smack of Orientalism or Universalism. However, I am arguing that this is not so, but that here, in trying to scientifically deal with the emotional side of modernism, we are facing contradictions of which the root causes are an integral part of the history of knowledge production in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Concepts or idea(l)s like "the rational", "the emotional", etc. had, as it is well established by the contributions of Subaltern History and Cultural Studies as well as by Postcolonial and Postmodern Theories, been charged with ideological meanings which were heavily contested during the struggles for securing hegemony or dominance. Consequently, one can state that these idea(l)s led, at least, a twin-existence: being made into the ideological carriers of the respective dominant systems of production, state power and civil society, or having had their liberatory capacity for yielding materially better living conditions for the majority of the disowned and suppressed population.

'Rationality'/ 'morality', 'unity'/ 'equality', and 'truth'/ 'Truth' are idea(l)s that play a major role in the struggles which are under scrutiny in this book. Since the end of the 18th century they exercised a magic spell all around the world, were resounding as the slogans of social movements, and have been the driving forces behind manifold revolutions, from below and from above.

Phalke's vision to better what he saw as a society in moral crisis, was that it could solely be changed by a fundamental shift in the individually held and collectively shared moral sentiments, the final synthesis lying in the merger of individually cherished truth and the Truth of the cosmological order. The moral dimension of Phalke's worldview as a cine-artist, which he communicated through the cinema and his "*Bharatiya chitrapat*", also mirrored in a very practical sense the response of the person Dhundiraj Govind Phalke to the imperatives that resulted from the technology of the cinematograph, from his passion to master it and show "Indian images on the screen".

Seen in this light, I will again recount Phalke's moral imperatives: his pledge for co-operation in support of technical and social innovation (the cinema) that would foster the good of all, the abolition of individualistic motivations in the dedicated service to society, and the removal of all man-made *pardahs* in all spheres of private and public life, equality of all human beings (as it was already established in the cinema), adherence to truth and to Truth, the inclusive, respectful, compassionate and loving attitude towards the Other. A precondition of this as a practice and morality was his individual conscience of the normative rightness of actions and ideas valuing the individual as a human being with equal rights, and not as a servant to a transcendentally installed order, whether it was the *varna* system, the zeitgeist, or Truth. This was Phalke's kind of modern morality.

RAJA HARISCHANDRA of 1912/ 13 and of 1917, and also his KRISHNAJANMA (1918) reflect this dimension of a modern, practically focussed sense of

morality. Phalke's cinema between 1912-1918 was a public space and a public sphere which projected views and visions that have been taken note of by historians and scholars of the Cultural and Sociological studies only later, when these normative sets of values were made into political slogans of Bombay's social movements.

Satyagraha

Satyagraha in the 1920s became an immensely popular strategy of confronting the colonial state apparatus. Gandhi's theory and practice of *satyagraha* of South African fame, now exerted its influence on the Indians in India. As "non-violent resistance" it became that peculiar political weapon, which, in its mystified version of collective memorising, claims that it *moved* the ones who used physical violence by force of its high ethics and strong morality present in each of the *satyagrahis*. However, *satyagraha* became a common strategy in the different mass agitations under varying leadership, and with varying theory and practice.

What could *satya* as a moral principle have meant in these days? What was the relation between *satyagraha* as a means in a political struggle that was striving for achieving a certain goal, and *satya*?

In order to assess the multiple meanings that 'morality' assumed in the modernity discourses just after World War I, I am referring to one of Ambedkar's most fascinating multilevel critiques of Western and Eastern sociological, economic and moralistic (philosophical) thoughts. It is employed as a foil to organise my arguments on the ambiguity and the tensions inherent to idea(l)s and visions on the 'good life' and the 'better society' in those days, particularly at times of an inter-nationally sensed overwhelming crisis like the World War, when Indian colonial subjects like the 'Mahatma' or Tagore were in 'high demand' to enlighten 'the West' about the futility of excess "materialism" and lack of "spiritualism".

In 1918, Ambedkar (1989a, 483-492) joined international discourses spurred by Bertrand Russell's *Principles of Social Reconstruction* of 1917, and wrote a review "Mr. Russell and the Reconstruction of Society" (in: *Journal of the Indian Economic Society*, Vol. I). With his inquisitive knowledge of the daily life in the United States and England, of the politics and of the Western world of letters, of the classical and the modern thought (he is quoting Nietzsche several times), he achieved a most appealing and thought provoking polemic against the most fashionable views of the apos-

tles of public morality in 'the East' (in favour of Brahminic Hinduism) and those of 'the West' (in favour of a plain anti-materialism).

In the beginning it is highlighted that Russell's "Reconstruction of society" was an anti-war book, a response to the shocking experience of World War I. Ambedkar goes into the particularities of Russell's diagnosis of the root causes of the war which, as we know, was an appeal to reconstruct society on the basis of a founded knowledge in psychology of man, and a novel ethics of sentiments ("a positive life of impulses and passions"). Rethinking Russell's standpoint Ambedkar maintained:

"Wars, he believes, cannot be banished by rationalistic appeals such as above. "It is not by reason alone" he says "that wars can be prevented by a positive life of impulses and passions antagonistic to those that lead to war. It is the life of impulse that needs to be changed, not only the life of conscious thought" [relating to Russell's leanings towards the contemporary behaviouristic psychology Ambedkar recounts the implications of these novel studies on the understanding of human action ...]. It has overthrown the doctrine that external circumstances are responsible for man's activity. If it were so, contends the behaviourist, it would presuppose a quiescent being which is a biological untruth. Man, it propounds, has the springs of action within him for he is born with certain tendencies to act. External circumstances do not induce activity. They only re-direct it." (Ambedkar 1989a, 483-484)

From the standpoint of the multiple suppression that the "untouchables" faced, Ambedkar felt the need for a theory of "caste" which would first profoundly scrutinise the factors, constellations and interconnections that caused this complex, yet historically 'dead' institution - dead also in terms of the fixed mind-set, and the absence of com-passion present in the "caste" Hindu - before visualising the 'good life' and the 'better society'.

Of particular interest to Ambedkar were two of Russell's ideas. The first one is that a society/ nation required *movement, action, passions*, which all merge in Russell's "*impulse*", to make any social and natural life progress. The second is conflict, in Russell's words: "conflict, provided it is not destructive and brutal [...]". These are discussed by Ambedkar as to their implications for the political practice, particularly when the question arose whether or not to "use force" to achieve one's ends. Ambedkar strongly opined that one cannot cast general judgements, but that one can decide only in the respective moment of action. However, he considered it to be essential that any objective in a society that was followed up by means of force, the whole context had to be made transparent, and should be justified. These passages are meant by Ambedkar as a special contribution from his side to balance and to correct possible misconceptions of Russell, par-

ticularly by Indians who might be followers of the [Gandhian] "doctrine of non-resistance" (Ambedkar 1979/ 1989a, 486).

This is the starting point for Ambedkar's critical discussion on "the Indian view of life", asking whether it was "a practicable view". What follows is a greatly informed and very reflective polemic against the nationalist attitude dominating in India at that time which was "justifying everything Indian". With reference to tendencies which Ambedkar found as widespread reactions by Indians in assessing the causes of the 'European war', namely that it was "the extreme materialism of the West leading to war and devastation", he continues "[t]here is however no justification for getting the West in such a cruel contrast. The East is too prone to forget that materialist we are; even the East in spite of itself" (ibid., 486-487), Ambedkar allowed no easy escape, neither to the self-stylised 'non-violent East', nor to Russell, the pacifist:

"Thus, surprising as it may be, the pacifist Mr. Russell thinks even war as an activity leading to the growth of the individual and condemns it only because it results in death and destruction. He would welcome milder forms of war for according to him, "Every man needs some kind of contest, some sense of resistance overcome, in order to feel that he is exercising his faculties", in other words to feel that he is growing" (ibid., 487).

Ambedkar took great care to found his piercing criticism on Russell's analysis of the material and the mental effects of "private property" in "industrialism". Yet, Ambedkar exposed Russell's plain anti-materialism as the gospel of the "haves":

"It would be unjust to pass over silently a most fundamental notion that pervades the whole outlook of Mr. Russell. He says that "men's impulses and desires may be divided into those that are creative and those that are possessive. Some of our activities are directed to creating what would not otherwise exist, others towards acquiring or retaining what exists already. The best life is that in which creative impulses play the largest part and possessive impulses the smallest. Is it possible so to divide the impulses? Is there such a thing as an impulse to appropriate? It is beyond the scope of this review to discuss this large question. I simply intend to raise a query because I feel, that by making the distinction as one of instinct, Mr. Russell is not on safe ground. Every impulse if uninhibited, will lead to some creative act. Whether the product will be appropriated or not is a matter wholly different from any act of impulse or instinct. It depends, I submit, upon the method of its production - whether individualistic or otherwise - and upon the nature of its use - whether communal or otherwise. No one sets up a right of appropriation to anything that is produced by common efforts nor to anything that is of joint use. [... the latter illustrated with the natural conduct in a family ...] It is therefore, just a question of production and use and not of impulse that a thing is appropriated. Thus the creative and the possessive are on different levels and the methods of augmenting the

former as of diminishing the latter are bound to be different. The more of one will not ensure the less of the latter.

With this we must close the review of Mr. Russell's book. There is much in it that can be laid at the foundation of the future reconstruction of Society. Mr. Russell deserves full credit for having emphasized the psychic basis of social life. Social reconstruction depends upon the right understanding of the relation of the individual to society - a problem which had eluded the grasp of many sociologists. Mr. Russell's conception of the relation - as being of impulse to institution is, beyond doubt the truest. However, to understand this and many other problems the book touches I will strongly recommend the reader to go to the original. I have confined myself to putting Mr. Russell in his right place where I thought he was likely to be misunderstood and to guarding his uncritical readers against certain misconceptions that may pass off unnoticed. In both cases I have attempted to do my duty to Mr. Russell and to his reader"(ibid., 491-492).

Ambedkar was particularly sharp in his critique of what he saw as Russell's ambiguous morality of the "haves" because it served the hegemonic mystification of the political-economic forces that produced tangible poverty and deprivation. With reference to its basic structure this myth operated in a manner similar to what Ambedkar opposed in the 'Mahatma's' political message. It manipulated by means of a wrong abstraction the acts of the "haves", respectively those in power, into a de-politicised and moralising idea of 'the' "impulses and desires" of 'man'. A consequence inherent to this manipulated worldview, which is at the core of the crusade of the modern apostles of public morality against their conception of the 'dangerous' "impulses and desires" of man/ woman being fostered by cinema, is to 'educate' and discipline the common 'man/ woman' into the proper moral conduct. The moral scolding of these modern critiques allowed those in power, their deeds, motivations and vested interests, an easy escape from responsibility and practical consequences.

Another trait in the modern moralists' perspective exposed by Ambedkar was the patronising attitude which resulted from that anti-materialist morality of the "haves". The 'Mahatma's' *naming* of the *dalits* as the "children of God" was to sanction their social existence in inequality and poverty. In his reply to the 'Mahatma's' positive picture of the role that the saints allegedly played in giving greater recognition to the "untouchables" Ambedkar formulates the same critique in a more pointed way:

"And even the saint Eknath who now figures in the film "Dharmatma" [a popular Prabhat production] as a hero for having shown courage to touch the untouchables and dine with them, did so not because he was opposed to Caste and Untouchability but because he felt that the pollution caused thereby could be washed away by a bath in the sacred waters of the river Ganges. The saints have never according to my study carried on a campaign against Caste and Untouchability. They were not concerned with the struggle

between men. They were concerned with the relation between **man and God**. They did not preach that all men were equal. They preached that all men were **equal in the eyes of God** - a very different and a very innocuous proposition which nobody can find difficult to preach or dangerous to believe in. [...] But nonetheless anyone who relies on an attempt to turn the members of the caste Hindus into better men by improving their **personal character** is in my judgment wasting his energy and hugging an illusion. [...] As a matter of fact, a Hindu does treat all those who are not of his Caste as though they were aliens, who could be discriminated against with impunity and against whom any fraud or trick may be practised without shame. *This is to say that there can be a better or a worse Hindu. But a good Hindu there cannot be*. This is so not because there is anything wrong with his personal character. In fact what is wrong is the entire basis of his relationship to his fellows. The best of men cannot be **moral** if the basis of relationship between them and their fellows is fundamentally a wrong relationship. To a slave his master may be better or worse. But there cannot be a good master. A good man cannot be a master and a master cannot be a good man. The same applies to the relationship between high caste and low caste." (Ambedkar 1979/ 1989a, 87-89, bold letters B. S.)

Ambedkar felt inspired by the Behaviourists and the American philosopher's views on the *mobility* of the individual psyche (and thus the potential to positively influence it). The idea of 'cultural-sociological kinetics' that made a society mobile, fascinated Ambedkar, though it did not result in his uncritical admiration of anything "American".
However, his ventures into objectifying what he understood as the objective 'laws' that '*move*' modern societies and individuals, by means of an inter-cultural comparison, inspired his comprehensive inspection of the social and ideological foundations of social life in India, and can also be traced in "The annihilation of caste" written 18 years later.
'(Social) mobility', 'morality', 'individuality', 'e-motion(s)' and 'passion(s)'/ 'desire(s)' - being of centrality to the Indian as well as the 'Western' modernisms - shall, for getting a clearer picture of the meanings that were attached to them, be pursued further in the subtly intertwined modern public spaces/ sphere(s) of 'the street' and 'the cinema' (cf. Frisby 1985 on Kracauer, 109-186).

The inter-cultural perspective will once again provide the means to deeper insight into the vital role that the cinema as a public space and a public sphere played in modernity and in its discourses around 1900. Particularly 1910-20 that saw the paradigmatic transformation of the institutionalised ethical and moral control of society by Church into the *individual conscience* of 'the modern citizen' took full shape in the cinema. It mutated into an agency of facilitating and manipulating what had been identified as (potentially) 'maverick' emotions/ moral sentiments into those which 'conform' to modernity's requirements. During the crucial years 1912-1918, this development got inscribed into the cinema's own characteristic transforma-

tion into 'the' popular medium of the 20th century which started its 'second life' by catering to bourgeois or middle-class values (Hiley 1993b, Schlüpmann 1996).

The modern 'emotions' and 'individual morality' coupling with the modern collective/ public had to 'learn' how to restrict their expression to the private sphere, primarily to the family.
If sentiments were expressed in the public sphere, it had to be either in negotiation with the hegemonic public morality, or through the officially encouraged national sentiments, or through the expanding consumerism in which they were on demand as "desires" or "pleasures" (cf. Charney and Schwartz 1995).

My approach will leave behind the paralysis resulting from imagining 'Eastern emotionalism/ spiritualism' on the one side, and 'Western rationalism' on the other as the two exclusive opposites[8]. Instead, I am arguing that 'emotion/ morality' in European and US-American societies were well establishing an influential space for negotiating modernity, yet in a mimicry form. And that the dynamics behind this mutation - the modern 'civil spirit' or 'civil sense' (coupled with bourgeois and middle-class interests) - was well active in Indian societies. Here it is particularly useful to follow up Gandhi's notion of 'emotion/ violence', 'individual', and 'morality', and the respective roles he ascribed to them in civil society.

Disciplining 'anarchic movements/ emotions' into State- and Market-, or Truth-conform 'desires'

Social movement(s) in political society with the proclaimed objective to intervene into the established order of commanding the labour input, the institution of private property, or the market system of the distribution of commodified goods, have, since the formation of capitalism, always been at odds with the institutions of power that guarded the established order: the State, the propertied classes, and the Church.

Any novel occurrence of an institution that exercised influence or control of the values that set the standard of what was normatively right, particularly in the newly emerging public spheres, was in these secularising times

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[8]) Whether these are understood as results of ideological construction, or of a habitual adjustment in the day-to-day life does not matter here.

a direct competitor to the traditionally monopolistic position of the Church. It was well aware of this.

The major North-American and European film trade magazines, like for instance, the US-based *Moving Picture News*, or the German *Der Kinematograph*, furnish rich source materials to find evidence for the moral discourses on the cinema's transformation into a 'suitable' medium of *national* entertainment between 1910-1918. In the preceding Act IV I highlighted the cinema's role in the process of inter-nationalising bourgeois views and visions of the idea of a 'world culture'. In the US one attributed the power to the cinema to convey a homogeneous "American spirit", and thus kindle the immigrant "masses" of multiethnic background. Yet, the formation of a truly "American" cinema was not just an educational campaign that deliberately focussed on those to whom "America" in terms of daily life experience was as 'alien' as they appeared to "Americans".

The "Americanization" of 'American cinema' was a 'nationalist endeavour' with multi-level effects within the context of the making of 'the' modern American citizen. Though it was somewhat initiated by the 'chaotic' dynamics of the nickelodeons which mushroomed and attracted according to the *New York Times* (3. 1. 1909) "weekly [...] perhaps half the population of the United States" (cited in: Abel 1995, 202). This provoked high flying discussions among the moralist reformers. They were asking what the 'American values' could be like to render "American culture" unique and to truly transcend the aggregate of the varied immigrants' cultures. The question of a national particularity became more pressing vis-à-vis the European nation states vociferously asserting their nationalist images:

"How would that [American] identity be differentiated from others in an era of heightened nationalism, and how would those without full citizenship - specifically immigrants, women, and children - best be trained to take up that identity and become proper social subjects within an "American" culture?" (Abel 1995, 202)

In his insightful "The Perils of Pathé, or the Americanization of Early American Cinema" Abel (1995) stresses that the 'Americanization' occurred during the industrialisation of cinema, a phase which began in the first decade of the 20th century. Then the emergence of a monopolist, internationally active film production firm like the French Pathé on the one hand, and on the other the immense demand for "movie" entertainment, triggered off what Abel summarises as a subtle interweaving of the economics of capitalism with "the development of 'modern consumer society', and what Homi Bhabha has called 'the ideological ambivalence' of the 'nation-space'" (ibid., 183). It so happened that at the intersection of modernity, national identity and cinema and not only in the case of the formation of the

"American national character" "[Pathé's] 'foreign' films provided one of the principal 'others' against which to construct an 'American' difference" (ibid., 203)

The Church(es) in the USA which were always pragmatic about how to secure their space in the field of an ethical discourse that was superimposed by the American prime credo into the freedom spelled out by market capitalism, started to make use of the cinematograph as soon as their disputes over the potentially heretic qualities of the photographic moving pictures (cf. Act 4 with reference to Passion films) had been resolved.

Numerous articles in the *Moving Picture News*, stressed that this moral edification via the cinematograph was considered to be especially effective amongst the poor (MPN, 22. 4. 1911). Rev. Zed. H. Copp from Washington D. C. reported thus under the headline "Turning Moving Picture Theatres into Churches":

"At the same time I realized [...] that these people must be approached in religion through some common avenue [...] They must be amused as well as instructed. So I hit upon the moving picture with its universal language of action [...] Do not the masses enjoy these exhibitions [...]? Why should religion bar that which best impresses and instructs?" (*Moving Picture News* 6. 1. 1912)

However, modernity favoured another 'moral institution' over the Church: the individual's moral sentiment. The ideal was that questions of public ethics and morality should henceforth be organised and controlled in a manner 'de-institutionalised'. What the usual moral consciousness of the modern individual had to acquire was the competence to be negotiable with what was established as the collective 'rightness'. This 'civil sense' or 'civil spirit' formed within an atmosphere that perceived its formation as one of the prime virtues of the modern citizen of democratic capitalist societies. It took the historical forms of 'national consciousness/ identity', or the will and preparedness for 'nation building'.

With regard to spectatorship and the quality of the spectator's 'moral' involvement of cinema, the new film history stresses that the nickelodeon in the US, the "Ladenkino" in Germany, or the Music Hall in England, had been those spheres that catered mainly to the proletarian class (Hiley 1993b, 1995), to women (Schlüpmann 1990 and 1996, Hansen 1991), and to anyone just 'passing by' with the lust to *see*. A common feature in terms of the economic and practical organisation of the cine-event was its 'openness' to the needs of the individual visitor who was free to step in at any time, mix with the crowd, sigh, laugh along with them, or wipe away the

tears unseen by others, and leave according to convenience. The varying items of short duration further enhanced this experience of senses and imagination unfettered. Views could be had for just some pennies, and the voyage around the world started off: the Eiffel Tower, the Tower of London, the Taj Mahal. In the "runaway hit slapsticks" a taste could be had of any absurdity woman/ man could face when the world of matter conspired against her/ him.

There was an atmosphere of excitement. Referring to the historical sources quoted by May (1980/ 1983, 38-39), and his point that there were these "captivating qualities" of the movies, one has to add that these 'excitements' also supplied the alienating tendencies of the monotony of the social and professional life with a certain stability. "What was 'seen and heard there [in the cinema] becomes their [the youth's] sole topic of conversation, forming the ground pattern of their social life'" (ibid., 38)

But also this freedom - being a supportive component of the capitalist project -was two-edged: it could incite a 'deviance' on the sensory-emotional and moral plane that was difficult to control, or, as it is usually happening, it was functional in supporting the people's subsistence and their further wilful submission to what was imagined to be the society's callings in accord with the individual's own aspirations.

From the standpoint of the moralists of the modern nation/ civil society this freedom of the cinema could not be left to itself. What contemporary film makers and spectators, each in her/ his specific way, celebrated as the liberating views and visions of *immediacy* - between the individual as a human, a social-cultural and a moral being, and her natural and social environment -, as the democratic flavour, or even as the anarchic tendencies of the cinema (cf. May 19807 1983, 36-42), was a state of the art in the medium which the modern moralists wished to influence in favour of their visions of modernity.

Phalke was one of the idealists of the democratic spirit of the cinema where one could freely, and in accordance with one's limited leisure time comfort oneself and the dear ones amongst an unassumingly mixing crowd:

"[...] the dramatists of today created the art of the motion pictures, which does not require any literary text at all, and can be understood easily even by children. Thus, in a sense, the exponents of the film art have done a great social service. All the differences of the caste, language, race have disappeared. All people, Hindus, Muslims, Parsees, Chinese or Japanese are gathering together in the cinema houses. The parda [sic] of ladies has disappeared. Men and women have equal rights on the seats in cinema theatres. Formerly, a person had to put his children to bed and then stealthily go to see a play.

Now, the situation is changed. The cinema has become a means of shorter entertainment for the entire family, which can enjoy it without sitting up late till early morning" (Phalke 1970C, 97-98)

The Indian film pioneer held the view that the cinema's innermost strength was the creation of a space for people to get together. In front of the screen they could equally experience, by means of the film's photography the perfect reproduction of the essential beauty of the world. Inherent to this he saw the possibility of the realisation of 'tTruth' and the initiation of a process of Self-realisation in the spectator. However, the spectator's pleasure was, according to Phalke, the prime mission of the "moving images". The Indian film pioneer's focus was the Self, the self who was 'embraced' by fellow beings, longing to 'lose' it-Self in the other(s) to attain a state of more truthful and pleasurable being.

The late Kracauer, in the preface to his *Theory of film* (1960), reminisced the spell that his first cine-experience ignited in him, and never left him. Experiences of the reflection of the world in the "moving photographic images", and of the Self which realised by means of the reflecting images the essentials of human existence: who am I in and vis-à-vis this world?

"[assuming that cinema retains major characteristics of photography ...] All this means that films cling to the surface of things. They even seem to be the more cinematic, the less they focus directly on inward life, ideology, and spiritual concerns. This explains why many people with strong cultural leanings scorn the cinema. they are afraid lest its undeniable penchant for externals might tempt us to neglect our highest aspirations in the kaleidoscopic sights of ephemeral outward appearances [...] Plausible as this verdict sounds it strikes me as unhistorical and superficial because it fails to do justice to the human condition in our time. Perhaps our condition is such that we cannot gain access to the elusive essentials of life unless we assimilate the seemingly non-essential? Perhaps the way today leads from, and through, the corporeal to the spiritual? And perhaps the cinema helps us to move from "below" to "above"? [...] I was still a young boy when I saw my first film. The impression it made upon me must have been intoxicating, for I there and then determined to commit my experience to writing. To the best of my recollection, this was my earliest literary project. Whether it ever materialized, I have forgotten. But I have not forgotten its long-winded title, which, back home from the moviehouse, I immediately put on a shred of paper. Film as the *Discoverer of the Marvels of Everyday Life*, the title read. And I remember, as if it were today, the marvels themselves. What thrilled me so deeply was an ordinary suburban street, filled with the lights and shadows which transfigured it. Several trees stood about, and there was in the foreground a puddle reflecting invisible house facades and a piece of the sky. Then a breeze moved the shadows, and the facades with the sky below began to waver. The trembling upper world in the dirty puddle - this image has never left me" (Kracauer 1969/ 1997, l-li).

According to views like these this medium engendered what Kracauer (and also Benjamin) discussed as the mimetic potential of cinema. However, here it is always truth, the 'what of things' and not Truth with a capital 'T' which was the focus of existence, and therefore that of the cinema which was likened to 'life itself'. Yet, cinema as a signifier of 'life' did not just result from its reproductive quality.

Particularly in Kracauer's perspective film was at the same time recording as it was rendering a strangeness to 'reality'. And thereby the Self-estrangement in this world could be revealed, its whole *meaning*-less emptiness (Hansen 1997, xxiv-xxv). Yet, it is here, in the cinema proper, that the alienated 'I' can regain its individuality while 'losing' itself in the act of 'gazing' at the film, i.e. fusing with 'the world', 'things' and 'beings' indiscriminately.

As Hansen put it in her introduction to Kracauer's *Theory of Film ...* which is more than professionally guiding the reader into Kracauer's absorbing world of cinema but it is a graphic reconfiguration of the relevance of Kracauer's *Theory of Film ...* at the beginning of the 21st century:

"the psychoperceptual process that Kracauer is concerned with is not one of identification with individual characters and the narrating gaze of the camera but, in a different conscious or subconscious register, a form of mimetic identification that pulls the viewer into the film and dissociates rather than integrates the spectatorial self. "In the theater I am always I," Kracauer quotes an anonymous French woman saying, "but in the cinema I dissolve into all things and beings." By the same token, this state of self-abandonment and dissociation becomes the condition of a perceptual movement in the opposite direction, away from the films, when a material detail assumes life of its own and triggers the viewer associations, "memories of the senses" and "cataracts of intrinsic fantasies and inchoate thoughts" that return the "absentee dreamer" to forgotten layers of the self [...] Film viewing thus not only requires a "mobile self" as Kracauer says of the historian's "job of sightseeing", but it also provides a framework for mobilizing the self" (Hansen 1997, xxviii).

In the realm of cinema the basic movements of modernity itself got reproduced. Thus, the individual's contested morality and the re-focussing of the public attention on the question of its 'compatibility' to the newly defined moral codes of the public sphere led away from the individual self to the abstract national self, or the economically defined self. These movements which took place in the cinema and in 'reality', i.e. in the interconnected politico-economic sphere and in the sphere of civil society, reciprocally illuminate one another. The discussion on the shift in cinema which I am highlighting in terms of a phenomenology of the contemporary experiential view points on the social/ national existence of the individual self, is of

central importance to the understanding of the aggressive and exclusive type of nationalism that developed from those days onwards and progressed into scales of homicide and destruction hardly imaginable.

Vis-à-vis the dissenting views of Ambedkar, Phalke and Kracauer on the individual Self that was lost but could and should be redeemed and thus could fulfil its own true being in a tight alliance with the 'fellow', it might be worth a deeper reflection why the dominant/ hegemonic modernity of the 20th century is re-presented in the idiom of self-realisation of the Individual. An important question at which I am pointing, but will not be able to tackle here.

Nation-oriented "passions", or Truth-oriented 'e-motionlessness'

In the beginning of 1900, when in the modern public spheres those 'emotions' and that kind of 'morality' of the individual self and its spontaneous associations with fellows of its choice (in love, friendship etc.) were profoundly transformed and re-located, contemporaries were wrestling with these convulsions. When a particular type of social reformers and moralists 'faded out' the individual Self and focussed on the abstract like 'nation', this submission was quite demanding. It encompassed the physical, mental, psychic, and emotional destruction of immediacy of the individual self towards her social and natural surroundings.

These modern virtues played a major role though in mobilising the *sacrificial spirit* of millions of European subjects to 'die for the mother-/ fatherland' in the battles that were fought during World War I. Nationalism, this new kind of a motivational sentiment that was strong enough to spur the individual to fight and kill the Other, an 'other' with whom she had no personal conflict, whom she did not even know. Founded on the 'community' imagined, this was the surrender of the individual's life to that idea(l). "[F]reedom[,] and the power to exercise the will" are the prerequisites of modern nationalism, as much as they are those of "building the society" (cf. with reference to Gandhi's concept of 'individual', Nizar 1998, 21).

Habermas's view on the essentially and universally liberating qualities of the bourgeois public sphere which, in his opinion, was the ideal location to communicate a "merely formal ethics of rationality" (cf. Taylor's criticism which I am partially adapting here, Taylor 1986/ 1991, 29-30), found it was 'degenerating' under the influence of the system of an unleashed industrial

mass-production. What I am suggesting in accordance with Taylor's critique of Habermas's reductive understanding of the ethical dimension and modern identity within the *Theory of Communicative Action*, is, to apply the concept of a "substantialist ethics" in lieu of Habermas's "procedural ethics" (31) in analyses of modernism. Doing this would enable us to theorise the emotional-moral tensions as an elementary concomitant of modernity. The qualitative differences in the points of view of the modernisms involved are becoming more transparent, particularly if one is focussing on a recollection and re-evaluation of the "fragments" of consensus building, i.e. the dissenting views and feelings.

What Frisby (1985) had worked out in such a refinement on German modernism around 1900, present in the works of Georg Simmel, Siegfried Kracauer and Walter Benjamin, was titled *Fragments of Modernity, theories of modernity in the work of Simmel, Kracauer and Benjamin*. The title of this book picked up an aphorism by Benjamin who likened Kracauer's meticulous studies on modern life(s) as to that of a "rag-picker":

"a loner. A discontent, not a leader [...] A rag-picker early in the dawn, who with his stick spikes the snatches of speeches and scraps of conversation in order to throw them into his cart, sullenly and obstinately, a little tipsy, but not without now and then scornfully letting one or other of these discarded cotton rags - 'humanity', 'inwardness', 'depth' - flutter in the morning breeze. A rag-picker, early - in the dawn of the day of the revolution" (Walter Benjamin on Siegfried Kracauer as quoted in Frisby 1985, 109).

Kracauer voiced his discontent in his numerous articles for the *Frankfurter Zeitung* on a most varied range of themes. What they had in common was their unabated focus on the movements in the day-to-day lives of the lower and middle strata of society. His sympathies for those at the receiving end of modernity included the 'modern individual' and her generally 'suffering soul'. Yet, his piercing and painstaking analyses were not meant to mollify her but to instigate her to end this modern ordeal.

The early Kracauer was similar to Phalke regarding their respective perception of the world and of the potential of photography to capture the world's 'essential beauty' by focussing on its 'surface phenomena'.
In their bordering upon the spiritual quests of human beings to 'embrace' the 'fellow', the 'nature', the other who might have been 'othered' by the dominant mechanism of alienation, it were indeed Ambedkar, Kracauer and Phalke who shared the longing for the elimination of the painfully experienced alienation, may it have been conceived as *pardah*, as "caste" or as

the subordination of the human being to an abstract "caste" like the modern nation (state).

In 1915, a time when public opinion in Germany was indulging in nationalist passions and war euphoria, focussing one's "love" on the "Fatherland" appeared to be rather questionable to Kracauer who had just completed his doctoral dissertation in architecture. Frisby (1985) relates this dissensus of the young Kracauer to his later preoccupation with "the painful experience of the sensitive outsider, the nervous inwardness of Simmel's 'stranger'" (112), who, though presented in an analytical language, had autobiographical features:

"Kracauer's first known publication is an article entitled 'On the Experience of War' (1915). Here, in the context of an essay ostensibly devoted to explaining the meaning of the feeling 'love of the Fatherland', Kracauer already announced some themes that concerned him both during and after the war. As in this and other wartime works, Kracauer is preoccupied with the consequences of the growth of a material civilization emptied of meaning and the increasingly problematic individual whose inner core or essence remains either lost or unfulfilled. In a manner reminiscent of Simmel's wartime writings, with their emphasis on the tragic separation of an objective material culture from an unrealized subjective culture of the individual, Kracauer outlines the nature of this debilitating separation" (ibid., 111-112, bold letters by B. S.).

The search here was one for the individual's 'inner world' to be filled with "meaning" which was not to be found in capitalist-bourgeois society and imperial nation (state). The individual, and her empirical 'culture' led a separate existence. The goals of the society/ state on the one side, and the individual on the other, never met, and were actually detrimental to each other. The early Kracauer saw himself and the majority of Germans not as the enthusiastic agents of history, nor of society, but as removed from their *own* history and society.

His portrayal of the state of the art of 'Western' modernity resembles in content and in the anger that he is nourishing, Ambedkar's appeal for "The annihilation of caste". However, had the leader of the *dalit* movement pinned his hopes on 'science' and 'knowledge' as being instrumental to overcome the encompassing violence of "caste", 'science' appeared as detrimental to the cause of liberation seen from the Berlin perspective.

In metropolitan Berlin Kracauer was longing for "[a]ction, powerful intervention" instead of accumulating "knowledge" which he saw as 'infected' by capitalism and a science that could not have been 'neutral' (ibid., 113). Its mechanisms strove for the "money value" only, for "the endowment of similarity and devaluation of the most diverse things", and ended in per-

ceiving anything according to its "utilisability" with "a deep indifference to the **'what'** of things" (ibid., 113, bold letters mine). This phenomenon spilled into the social existence.

Here 'movement' and modern 'science' acquired a destructive nature - which also remarkably differed with the notions held by Russell. Kracauer did not give up his standpoint which focussed on the individual, the quality of her 'inner life' as against the forces that reduced any quality into quantity and functionality, and made "movement" into an end in itself. He strongly maintained that this was an existential crisis of the individual which could not be resolved within the system. Frisby summarises:

"the feelings and values of the individual can no longer be integrated into the social functions that are available. The modern individual, in his or her inner core at least, remains isolated. The only values that can be striven for are those of a lost humanity. But they can only exist in this objectified world as private residues (such as friendship). Such relics have nothing in common with that individualism which is compatible with capitalist strivings: 'the self-adjustment to the rigid reality and the superior totality has its counterpart in an unbounded, arbitrary individualism.' **What is totally absent, and what Kracauer calls for, is a form of association based on community. This longing for community, for friendship, for the fulfilment of inner life, for the realization of the individual personality all remain longings that cannot be realized**" (Frisby 1984, 114-115, bold letters by B. S.).

Kracauer's radical perspective denied any coherence to the material as well as to the cognitive and 'inner' worlds. "Only its individual fragments remain" (ibid. 115). This brought him very close to Simmel's methodological rejection "of abstract conceptualizations as the starting point for his analysis of reality" (ibid., 118), his sympathy with phenomenological procedures in sociology, and his aversion to the dissolution of the particular individual features in abstraction, which equally opposed the abstraction 'the Fatherland' as it opposed a sociology that would participate in the destructive project of 'fragmentation'. His idea(l) of a sociology was that of

"a phenomenology of 'intentional existence and events'. Sociology must give up its claim to universal and causally necessary knowledge of reality, since, for Kracauer, this is only possible 'in an epoch filled with meaning'. [...] Sociology's role, for Kracauer, is a limited one. It is concerned with the 'intentional life manifestations of sociated human beings'. Its goal is the 'mastery of the immediately experienced social reality of life'. This cannot be achieved by abstract conceptualization. Rather, the starting point must be the object itself, whose empirical diversity provides no enclosed system of concepts." (Frisby 1985, 120).

If Kracauer's, Phalke's and Ambedkar's "fragments of modernity" are understood as a "Befindlichkeit"[9] prevailing within a modernity that spanned from Bombay to Berlin, one can well imagine why the bourgeois, the middle-classes and the upper "castes" felt haunted by those 'spectres' which now - different from the situation preceding Marx's *Communist Manifest* in the heart of Europe - were well released from amongst their midst, in a range from 'East' to 'West', the cinematograph being one of the mediators of the possibility of sudden disruption of the dominant/ hegemonic consensus.

Afterthoughts on the Bombay "masses" inspired by Gandhi: 'Othering' "the crowd" in the name of Truth

In the 1920s, a crucial decade for the emerging *Dalit* movement in the Bombay Presidency, Ambedkar focussed their policy on the accessibility of public places, and on spreading the message of self-respect (Omvedt 1994, 139-160). An important feature in this first phase of consolidating the movement in the urban areas was to find others ready for co-operation. In Bombay links were established with the non-*Brahmin* movement and with the organising working class.

A culmination in the public assertion of the *dalits*' "right to live as full human beings" was the Mahad *satyagraha* of 1927. An agitation like this, for the free access to water tanks and wells, was of immediate importance to the individual *dalit*. It had to be planned and organised in such a manner that it procured its effects on the material, political and ideological levels. To quench the material *want* of water of the dispossessed was a prime goal. Yet, any of these immediate objectives was inseparably linked to the gen-

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[9]) It is "*Befindlichkeit*" of a society as expressed in Kracauer's *The Mass Ornament* of 1927 (1975). Here, he most clearly highlighted his interest in the "inconspicuous surface manifestations" rather than picking up the judgements which an epoch held upon itself. What "*Be-find-lich-keit*" delineates is a more fuzzy locatedness in space and time of matter, a collective, or an individual, as well as within these latter bodies (attaining to physical health but also to psychological balance). Etymologically centred around the verb "*finden*", 'to find' (double meaning inclusive of 'to assess', to express your opinion which is accepted as not being substantial or founded on actual knowledge, thus in daily use very close to more diffuse statements like 'I have a feeling that ...'). The noun *Befindlichkeit* is also used in this latter sense of 'where do you place yourself?' In a private letter in which David Frisby extended his help to my problems in translating "*Befindlichkeit*" into English, he suggested the "situating of society" extending the meaning to its "decipherability" and "opacity". In order not to lose this kaleidoscopic set of meanings which I just outlined I will be using the original German "*Befindlichkeit*".

eral assertion of one's human rights. The bodily presence at the side of the tank, or the well, on the street, or in the temple, was a 'statement' with far-reaching repercussions on the psyche of the suppressed, as well as on those who adhered to the view of separation, or to the idea that natural and social resources could not be commonly used. Seen from this "caste"-perspective, the *individual*, her want or need, was never the starting point for any deliberations on the general organisation of the social and economic life. "Caste" is inherently anti-'individual' and anti-material (in terms of the individually felt need). The individual cannot claim, nor is any recognition given on the basis of her particular 'she', since she is always already transformed into her placement within the fixed order of the system's relational entities ('community', "caste", *jati* etc.).

However, seen from the viewpoint of Kracauer's opposition to subordinate, either in the intellectual world or in the world of the day-to-day life, any concrete matter, or human being to abstractions because this rendered a stronger spin to the dynamics of the ongoing processes of alienation and destruction, Ambedkar's critique of "caste" could thus, from the perspective of the ones who realised its injustice and discrimination, even be extended to the modern 'Western' world's fixed categories which are constructed by the utilisability.

It is particularly to be found in the modern psychological 'virtue' to wilfully and voluntarily submit one's wants, needs, desires, to the established 'higher' perspectives of the 'civic sense', the 'national consciousness', or the consumer market. Ambedkar's critique of the ideological effects of making the *dalits* into "the children of God", i.e. elevating them morally and psychologically while their material wants are ignored, can also well be extended to the 'West'. Though the ground realities of suppression were very different between "caste" and "class", the myths that enshrouded them, and secured their stability were strikingly similar.

In Ambedkar's answer to Gandhi's reaction to "The annihilation of caste", the *dalit* leader wonders: "Why does the Mahatma cling to the theory of every one following his or her ancestral calling?" and he has to state that the 'Mahatma' is giving "his reasons nowhere". Deliberating on what these might be, Ambedkar remembered:

"Years ago writing on "Caste versus Class" in his *Young India* he [Gandhi] argued that Caste System was better than Class System on the ground that caste was the best possible adjustment of social stability. If that be the reason why the Mahatma clings to the theory of every one following his or her ancestral calling, then he is clinging to a false view of social life. [...] Far from being the best possible adjustment I have no doubt that

it is of the worst possible kind inasmuch as it offends against both the canons of social adjustment - namely fluidity and equity" (Ambedkar 1979/ 1989b, 91-92).

It indeed characterises Gandhi's reply to Ambedkar not to pick up and counter a single of the latter's painstakingly substantiated arguments. These are ignored because the 'Mahatma's' view of "The annihilation of caste" was that it rode an in and out *immoral* attack on 'the Hindus' per se. From a moralist's position this was a heresy which one could not tolerate. However, what was the *quality* of the 'Mahatma's' morality? Again the exposition of Ambedkar on Gandhi's reaction to his polemic will help to answer this question.

Under paragraph X of Ambedkar's reply to Gandhi, the former touched upon the question of the essentials of morality in a *varna-/* or "caste"-oriented social vision, and stated that there could be no compromising with this system of subordination. Particularly not, if one nurtured concern for the "mass of the people". In Ambedkar's social analysis there is an echo of Phalke's desire to do away with all the *pardahs*, all the "dualities":

"The Mahatma says that the standards I have applied to test Hindus and Hinduism are too severe and that judged by those standards every known living faith will probably fail. The complaint that my standards are high may be true. But the question is not whether they are high or whether they are low. The question is whether they are the right standards based on social ethics. [...] I like to assure the Mahatma that it is not the mere failure of the Hindus and Hinduism which has produced in me the feelings of disgust and contempt with which I am charged. I realize that the world is a very imperfect world and any one who wants to live in it must bear with its imperfections. But while I am prepared to bear with the imperfections and shortcomings of the society in which I may be destined to labour, I feel I should not consent to live in a society which cherishes wrong ideals or a society which having right ideals will not consent to bring its social life in conformity with those ideals. [...] My quarrel with Hindus and Hinduism is not over the imperfections of their social conduct. It is more fundamental. It is over their ideals. XI Hindu society seems to me to stand in need of a moral regeneration which it is dangerous to postpone. And the question is who can determine and control this moral regeneration? [... the Hindu leaders ... quite unfit ...] Unlike the Mahatma there are Hindu leaders who are not content merely to believe and follow. They dare to think, and act in accordance with the result of their thinking. But unfortunately they are either a dishonest lot or an indifferent lot when it comes to the question of giving right guidance to the mass of the people. Almost every Brahmin has transgressed the rule of Caste [...] For one honest Brahmin preaching against Caste and *Shastras* because his practical instinct and moral conscience cannot support a conviction in them, there are hundreds who break Caste and trample upon the Shastras every day but who are the most fanatic upholders of the theory of Caste and the sanctity of the *Shastras*. Why this duplicity? Because they feel that if the **masses** are emancipated from the yoke of Caste they would be a **menace** to the power and prestige of the Brahmins as a class. The dishonesty of this intellectual class who would deny the masses the fruits of their thinking is a most disgraceful phenomenon" (Ambedkar 1979/ 1989b, 94-95, bold letters by B. S.).

The perspective of a higher moral position that scrutinised popular struggles for their rightness in terms of their wilful exposure to even more violence exerted against them than what they already experienced as the structural violence of "caste" and "class", was present in Gandhi's perception of "the crowds" during the Bombay agitations against the visit of the British Crown Prince:

"The reputation of Bombay, the hope of my dreams [of reviving mass civil disobedience], was being stained yesterday even whilst in my simplicity I was congratulating the citizens upon their non-violence in the face of provocation. Little did I know that at the very time that the Prince was passing through the decorated route and the pile of foreign cloth was burning, in another part of the city the mill hands were in criminal disobedience of the wishes of their masters emptying them, first one and then the others, by force, that a swelling mob was molesting peaceful passengers in the tramcars and holding up the tram traffic, that it was forcibly depriving those that were wearing foreign caps of their headdresses and pelting in offensive Europeans. As the day went up the fury of the mob now intoxicated with its initial success rose also [...] (Gandhi 1967, 57-58) [continued ...] The crowd did not consist of hooligans only or boys. It was not an unintelligent crowd. They were not all mill hands. It was essentially a mixed crowd unprepared and unwilling to listen to anybody. For the moment it had lost its head [...] Thus the hope of reviving mass civil disobedience has once more in my opinion been dashed to pieces (59) [continued ...] We [non-co-operators] failed where we ought to have succeeded. For yesterday was a day of our trial. We were under our pledge bound to protect the person of the Prince from any harm or insult [...] They [Europeans] were as much entitled to take part in the welcome as we were to refrain. Nor can I shirk my own personal responsibility. I am more instrumental than any other in bringing into being the spirit of revolt. I find myself not fully capable of controlling and disciplining that spirit. I must do penance for it. For me the struggle is essentially religious. I believe in fasting and prayer, and I propose henceforth to observe every Monday a twenty-four hours' fast till Swaraj is attained (60) [...] I can have nothing to do with the organized violence of the Government, I can have less to do with the unorganized violence of the people. I would prefer to be crushed between the two" (ibid., 60-61, originally in *Young India*, 24-11-21, 380)

In order to render the reconciliation of the "human beings" from the perspective of 'non-violence'/ Truth - which was God to Gandhi - it was the violence of the 'have-nots' that became his focus of criticism. Why? Gandhi did not discriminate between different kinds of violence. According to the same logic as that of the 'equality' of all the 'children' before Him, before 'non-violence' conceived as Law Supreme, all kinds of violence are equal. Consequently, Gandhi perceived the "organised violence" of the State authority as harmful to *his* idea(l)/ Law Supreme, rather than as a physical assault on those who were exposed to it in the *brahmin*-bourgeois dominated civil society, or in the factories. Likewise he perceived the outraged, retaliating violence. Their agents had no face, and they were denied reason,

as well as pain. They were made into "the rowdies" and "the crowd(s)" who had to face particular disapproval by Gandhi because they violated a value even more precious than that of non-violence. They had disgraced their *Indianness* because, according to the 'Mahatma' it epitomised in understanding "the moral necessity" of non-violence, despite, or even because one hailed from the oppressed "castes" and classes (Gandhi 1967, 63). As he pointed out in his appeal "To co-workers" that he made after the incidences:

"Comrades, Past few days have been a fiery ordeal for us [...] These deaths and injuries show that in spite of the error of many of our countrymen, some of us are **prepared to die** for the attainment of our goal [...] So the task before **the worker is to take the blows from the Government and our erring countrymen**. This is the only way open to us of sterilizing the forces of **violence**. The way to immediate Swaraj lies through our gaining **control** over the **forces of violence**, and that not by greater violence but by **moral influence**" (64-65) [winning over opponents without ill-will ...] And this we can only do by being **prepared to die for the faith within us** and not by billing those who do not see the truth we enunciate" (67, Gandhi 1967, originally in *Young India*, 24-11-21, 383, bold letters by B. S.)

The Gandhian Individual is a modern individual as it "is fashioned with the ingredients of freedom and, the power to exercise the will for building the society" (Nizar 1998, 21). However, the 'Mahatma's' perspective on the individual human being deliberately disregarded her particularity which is superimposed by his ideal of 'man'. It knows of no other relationship of the individual than her facing Truth. This perspective is *per se* unconcerned with the "what" of things - not unlike the observation made by Kracauer - but Gandhi was also unconcerned with the 'why' of human action, and with the *differences* between human beings. In this way Gandhi was modern, anti-modern and traditional at the same time. He cultivated the attitude of individual morality consisting of the modern (democratic) view of 'equality' where there was difference and injustice; and of the 'virtue' of wilful subordination of the immediate individual wants and needs to a 'higher' entity which led away from one's self, and from one's fellow because 'non-violence' was non-co-operation also in terms of any co-ordinated action undertaken by the suppressed.

I hope some of the many shades and colours of the views and visions of Indianness in Bombay at the beginning of the 20th century have been elucidated. However, to obtain these nuances of great consequence the assumption has to be dropped that 'Indianness' was essentially characterised by a stark and earthy dichotomy of 'tradition' and 'modernity' - even when one is interested in those experiences which fell prey to the centrifugal forces of

exclusion and selection inscribed into industrial capitalism which is politically represented in the form of the bourgeois (colonialist) state. Another prerequisite is that tradition is understood and methodologically and theoretically treated as *one precondition* of human action which makes up for one's social, ideological and natural environment, and might be under a more or less strictly handled social taboo against introducing any change. This, however, besides very few exemptions, does not make cultural phenomena or artefacts stagnant. 'Tradition' thus, is an ephemeral category, like the short-lived illusions of the cinema:

"It is well known that every illusion which is seen on the screen takes place before the camera or is recreated for it. [...] the miracle of the visual appearance of objects is sometimes caused by the play of light and shadow. This is the magic of the film maker. A film maker must have a good skill in photography. Even with an interesting story and highly skilled actors, all the efforts of the film maker will come to nought, if the photography is unscientific and of low standard. [...] Even the fair Europeans have to make up their faces in order to be photographed at 16 pictures per second or 1,000 photographs a minute, taken for the film.
We who are known for our dark complexions have to do our make up even more carefully." (Phalke 1970B, 95-96)

A more radical social theory of identity formation in the 20th century's modernity which aspires to unravel the inner dynamics, contradictions, and tensions involved, would require a revisionist attitude towards modern *consensus formation* and towards its historical agents. A revised strategy would thus analyse consensus in juxtaposition to dissensus, modernity in juxtaposition to tradition, it would juxtapose 'the East' to 'the West'.

Phalke's RAJA HARISCHANDRA was a cinema that provided a public space and a public sphere for a type of Indianness that transformed from the diffuse "*Befindlichkeit*" that it was in 1912/ 13-1917/ 18, into a socially and politically relevant platform in the 1920s. It was present as *satya*, that strong moral conviction in the politics of *satyagraha* which, however, revealed the highly ambiguous nature of a modern 'morality' co-opting the majority of the suppressed "castes" and classes including the middle-classes into the mainstay-myths of bourgeois modernity.
Phalke's cinema at its particular time withstood taking over the point of view of being directly *useful* to any of the dominant political movements wooing for loyalty in the name of Indianness - whether it was Tilak, or the colonial Government. As an 'idea(l)' it once transgressed the borders of British India, and can be redeemed in a discourse like that of Kracauer, another dis-senting 'soul' who did not compromise when confronted with the compulsion to exist as an in-and-out 'useful citizen'. However, Phalke's

early cinema could not escape being claimed in the one (the hegemonic), or the other ('folk') way as this Indianness confined to state borders.

Summing up the quality of the dynamics of early 20th century modernism/ modernity in Bombay, one is not just facing the structural powers which effected the fragmentation of the socio-political and mental, as well as emotional-moral topographies of lifeworlds and 'outer' worlds. A novel agency had made its appearance and was subtly optimising these structural mechanisms: modern (national) morality. Consequently, the ambiguity that we find in the early cinema of modernity which results from the structurally induced tensions as Hansen (1991) has pointed out, this ambiguity is, according to my argumentation, a facet of the modern Individual:

"The juxtaposition of Babel and Babylon is programmatic to my approach to the question of spectatorship in the sense that it highlights a tension, at least during the silent era, between the cinema's role as a universalizing, ideological idiom and its redemptive possibilities as an inclusive, heterogeneous, and at times unpredictable horizon of experience" (Hansen 1991, 19).

In modern individuality, i.e. in the maturation process of the modern subject, tensions crystallise in a manner that resembles the fetishisation which Marx (*Das Kapital*, vol. I) highlighted as a component of the process of commodification of the real world. This study shows that fetishisation has emotional-moral and psychological dimensions promoted by the historical agents (whether objectively suppressed or not) themselves and is an integral part of the consensus building. Dominated as it is by capitalism this emotional-moral fetishisation is lured by the liberating features of capitalism - e.g. from patriarchal bondage - and by the actual experiences of liberalisation from these forms of pre-modern bondage. However, it is still as imperative as it was during the 1910s and 1920s, when this liberation was reflected by modernisms between Berlin and Bombay urging to go into the 'what' of things and 'life'.

To the re-searcher of the meanings of Indianness, Ambedkar's vision of the "Indian view of life", expressed in his review of Russell's *The Reconstruction of Society* (1917) in 1918, might stand as a motto at the end of this book. It brings into focus the traces of the marginalised views and visions of modernity which I have been trying to recollect and evaluate. That 'Indianness' might, on the one hand, well be discovered in those historical experiences and in traditions of thought where we least expect it: a "fragment" of modernity and a component of intersecting spaces - like cinema - of the dis-senting discourses on the (national) features of modernity at the begin-

ning of the 20th century. That these "fragments of modernity" had the inherent tendency to mentally and emotionally-morally transgress, and not to ascertain the borders of nation states, or their constructs of national identities. Because the difference, which had been crucial to Phalke, Kracauer, Ambedkar, and others to express their dissensus, had been the 'what of life', and not the mere survival being fuelled by the illusion of serving one's 'good life' while one is just confusing this with one's conformist modern 'interests':

"Of the many reasons urged in support of the Indian view of life one is that it is chiefly owing to its influence that India alone of all the oldest countries has survived to this day. This is a statement that is often heard and even from persons whose opinions cannot be too easily set aside. With the proof or disproof however of this statement I do not wish to concern myself. Granting the fact of survival I mean to make a statement yet more important. It is this; there are many modes of survival and not all are equally commendable. For instance, mobility to beat a timely retreat may allow weaker varieties of people to survive. So the capacity to grovel or lay low may equally as the power of rising to the occasion be the condition of the survival of a people. Consequently, it cannot be granted - as is usually supposed - that because a people have survived through the ages that therefore they have been growing and improving through ages. Thus it is not survival but the quality, the plane of survival, that is important. If the Indian readers of Mr. Russell probe into the quality of their survival and not remain contented merely with having survived I feel confident that they will be convinced of the necessity of a revaluation of their values in life" (Ambedkar 1989a, 487).

An example of the 'Indian Punch'-tradition around 1857, Mitter (1994), 144.

INDIA IN THEORY.   INDIA IN PRACTICE.
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