

Universität Trier  
Fachbereich III  
Politikwissenschaft  
54296 Trier

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*The Relationship between  
Economic Development and Democracy in Africa:  
A Quantitative and Qualitative Perspective*

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*Der Zusammenhang zwischen  
wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung und Demokratie in Afrika:  
Eine quantitative und qualitative Analyse*



Wissenschaftliche Prüfungsarbeit zum Ersten Staatsexamen für das Lehramt an  
Gymnasien eingereicht von:

Stephanie Olk  
Zum Jugendheim 17  
54298 Welschbillig

Inwieweit spielen wirtschaftliche Entwicklungen eine Rolle bei der Entstehung von neuen Demokratien? Die vorliegende Arbeit konzentriert sich bei der Beantwortung dieser Frage auf die Länder Afrikas. Es wird gezeigt, dass *Modernisierungsthesen* die afrikanischen Erfahrungen der vergangenen Jahrzehnte nicht erklären können, d.h. Wirtschaftsdaten nur eine unvollständige Erklärung für demokratische Veränderungen in Afrika geben. Da wirtschaftliche Entwicklungen die Einstellungen und Gefühle der Bevölkerung gegenüber ihrem Staat beeinflussen, spielen sie zwar, sowohl in ihrer positiven als auch negativen Ausprägung, eine Rolle für die Entstehung von Demokratie – aber nicht die alleinige. Eine umfassende Ursachenerklärung für Demokratie muss die *politische Tradition oder Kultur* afrikanischer Länder miteinbeziehen, denn Demokratie erfordert eine Reihe bestimmter politischer Werte von ihren Bürgern.

Daher gebührt der Formation politischer Werte im Laufe der turbulenten Geschichte des afrikanischen Kontinents Aufmerksamkeit. Nach der Darstellung relevanter theoretischer Konzepte, untersucht eine statistische Analyse zunächst den Einfluss *wirtschaftlicher Entwicklungen* und *politischer Tradition* auf die Entstehung von Demokratie in Gesamtafrika. Ein intensiver qualitativer Vergleich der drei westafrikanischen Staaten Benin, Mali und Ghana wird dann die historischen Ursprünge demokratischen politischen Wandels konkreter beleuchten. Dabei wird der Einfluss vorkolonialer, kolonialer und postkolonialer Faktoren untersucht, um zu einer differenzierten Antwort zu gelangen.

Hiermit versichere ich, dass ich diese wissenschaftliche Prüfungsarbeit selbständig verfasst habe und keine anderen als die angegebenen Hilfsmittel benutzt habe.

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Stephanie Olk

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## Introduction

“Africa poses the greatest challenge to world development efforts to the end of the century and beyond.”<sup>1</sup>

Africa’s political landscape was still dominated by authoritarian governments at the end of the 1980s. By the end of 1994, however, 29 countries had held a total of 54 elections, with observers acknowledging more than half of them as “free”. Voters removed 11 sitting presidents, and three more had declined to run these elections held during - what has been described as - the “African Renaissance”.<sup>2</sup> During 1995-1997, 16 countries held second-round elections, so that by 1998 only four countries in all Sub-Saharan Africa had not granted themselves some sort of competitive contest during the 1990s. Even if North Africa cannot be added to the list of liberalisation successes, given the continent’s overall poor record of competitive elections that followed its first wave of democracy in the 1960s, the wave of elections in the 1990s clearly signalled that some form of political change had come to Africa as a whole.<sup>3</sup> Though liberalisation and transition often came at the cost of public unrest, violence, and war, for instance in Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Zaire, sometimes they also arrived peacefully, as in South Africa or Benin.<sup>4</sup>

In fact, Africa is the poorest continent in the world. With about 13 percent of the world’s population, African real GDP has remained constant at about 2 percent as a share of the world’s total since 1970. At the same time, Africa’s population has increased sharply, from 364 million in 1970 to nearly 800 million in 1999, and is expected to increase to approximately 1.3 billion by 2020. Suffering from the consequences of widespread corruption and the rage of AIDS, facing declining world prices and increasing debt obligations, most African states belong to the outer periphery of the global economic system.<sup>5</sup> Only in the second half of the 1990s, did Africa start to stem economic decline, and some states even experienced positive

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<sup>1</sup> International Institute for Environment and Development and the World Resources Institute (1987) *World Resources, 1987*. New York, Basic Books. p. 221.

<sup>2</sup> Alagiah, George (2001) *A Passage through Africa*. London, Little, Brown and Company. p. 263ff. Gibson, Clark C. (2002) “Of Waves and Ripples: Democracy and Political Change in Africa in the 1990s.” In: *Annual Review of Political Science* 5: 201-221. p. 202ff.

<sup>3</sup> Bratton, Michael & van de Valle, Nicolas (1997) *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. pp. 21ff.

<sup>4</sup> Alagiah, George (2001). p. 263ff.

<sup>5</sup> Assogba, Y. (1996) “Problematique de la Gouvernance en Afrique au Sud du Sahara”, *Revue Canadienne d’Etudes du Development*. Special Issue. pp. 57-73.

growth.<sup>6</sup> This came after already two decades of authoritarian government policies had driven most African economies into the ground.<sup>7</sup>

Hence, African countries are facing the double challenge of having to establish development and democracy at the same time. The border between politics and economics is peculiarly open, for the obvious reason that states dispose of substantial material resources while production and exchange can hardly take place without some framework of security.<sup>8</sup> What role do *economic developments* play in the *emergence of democracy*?

I will argue that *modernisation theory* is not applicable to the African experience over the past decades, i.e. economics are only a part of the answer explaining democratic changes. In influencing popular attitudes towards the state I expect economic developments, both positive and negative ones, to have played a role – but not the only one. The *political tradition or culture* of African countries has to be included in a consideration of democratic origins, since democracy requires a set of certain political values from its citizens.

Therefore, after having revisited relevant theoretical concepts, the statistical analysis will ask for the impact of both *economic developments* and *political tradition* on democratic emergence. Subsequently, political value formation in the course of the turbulent African history earns some investigation. A qualitative comparison of three West African states, Benin, Mali and Ghana, will illuminate the sources of democratic political change in more detail.

*Modernisation theory* has been widely attacked in recent years and especially development research declared it to be obsolete.<sup>9</sup> Its defenders, however, e.g. Burkhart & Lewis-Beck and Przeworski & al, continued to publish statistical analyses intending to support the *economic development hypothesis* during the late 1990s.<sup>10</sup>

More precisely, the hypothesis claims a positive association between levels of development and democracy. The strong version of this argument states that economic success actually causes democracy. Put differently, the economic development hypothesis expects that a strategy targeted at achieving economic development will yield into successful democratisation

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<sup>6</sup> Todaro, Michael P. (2000) *Economic Development*. Reading, Massachusetts, Addison-Wesley. p. 708ff.

<sup>7</sup> Gibson, C. C. (2002) pp. 202f.

<sup>8</sup> McLean, Ian (1996) *Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics*. Oxford, Oxford University Press. p. 389.

<sup>9</sup> For example: Diamond, Larry (1994) *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*. Boulder, Lynne Rienner. p. 236.

<sup>10</sup> Burkhart, R. E. & Lewis-Beck, M. S. (1995) "Comparative democracy: the economic development thesis." *American Political Science Review* 88: 903-912. Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M.E., Cheibub, J.A. & Limongi, F. (2000) *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World 1950-1990*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. p. 136ff.

as a “by-product”. This so-called “iron law” of development has been of immense importance in development thinking and has “generated the largest body of literature in comparative politics”.<sup>11</sup> While modernisation theory is commonly based on *large-n* statistical analyses, *small-n* studies or qualitative research mainly contradict it. To “defeat” modernisation theory with its “own” arguments, the statistical analysis conducted here will aim to *infirm* the modernisation claim for 51 African countries.<sup>12</sup>

With respect to democratisation in developing countries, a new scientific discussion has evolved around the *political culture* concept, which has been perceived to be the “crucial link between economic development and democracy”.<sup>13</sup> Hence, the statistical analysis includes a measure of political tradition which will be interpreted as a signifier not only for the democratic quality of the objective dimensions of political life (polity, politics, policy), but indirectly also for the subjective dimensions of politics, i.e. political culture. Government for the people by the people requires popular values, such as moderation, tolerance, civility, efficacy, knowledge, and participation. It will be shown that political values of African elites and populations have been shaped in a unique way by pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial experiences.

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<sup>11</sup> Lipset, Seymour Martin (1959) “Some social requisites for democracy.” *American Political Science Review* 53: 69-105. Neubauer, D. E. (1967) “Some conditions of democracy.” *American Political Science Review*. pp. 1002-1009.

<sup>12</sup> The statistical analysis follows the regression model by Landman (1999) originally developed to examine the impact of economic factors on democratic regime transformation in Latin America. Landman, Todd (1999) “Economic Development and Democracy: the View from Latin America.” *Political Studies* 47: 607-626.

<sup>13</sup> For example: Leys, Colin (1982) “Economic Development in Theory and Practice.” *Daedalus* 111 (2): 119-120.

# I. Theoretical Background: Democracy and its Sources

## 1. Approaches to Democracy and Classification of African Transitions

*Democratic transformation*, or *democratisation* is a complex and difficult process that can stretch over several generations and is prone to fallbacks.<sup>14</sup> An authoritarian regime that undergoes such a process ideally passes through several periods. The first phase is the *liberalisation* of the old regime, i.e. authorities relax their controls on the political activities of citizens and officially recognise basic civil liberties. The next stage, *democratic transition*, involves the construction of participatory and competitive political institutions. It is “a shift from one set of political procedures to another, from an old pattern of rule to a new one”, usually via free and fair elections. Extreme political uncertainty characterises this time of struggle between competing political forces over the rules of the political game and for the resources with which this game is played. The direction of a transition, therefore, is not necessarily linear and might not end in a democratic regime but, instead, one that is authoritarian. *Democratic consolidation*, the final stage, requires time. A democracy is regarded as consolidated if the institutional features of democracy are in place and citizens have become habituated to democratic values, practices, and culture.<sup>15</sup>

Scientific literature knows more than 550 definitions of sub-types of *democracy*.<sup>16</sup> Aiming to confirm modernisation theory, Przeworski and his colleagues, regard it as sufficient to employ a dichotomous measure, distinguishing between *democracy* and *non-democracy*. They characterise democracy as “a regime in which governmental offices are filled as a consequence of contested elections”.<sup>17</sup> Their concept privileges elections over other dimensions of democracy, ignores that multiparty elections might exclude significant portions of the populations from contesting power, or may leave important organs of decision-making beyond the control of elected officials. Consequently, they ground their conclusions on a measure that

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<sup>14</sup> Diamond, Larry (1999) *Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation*. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press. p. 64ff.

<sup>15</sup> Zanger, S. C. (2000) “A Global Analysis of the Effect of Political Regime Changes on Life Integrity Violations, 1977-93.” *Journal of Peace Research* 37(2):213-233.

<sup>16</sup> Collier, D. & Levitsky, S. (1997) “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research.” *World Politics* 49 (3): 430-451.

<sup>17</sup> Przeworski, A. et al. (2000). p. 19, 137ff. Huntington, Samuel P. (1991) *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. New Haven, Yale University Press.

is likely to identify many regimes as democratic that in truth might be authoritarian in nature. This minimalist definition of *electoral* or *procedural democracy* has been extended and is now commonly defined as follows:

“Electoral democracy is a civilian, constitutional system in which the legislative and chief executive offices are filled through regular, competitive multiparty elections with universal suffrage.”<sup>18</sup>

This new concept is concerned with a series of democratic processes and procedures, designed to safeguard a participatory system, but it is still likely to commit the “fallacy of electoralism”.<sup>19</sup> A more refined, but still procedural definition is provided by Dahl. He uses the term “*polyarchy*” to describe a system with two evident dimensions: opposition and participation, i.e. organised contestation through regular, free, and fair elections, and participation and the right of virtually all adults to vote and contest for office. Underlying these two dimensions is civil liberty, in other words, the freedom to speak and publish dissenting views, to form and join organisations, and to alternative sources of information. Dahl reserves the expression “democracy” to an ideal form of democracy that is completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens. Such a perfect system, he claims, only exists in theory, not in reality.<sup>20</sup>

There have been numerous further specifications of democracy. Diamond analyses the relevant literature and provides a complete list of conditions that a regime has to meet in constitutional theory as well as in fact to be called a fully *liberal democracy*:

- (1) Control of the state and its key decisions and allocations lies with elected officials; in particular, the military is subordinate to the elected authority.
- (2) Executive power is constrained by the autonomous power of other government institutions such as an independent judiciary, parliament, and other mechanisms of horizontal accountability.
- (3) Electoral outcomes are uncertain, with a significant opposition vote and the presumption of party alternation in government, and no group that adheres to constitutional principles is denied the right to form a party and contest elections.
- (4) Cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups are not prohibited from expressing their political interests, speaking their language or practicing their culture.

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<sup>18</sup> Diamond, Larry (1999). p. 7ff.

<sup>19</sup> Karl, T. L. (1986) “Imposing Consent? Electoralism versus Democratization in El Salvador.” In: Drake, P. & Silva, E. (eds. 1986) *Elections and Democratization in Latin America, 1980-1985*. San Diego, Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies. p. 9ff.

<sup>20</sup> Dahl, Robert A. (1971) *Polyarchy: Participation & Opposition*. New Haven, Yale University Press. p. 10f



- (5) Beyond parties and elections, citizens have multiple, ongoing channels for expression and representation of their interests and values, i.e. they can form and join diverse, independent associations and movements.
- (6) There are alternative sources of information, including independent media, to which citizens have free access.
- (7) Individuals also have substantial freedom of belief, opinion, discussion, speech, publication, assembly, demonstration, and petition.
- (8) Citizens are politically equal under the law.
- (9) An independent, non-discriminatory judiciary, whose decisions are enforced and respected by other centres of power, effectively protects individual and group liberties.
- (10) The rule of law protects citizens from unjustified detention, exile, terror, torture, and undue interference in their personal lives not only by the state but also by organised non-state or anti-state forces.<sup>21</sup>

Liberal democracy therefore is defined as a system in which political authority is to be constrained and balanced, individual and minority rights are protected, the rule of law is assured, and a supreme constitution guarantees that the state acts in accordance with the laws. In such a “Rechtsstaat” (“a state of rights”), the courts enforce restrictions on popularly elected governments when they violate the laws or the constitutional rules. At the heart of liberal democracy, therefore, are the *rule of law*, the *separation of powers*, and certain normative moral standards, i.e. the protection of certain unalienable *rights*.<sup>22</sup>

The idea of democratic rights protection partially overlaps with the concept of *human rights*. First generation, *civil rights* are designed to protect one’s personhood from governmental intervention and allow a human being to be and be treated as a person and to have a private life. Thus, first generation rights form the basis for civil society. *Political* or *solidarity rights* guarantee the right to contest for political power and constitute the foundation of political society. The third generation includes *socio-economic rights*. Below a certain minimum level of living conditions human life is not worth living. However, rights of this last generation are a function of comparative state prosperity.

Poe and Tate focus on rights to personal integrity (PIR), stating that they constitute “a sub-set of civil, political, and socio-economic human rights”. Violations of these rights are regarded as instances of state terrorism, i.e. coercive activities on the part of the government designed to induce compliance in a person. Examples are murder, torture, forced disappearance, and

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<sup>21</sup> Diamond, Larry (1999). p. 11ff.

<sup>22</sup> Heller, Hermann (1934) *Staatslehre*. Leiden, Sijthof. p. 23ff.

imprisonment of persons for their political views. Poe and Tate justify their focus on personal integrity:

“[...] we believe governments abusing this right are committing the most egregious and severe crimes against humanity and that these violations are of the sort that can usually be avoided. Further, limiting the term to this category of rights allows us to separate the concept of human rights from related concepts (e.g. democracy, economic standing) that may be, or have been, linked theoretically with national propensities to respect human rights.”<sup>23</sup>

The exact relationship between the concepts of *democracy* and *human rights* is widely disputed.<sup>24</sup> Definitions of democracy describe a regime type. Regimes are sets of political procedures, the rules of the political game that determine the distribution of power.<sup>25</sup> Human rights, in contrast, are a set of moral standards that independently define a desirable *output* that a regime should produce. Liberal democracy is compatible with many of these demands, in particular civil and political rights protection; however, it does not necessarily fulfil all of them, especially with regards to economic rights. Definitions of democracy talk about *how* to organise societal life, human rights talk about *what* is to be achieved for each individual. As Henderson states:

“The democratic process, with its emphasis on bargaining and compromise, offers a meaningful alternative for handling conflict if leaders choose to use it. Democracy should not be viewed as an idealistic process, but as a realistic way to accommodate demands with a minimum of conflict [...] with a large measure of democracy, conflict should not grow so sharp as to invite repression.”<sup>26</sup>

Thus, certain procedural rights are commonly regarded as elemental features of a democratic form of government. In addition, effective democracy of course enables citizens to oust potentially abusive leaders from office before they are able to become a serious threat. If the rights that are to be respected in a democracy are defined very broadly, “they well merge imperceptibly into the respect for human dignity that is, by definition, antithetical to the use of state terrorism”.<sup>27</sup> Consequently, personal integrity rights define a minimum standard of rights protection and their abuse is absolutely incompatible with any form of true liberal democracy.

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<sup>23</sup> Poe, S. C. & Tate, C. N. (1994) “Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis.” *American Political Science Review* 88: 853-900. Poe, S. C., Tate, C. N. & Keith, L. C. (1999) “Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976-1993.” *International Studies Quarterly* 43: 291-313.

<sup>24</sup> Forsythe, D. P. (2000) *Human Rights in International Relations*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. p. 28ff. Donnelly, J. (1999) “Human Rights, Democracy, and Development.” *Human Rights Quarterly* 21 (3): 608-632.

<sup>25</sup> Bratton, Michael & van de Valle, Nicolas (1997). p. 9.

<sup>26</sup> Henderson, C. (1991) “Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35: 120-142. p. 123f.

<sup>27</sup> Poe, S. C. & Tate, C. N. (1984). p. 856.

Including a measure of PIR in our statistical analysis allows us to determine the extent to which we are dealing with a truly liberal democratic system or a “hollow” democracy or pseudodemocracy.

*Pseudodemocracies* are the results of defective, incomplete regime transformations and are less than minimally democratic but still distinct from purely *authoritarian regimes*.<sup>28</sup> In the latter systems, the rules demand unquestioning obedience from the ruled. Consequently, authoritarian systems lack the crucial building blocks of democracy, i.e. legal, independent opposition parties. Before the “third wave”, the African variety of authoritarianism was neopatrimonialism. These systems had a modern bureaucracy but concentrated political power in a person, not an institution. Maintaining political authority in such a system requires the giving and granting of favours, “in an endless series of dyadic exchanges that go from the village level to the highest reaches of the central state”.<sup>29</sup>

Many African regimes seem to be stuck in transit. The resulting pseudodemocracies have adopted multiple parties and many other features of electoral democracy, but they still lack a forum of electoral contestation sufficiently fair to allow the peaceful turnover of government. Formally democratic institutions exist, but they mask what in reality is authoritarian control.<sup>30</sup> Based on a study of Bratton and van de Walle, it is possible to categorise African regimes for their degree of “electioneering” (Table 5).<sup>31</sup> Transition was precluded in four countries, Egypt, Liberia, Libya, and Sudan, because political conditions were un conducive to democratic demands.

In another twelve countries transitions were blocked. Political reforms were commenced but never fully realised. Typically, as in Zaire and Rwanda, rulers made strategic concessions intended to buy time for the failing authorities, with no evident intention of carrying out elections or yielding power.

By 2002, one can conclude that the majority of African transitions, i.e. twenty-two cases, were flawed. In these nations, rulers could not stop the progress of opposition demands for political reform and allowed the reform process to unfold to a significant degree. Often they agreed to competitive elections, at the same time they exploited the powers of their post to manipulate electoral laws, monopolise campaign resources, or interfere with the polls. The results, as in

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<sup>28</sup> Diamond, Larry (1999). p. 17.

<sup>29</sup> van de Walle, Nicolas (2001) *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. p. 51.

<sup>30</sup> Diamond, Larry (1999). p. 17.

<sup>31</sup> Bratton, Michael & van de Walle, Nicolas (1997). p. 120ff. Magnarella, P. J. (ed. 1999) *Middle East and North Africa: Governance, Democratization, Human Rights*. Aldershot, Ashgate. Gibson, C. C. (2002). p. 210.

Cameroon, Gabon, and Mauritania, were more or less dubious elections that usually returned the current president to power.

Only nine countries experienced true transitions to democracy, i.e. democratic regimes emerged through valid elections. If we add the five states that fulfilled the minimum criteria for democracy already before 1994, i.e. Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius, Senegal, and Eritrea, we find that 14 out of 52 or 27% of African states experienced democratisation. However, since the populations of these countries are comparatively small, less than a fifth of the African population came to live under democratic regimes.<sup>32</sup>

Despite deficits, Africa has clearly undergone a wave of democratisation efforts. Based on above considerations on the nature of democracy, we can proceed to ask for the sources of African democracy: the significance of political culture and the role of economic development.

## 2. Development and Democracy

As we have seen, the African experience with democracy in the postcolonial period has been complex and puzzling. Frequently, attempts to introduce and sustain democratic rule from the 1960s through the 1980s wavered. At the same time, many Africans have conducted “an unremitting quest for democratic rule”, as evidenced in the surge of democratisations during the early 1990s: the ambivalence of democratic practice has gone hand in hand with the ongoing search for a democratic order.<sup>33</sup>

Authors generally agree that standard measures of *national-level economic aggregate indicators* alone explain little of Africa’s recent political changes.<sup>34</sup> Widner, for example, finds no association linking political liberalisation in Sub-Saharan Africa with growth of gross domestic product, per capita income, defence expenditure, development assistance, inflation, or the rural workforce. Neither is there a relationship between reform and states experiencing a bonus in natural resources or foreign aid.<sup>35</sup> In Bratton and van der Walle’s panel data analysis

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<sup>32</sup> Bratton, Michael & van de Walle, Nicolas (1997). p. 120ff. Magnarella, P. J. (ed. 1999). The transition statistics was updated to 2002 on the basis of the Freedom House ratings: Freedom House, “FH Country Ratings.” <<http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm>>. September 2003.

<sup>33</sup> Chazan, Naomi (1994) “Between Liberalism and Statism: African Political Cultures and Democracy.” In: Larry Diamond (ed. 1994) *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*. Boulder, Lynne Rienner. pp. 59-89. p. 59.

<sup>34</sup> Gibson, C. C. (2002). p. 2001f.

<sup>35</sup> Widner, Jennifer A. (1994) “Political Reform in Anglophone and Francophone African Countries.” In: Widner, Jennifer A. (ed. 1994) *Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press. pp. 49-79. p. 49f.

of African regime change, *democratic tradition and behaviour of political actors* seem to provide a better explanation for democratic transition than economic factors.<sup>36</sup>

In any case, the citizens of every state, independent from their form of government, are not indifferent to their country's economic performance. I agree with Bratton and van der Walle when they argue that the African long-run economic crisis undermines the legitimacy of any political regime, democratic or autocratic, when governments are held responsible for existing economic conditions. However, democratic regimes have the ability to legitimise themselves also with their specifically democratic output:

“Democratic governments rarely rely for legitimacy on economic performance to the same extent as authoritarian governments do, but they too must improve material conditions on their watch. In a consolidated democracy, economic grievances are expressed through the ballot box and can lead to the replacement of one elected government by another; in a nonconsolidated democracy, however, the penalty for poor performance may well be the end of democratic rule itself and a return to authoritarianism.

Overcoming the economic crisis while simultaneously achieving democratisation is a distinctive challenge facing Africa.”<sup>37</sup>

For these reasons, the statistical analysis conducted in chapter II will ask for the weight of two possible sources of democratic emergence in the democratisation process: economic development and political tradition. The latter is regarded as a measure not only representing the objective dimensions of political life (polity, politics, policy) but also the subjective dimensions of politics, i.e. political culture (see chapters I.2.2. and III.).

Concerning the relationship between development and democracy, modernisation theory not merely speaks of mutual influence but of cause and effect. Political culture theory, on the other hand, emphasises that “development and cultural change are linked in a complex pattern of reciprocal influence”.<sup>38</sup> Both concepts will be presented in the following.

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<sup>36</sup> Bratton, Michael & van de Walle, Nicolas (1997). p. 239ff.

<sup>37</sup> Bratton Michael & van de Walle, Nicolas (1997). p. 239ff.

<sup>38</sup> Inglehart, Ronald (1988) “The Renaissance of Political Culture.” *American Political Science Review* 82: 1203-1230. p. 1203.

## 2.1. Modernisation and Democratisation

**Modernisation** or the *economic development hypothesis* is based on Rostow's "The Stages of Economic Growth". Not unlike Marx's materialist approach to history, yet firmly imbedded in American free market principles of the post-war period, the Rostow doctrine claims that all sociological change has its roots in economics:<sup>39</sup>

"It is possible to identify all societies, in their economic dimensions, as lying within one of five categories: the traditional society, the pre-conditions for take-off into self-sustaining growth, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass consumption [...] These stages have an inner logic and continuity [...] They constitute, in the end, both a theory about economic growth and a more general, if still highly partial theory about modern history as a whole."<sup>40</sup>

Savings and investments are regarded as *economic* requirements that will trigger the "take-off to self-sustaining growth". This, it is assumed, will transform *society*, which in turn will call for *political change and democracy*. As country by country develops, the social structure becomes more complex, increasing urbanisation makes social movement organisation easier, production processes start to require the active involvement of employees, and new political groups organise themselves. Society will diversify, technological advance grants producers more autonomy and private information, and civil society develops and will rise successfully against the dictatorial regime.<sup>41</sup> In sum, lasting economic growth is regarded as the trigger and drive for democratisation.

In 1959 Lipset provides first empirical tests to prove that "democracy is related to the state of economic development" by correlating cross-national data on economic and democratic performance.<sup>42</sup> Later studies in the political science and sociology literature are regression-based analyses usually with a global cross-sectional focus, also using time-series and panel data and employing different functional forms. During the 1970s and 1980s leading quantitative studies based on multivariate regression showed that it is possible to predict a non-dichotomous measure of democratic performance from economic variables (amongst others).<sup>43</sup> Economic development consistently emerges as a statistically significant influence on

<sup>39</sup> Todaro, Michael P. (2000). p. 79f.

<sup>40</sup> Rostow, W. W. (1960) *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*. London, Cambridge University Press. p. 1ff.

<sup>41</sup> Przeworski, A. & Limongi, F. (1997) "Modernization: Theories and Facts." *World Politics* 49: 155-183. p. 156.

<sup>42</sup> Lipset, Seymour Martin (1959). p. 75.

<sup>43</sup> Bollen, K. (1979) "Political Democracy and the Timing of Development." *American Sociological Review* 44: p. 572-587. Bollen, K. (1983) "World System Position, Dependency, and Democracy: The Cross-National Evidence." *American Sociological Review* 48: 468-479. Brunk, G., Gregory, A. C. & Lewis Beck, M. S. (1987) "Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy: An Empirical Inquiry." *European Journal of Political Research* 15: 459-470. Jackman, R. W. (1973) "On the Relationship of Economic Development to Political Performance." *American Journal of Political Science* 17: 611-621.

democracy. Brunk, Caldeira, and Lewis-Beck find that economic development alone accounts for more variance in democracy than the other independent variables taken together. Further robust support on the basis of panel data is provided by more recent studies.<sup>44</sup>

In the mid-1990s Burkhart and Lewis-Beck confirm the *strong argument* of modernisation, which claims that economic development “causes” democracy, but they specify the hypothesis in more detail by stating that the economic impact on democracy apparently depends on the “world system position” of a country:

“[T]he full magnitude of that effect depends on the location of the nation in the world system. As the nation moves from the core, to the semiperiphery, to the periphery, the effect diminishes. *Even in the periphery, however, the effect remains statistically and substantively significant* (stress added).”<sup>45</sup>

Also Przeworski et al, originally setting out to locate an economic threshold of per capita income for the “take-off to democracy” in their recent analysis of development and democracy around the world (1940-1990), cannot find such a critical value. Nevertheless, they observe that overall surviving democracies are rich, and therefore they support a *modified* view of modernisation theory, claiming that for consolidation and survival democracies require economic development:

“The most important lesson we have learned is that wealthy countries tend to be democratic not because democracies emerge as a consequence of economic development under dictatorships but because, however they emerge, democracies are much more likely to survive in affluent societies.”<sup>46</sup>

Though Przeworski and his colleagues agree here with Bratton and van der Walle’s conclusion, the latter stress that for political legitimacy democracies do not rely on economic performance as much as authoritarian regimes do (see I.2.).

The modernisation notion that economic development suffices for the emergence of a liberal-democratic nation state played an important role in the development strategies pursued during the 1960s, 70s, and 80s. Accordingly, foreign aid was politically unconditional and rewarded economic rather than political liberalisation.<sup>47</sup> Modernisation also played into the hands of Cold War strategic considerations. The development thesis could be misused as scientific

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<sup>44</sup> Jackman, R.W. (1973). p. 611ff. Burkhart, R. E. & Lewis-Beck, M. S. (1995). Helliwell, J. F. (1994) “Empirical linkages between democracy and economic growth.” *British Journal of Political Science* 24: 234- 253. p. 246.

<sup>45</sup> Burkhart, R. E. & Lewis-Beck, M. S. (1995) “Comparative Democracy: the Economic development thesis.” p. 907.

<sup>46</sup> Huntington, Samuel P. (1991). Przeworski, A. et al (2000). p. 136ff.

<sup>47</sup> Stein, H. (1994) “Theories of Institutions and Economic Reform in Africa.” *World Development* 22 (2): 1833-1849. Gibson, C. C. (2002). p. 2001f.

justification for the funding of autocratic African regimes. In pursuit of establishing their spheres of influence on the continent, “both superpowers were willing to reward compliant regimes with economic support and military hardware even if those regimes chose to act in an oppressive manner towards their domestic populations.”<sup>48</sup> In this context, the modernisation claim reveals its simplification of reality: If the economic prerequisites were presumably fulfilled, modernisation theory predicted that democracy would arrive sooner or later by itself. Thus, the theory has been attacked for its *deterministic and teleological view* of the world, since it assumes that democracy will necessarily be achieved if a country reaches a high level of economic development.<sup>49</sup> Following the wave of decolonisation in the 1960s and 70s, Africa is said to have experienced an “African Renaissance” after 1989, however, not much positive economic growth took place in the years preceding these great political changes.<sup>50</sup> Consequently, this study expects modernisation theory to have problems in explaining democratic political changes in Africa.

Further criticism has argued that political *institutionalisation* is necessary to promote socio-economic development. In the absence of appropriate institutions, growth can actually lead to political instability.<sup>51</sup> However, regarding Africa, modernisation theory coupled with neo-liberalist principles tried to avoid interference of political and economic institutions (i.e. government or central bank) with economic processes.<sup>52</sup>

Culturalist critics have accused the theory of being *ethnocentric*, since it assumes that lessons learned from European and North American industrialisation can be universally applied to developing countries, despite being characterised by very different cultural and social preconditions.<sup>53</sup> Africa with its myriad ethnic groups and 2,000 languages is more diverse than any other continent. Many Sub-Saharan countries are still in the process of developing a common national identity within their borders.<sup>54</sup> The concept of the nation state, however, as it developed in Europe and America, is not considered by modernisation theory, though the nation state principle is generally regarded as stability enhancing and as supportive to socio-economic development.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Wiseman, John A. (ed. 1995) *Democracy and Political Change in Sub-Saharan Africa*. London, Routledge. p. 3.

<sup>49</sup> Przeworski, A. et al (2000). p. 97f. Przeworski, A. & Limongi, F. (1997). p. 176f.

<sup>50</sup> Alagiah, George (2001). p. 198ff.

<sup>51</sup> Huntington, Samuel P. (1968) *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, Yale University Press.

<sup>52</sup> Stein (1994). pp. 1833ff.

<sup>53</sup> Valenzuela, J. S. & Valenzuela, A. (1978) “Modernisation and dependency: alternative perspectives in the study of Latin American underdevelopment.” *Comparative Politics* 10: 535-557.

<sup>54</sup> Alagiah, George (2001). pp. 144ff.

<sup>55</sup> McLean, Ian (1996). p. 331f.



What is more, “late developers” are expected to repeat inevitably the economic and political experience of Western nations, which were the first to industrialise in the world. The former, though, are nowadays confronted with competition from cheap, high-quality, industrial products and face first-world protectionism and declining prices for primary goods in a complex global trading system. Thus, modernisation theory draws up a *uniform trajectory path to development*, disregarding the unique effects of colonisation, decolonisation, and the collapse of communism.<sup>56</sup>

Critique on the *statistical methods* applied points out that studies conducted on a global level and a cross-sectional basis tend to confirm the theory, while regional studies, for example on Latin America, and panel or time series analyses in firm the economic development thesis. This might be due to the fact that large-n cross-section observations can lead to spurious results, due to great variations among the observations.<sup>57</sup> Moreover, the use of different functional forms has been held responsible for varying conclusions.<sup>58</sup>

In summary, modernisation theory is a widely disputed concept. By now, its defenders have lost much ground to its critics in the scientific debate. Political culture theory, in contrast, claims that the influences of economic development on politics are complex and reciprocal rather deterministic. What is more, political culture recalls the importance of values in political life – a view explained in more detail below.

## 2.2. Political Culture and African Democracy

To answer the question for the sources of democratic emergence and persistence (or consolidation), development scientists re-discovered the concept of *political culture* during the past decade. Eckstein has given a commonly used definition of political culture as “a people’s predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations about the political system of its country, and the role of the self in that system”. The relatively firm and enduring character of these orientations generates an “economy of action and predictability in interaction”.<sup>59</sup> Political culture describes three orientations from the citizens’ side: a *cognitive*

<sup>56</sup> Landman, Todd (1999). p. 608. Przeworski, M. E. et al (2000).p. 269ff.

<sup>57</sup> Landman, Todd (1999). Przeworski, M. E. et al (2000).

<sup>58</sup> Burkhart, R. E. & Lewis-Beck, M. S. (1995). Landman, Todd (1999). Katz, J. N. (1995) “What to do (and not to do) with time-series cross-section data.” *American Political Science Review* 89 (3): 634-647.

<sup>59</sup> Eckstein, Harry (1988) “A Culturalist Theory of Political Change.” *American Political Science Review* 82: 788-805. p. 790ff. Definitions also used by the authors publishing in: Larry Diamond (ed. 1994), *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*. Boulder, Lynne Rieder. p. 7.

orientation, which involves knowledge of and beliefs about the political system; an *affective* orientation, which consists of feelings about the political system; and an *evaluational* orientation, which includes commitments to political values and judgements about the performance of the political system in relation to those values.

These three elements of political culture form the “subjective dimension” of politics and are mirrored in the three objective dimensions of political life: *system*, *process*, and *policy*. The *political system* or *polity* includes the political institutions (including input through political parties, interest groups, mass media and output through legislatures, executives, bureaucracies, courts), the individual incumbents of these institutions, and the nation. The *political process* or *politics* consists of the actions, conflicts, alliances, and behaviour of parties, interest groups, movements, and individuals. *Policies* are decisions and political outputs of the system such as, for example, laws.<sup>60</sup>

Theories of democracy, both classical and modern, have proclaimed that democracy requires a distinctive set of *democratic values and orientations* from its citizens: for example, moderation, tolerance, civility, efficacy, knowledge, and participation. Moderation and accommodation imply tolerance for opposing political beliefs and opinions, and for social and cultural differences more generally, while a certain pragmatism and flexibility, as opposed to a rigid and ideological approach to politics, suggest a sense of trust in other political actors, and in the social environment more generally. The insight in the necessity and desirability of compromise and a certain civility of political discourse result in respect for other views. Moreover, knowledge of and participation in democracy have to go hand in hand with a paramount commitment to *democratic proceduralism*, which is a critical political cultural condition for democracy. The interrelationships among all these factors are dense and entangled.<sup>61</sup> In addition, citizens’ beliefs and perceptions about the *legitimacy of a regime* have long been recognised as a critical factor in regime change in general and are of special importance for the persistence or breakdown of democracy.<sup>62</sup>

Naturally, different ethnic and regional groups within a single country often have different value systems and views of the world. Moreover, political elites typically have distinctive values and norms from those in the population. The former often lead the way in large-scale value change. In addition, distinctive types of beliefs and norms may prevail in different institutional settings, such as the military, the bureaucracy, and the university. *Aggregate*

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<sup>60</sup> Almond, Gabriel A. & Verba, Sidney (1972) *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton, Princeton University Press. p. 15. Larry Diamond (ed. 1994). p. 8.

<sup>61</sup> Larry Diamond (ed. 1994). p. 7.

<sup>62</sup> Dahl, Robert A. (1971). p. 129-140. Linz, Juan (1978) *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*. Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press.

*political culture*, therefore, consists of *political subcultures*, which need to be explored in depth, especially for Africa putting other continents in the shade with its colourful variety of ethnicities, groups, and historical influences.<sup>63</sup> Diamond systemises three principal ways in which political culture contributes to democratisation: firstly, by changing beliefs and perceptions of key elites; secondly, by bringing about broader changes in mass political culture; and, thirdly, by reviving established but dormant democratic values, norms and preferences.<sup>64</sup>

Countries do differ profoundly in their patterns of politically relevant beliefs, values, and attitudes, and within countries these elements of political culture are shaped by life experiences, education, and social class.<sup>65</sup> Almond and Verba stress the significance of a “*participant political culture*” for democracy, which involves “an ‘activist’ role of the self in the polity”, expressed not only through elections but also through high levels of political interest, information, knowledge, opinion formation, and organisational membership.<sup>66</sup> This refers to the concept of *civil society* defined as the set of intermediate associations which are neither the state nor the family; civil society therefore includes voluntary associations, organisations, networks, and other corporate bodies articulating and supporting specific needs and interests of the individuals belonging to these groups. Ideally, the resulting pluralism contributes to guaranteeing the realisation and protection of rights.<sup>67</sup> Thus, democracy can be perceived to be in “a continuous state of becoming” and builds on the self-confidence and sense of competence on the part of citizens that their political action may actually result in a change in policy or resolve grievances. This so-called political efficacy or political competence may be shaped by many factors, including early socialisation in and the actual responsiveness of the political system, as well as by the general belief in democratic legitimacy.<sup>68</sup>

Accordingly, Linz and Stepan state that *democratic consolidation* poses political challenges, such as (i) the establishment of strong procedural commitments to constitutionalism and the rule of law, which will lead people to value democracy even when it does not perform well economically; (ii) the gradual increase of democratic civilian control over the means of state

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<sup>63</sup> Thompson, Michael, Ellis, Richard & Wildavsky, Aaron (1990) *Cultural Theory*. Boulder, Westview Press. p. 247-259.

<sup>64</sup> Diamond, Larry (1994) “Causes and Effects.” In: Diamond, Larry (ed. 1994).p. 229-247. p. 239f.

<sup>65</sup> Almond, Gabriel A. & Verba, Sidney (1972). Inkeles, Alex & Smity, David (1974) *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Nations*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press.

<sup>66</sup> Almond, Gabriel A. & Verba, Sidney (1972). p. 19.

<sup>67</sup> Nohlen, Dieter (ed. 1998) *Lexikon der Politik*. München, C. H. Beck. Vol. 7. p. 736.

<sup>68</sup> Almond, Gabriel A. & Verba, Sidney (1972).p. 19.

violence and parallel reduction of unofficial violence; and (iii) the creation of new and more practicable institutional arrangements such as parliamentary rule.<sup>69</sup>

In his comparative analysis of more than twenty countries, Inglehart finds that life satisfaction, interpersonal trust, and rejection of revolutionary change are highly correlated not only with economic development but also with stable democracy.<sup>70</sup> He concludes that political culture may be *a vital link between economic development and democracy*; yet he emphasises that the long-term relationship between economics and politics is complex:

“Economic changes help shape cultural change, but they are by no means the only factor involved; moreover, cultural patterns can persist long after the factors that gave rise to them have ceased to operate. Thus, they can influence economic life as well as being shaped by it.”<sup>71</sup>

The details of Inglehart’s analysis mainly focus on Western political-economic experiences. Chazan, therefore, develops categories to examine the linkage between African political, economic, and cultural changes. He finds that African everyday life is still influenced by three distinct epochs in history: pre-colonial traditions and institutions, colonial economic, social, and administrative structures, and frameworks established during the anti-colonial struggles:

“Each of these inheritances possesses well-defined concepts of the parameters of the political community, attitudes toward authority, and access to leadership; an understanding of societal goals and desiderata, some ranking of important spheres of human activity; and ideas about the functions of government, distributive justice, and terms of exchange.”<sup>72</sup>

In consequence, African political cultures are characterised by their variety and fragmentation. In the course of time, various traditional institutions and cultural traditions interacted with colonial structures and beliefs and with the apparatus and concomitant values of independent states. In this way, institutional proliferation has been accompanied by cultural diversification. In many African countries, different political perspectives and opinions have yet to join together on a countrywide basis into cohesive cultural frameworks.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> Linz, Juan & Stepan, Alfred (1989) “Political Crafting of Democratic Consolidation or Destruction: European and South American Comparisons.” In: Pastor, Robert A. (ed. 1989) *Democracy in the Americas: Stopping the Pendulum*. New York, Holmes and Meier. p. 41-61.

<sup>70</sup> Inglehart, Ronald (1988) “The Renaissance of Political Culture.” *American Political Science Review* 82: 1203-1230.

<sup>71</sup> Inglehart, Ronald (1990) *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton, Princeton University Press. p. 22.

<sup>72</sup> Chazan, Naomi (1994). p.60.

<sup>73</sup> Darbon, Dominique (1995) “Public Administration, State and Society.” In: Kirk-Greene, Anthony (ed. 1995), *State and Society in Francophone Africa since Independence*. London, Macmillan Press. p. 46-61.

In this sense, the extent of consolidation of African political cultures is directly related to the *degree of stateness*: “Authoritarianism is not the major issue in contemporary Africa; rather, it is the absence of central state authority and the resulting search for it.”<sup>74</sup> Without adequate political institutions, integrating ideas cannot prosper. Thus, the poor linkage mechanisms between state and society weigh heavily on democratic renewals and norms on the continent. Since democracy primarily is a relationship between organised power and those for whom it is organised, democratic values are realised through the development of suitable *interlocking political, social and economic structures* connecting society and the state:

“The gap between democratic visions of politics and their authoritarian expressions will, in all likelihood, persist in various forms pending the creation of [...] institutional mediations.”<sup>75</sup>

Future developments of African civil societies might result in uniquely African forms of democratic government. Therefore, chapter III analysis the state-societies relations in Benin, Mali, and Ghana in detail. Before, the next section weighs economic development and democratic tradition against each other in bringing about the political changes experienced one decade ago.

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<sup>74</sup> Callaghy, Thomas M. (1984) *The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective*. New York, Columbia University Press. p. 32.

<sup>75</sup> Chazan, Naomi (1994). p.61.

## II. Development and Democracy on the African Continent, 1975-2000

### 1. Measuring Economic Development and Democracy

The subsequent analysis tests the universal claims of modernisation theory for the continent of Africa (see map and country lists). The time from 1975 to 2000 is covered for 51 countries (i.e. all African states except Eritrea due to its foundation only in 1993), which results into a total of 1326 country years. Thus, a large time span and country cover in combination with the use of several economic and democratic measures generates high external validity of results.

### Economic Development

This investigation uses *gross national income (GNI) per capita* as first measure of economic development.<sup>76</sup> Unfortunately, indicators covering the distribution of income or human development more precisely, such as the human development indicator (HDI), are not available for longer time periods, especially not for poor or disrupted countries that do not collect and report information on literacy rate and life expectancy on a regular basis. Measuring development in terms of growth rates would be an even rougher yardstick of changes in the quality of people's lives. Therefore, GNI per capita is still most common, even though limited in its representative value, when dealing with (African) economic development.<sup>77</sup>

Figure 6 reflects aggregate African economic history over the past decades. In the late 1970s, African economies displayed moderate positive growth, which was higher in oil-exporting African countries. But then world recession, caused by the 1973/74-oil crisis, hit the developing world, most of which was heavily export-oriented. To finance imports for their growing industries in the future, LDCs had to rely on international lending. Twenty years later, in 1997, still 28 out of 48 nations listed as severely indebted by the World Bank were African. The continent's indebtedness nearly tripled between 1980 and 1995. The seventh most affected countries are Algeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Malawi, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. In comparison to Latin America, the debt

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<sup>76</sup> In calculating gross national income (GNI—formerly referred to as GNP) and GNI per capita in U.S. dollars, the World Bank uses the *Atlas conversion factor*. The purpose of the Atlas conversion factor is to reduce the impact of exchange rate fluctuations in the cross-country comparison of national incomes. World Bank Group, "Data and Statistics: Methodology." <<http://www.worldbank.org/data/aboutdata/working-meth.html>>. July 2002.

<sup>77</sup> Todaro, Michael P. (2000). p. 13ff.

problem of the African region is made more troublesome by sluggish economies. Their debt-to-export and debt-service ratios have both been well above the overall LDC average.<sup>78</sup>

Since 1980, real GDP has grown much more rapidly in southern Africa than in any other part of the continent. Adjustment programmes, however, demanded by the World Bank and IMF for most of the Sub-Sahara did not improve the situation. In addition, from their peak in the late 1970s and early 1980s, North African real oil revenues declined sharply between 1980 and the mid-1990s. Real income also fell sharply in Nigeria, the major oil producing country in sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>79</sup>

A second established indicator of development is *per capita energy consumption* measured in kilograms of coal or oil equivalent (Figure 6).<sup>80</sup> Africa's energy consumption has been static for most of the observed period. As a share of world commercial energy consumption, African consumption has increased only slightly, from 2% in 1970 to 3% in 1997. African energy use is expected to remain approximately constant as a share of the world total through 2020. This share is small for a variety of reasons, including low per capita incomes and levels of industrialization, ownership and usage of automobiles (around 20 cars per 1,000 people), and slow penetration of appliances like refrigerators, freezers, air conditioning, etc. Africa's enormous commercial energy resources are massively underdeveloped and so is most of its commercial energy infrastructure, including pipelines and electricity grids, to deliver commercial energy to customers. In addition, most Africans consume large amounts of non-commercial energy. Widespread and severe poverty means that people cannot afford to pay for "conventional" energy resources, and must instead rely on biomass, etc. Moreover, many African countries are landlocked, which makes the import of commercial energy resources even more difficult and expensive.<sup>81</sup> In contrast, the oil exporting countries of Africa often display a higher consumption of energy, since it is easily accessible to their population.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> International Monetary Fund (1988, 1998) *World Economic Outlook, 1988 and 1998*. Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund. Tables A-38, A-41, and A-42.

<sup>79</sup> Collier, P. & Gunning, J. W. (1999) "Explaining African Economic Performance." *Journal of Economic Literature* 37: 64-111.

<sup>80</sup> World Bank Group (ed. 1978-1998) *World Development Reports 1978 – 1998*. New York, Oxford University Press.

DAC Online, "International Development Statistics Online."  
<<http://www.oecd.org/htm/M00005000/M00005347.htm>>. July 2002.

<sup>81</sup> US Department of Energy, "Energy in Africa."  
<<http://216.239.51.100/search?q=cache:qpt9yE1bI9wC:www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/africa.html+energy+use+africa+1990s+increase&hl=en&ie=UTF-8>>. July 2002.

<sup>82</sup> World Bank Group (ed. 1978-1998).

Despite these weaknesses, GNI and energy consumption per capita remain useful indicators of development if they are used to *compare* the relative industrial positions of countries. Both indicators are statistically strongly and highly correlated (Table 7).

## Democracy

The measures in this study operationalise human rights as well as democracy. Classically, these indicators have been interpreted in terms of the *objective dimensions of political life*, i.e. polity, politics, and policy. In this study, they are also intended to mirror the *subjective dimensions*, i.e. political cultural values and orientations, or – to be precise – to which extent it has been possible for the population to realise democratic values in the national political scene.

Given the African complexity of regime types and transition outcomes after the third wave, all five indices use interval scales, not dichotomous categories (Table 8).

**Poe and Tate** measure the *right to personal integrity (PIR)* by analysing US State Department and Amnesty International annual country reports. As we will see, the distinction between rights protection in the form of personal integrity, on the one hand, and democratic institutionalisation, on the other hand, lead to very different conclusions about the political performance of a regime. Poe and Tate assess the degree of rights protection on a range from 1 for a country with a healthy record for personal integrity to 5 for a human rights disaster.<sup>83</sup> For the sake of simplicity, the coded Amnesty reports are called Poe & Tate 1, while scores for the State Department reports are named Poe & Tate 2.

**Gastil's** index of *political rights and civil liberties* is a widely recognised measure of rights protection that aims to cover the concept of liberal democracy.<sup>84</sup> It does so by coding civil and political rights separately on two seven-point scales, 1 representing the most free and 7 the

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<sup>83</sup> Ranking criteria: Rank 1: rule of law, no political imprisonment, torture is rare or exceptional, political murders are extremely rare. Rank 2: limited amount of imprisonment for non-violent political activity, torture and beating are exceptional, political murder is rare. Rank 3: extensive political imprisonment or recent history of such imprisonment; execution or other political murders and brutality may be common; unlimited detention with or without trial, for political views is accepted. Rank 4: practices of level 3 are expanded to larger numbers; murders, disappearances are a common part of life; yet terror affects primarily those who interest themselves in politics or ideas. Rank 5: terrors of level 4 have been expanded to whole population; leaders of society place no limits on the means of thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

<sup>84</sup> Diamond, Larry (1999). p. 12f. Bratton, Michael & van de Walle, Nicolas (1997). p. 14f.



least free state.<sup>85</sup> Every year, the Survey Team of Freedom House assigns a country to a particular value based on responses to checklists for civil and political liberties.<sup>86</sup>

The remaining two indices, Polity IV and Vanhanen, focus on the realisation of democratic *institutions*. They both embrace procedural definitions of democracy. **Polity IV**, developed by Jagers and Gurr, measures democratic institutionalisation using two scales. Countries are assigned a democracy and an autocracy score for the following five dimensions: competitiveness of political participation, regulation of political participation, competitiveness of executive, openness of executive recruitment, and constraints on chief executive. By subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score, the authors arrive at a single measure ranging from -10 to +10.<sup>87</sup>

**Vanhanen's** dataset, in contrast to the other measures, does not rely on inter-subjective assessment of events, but develops an objective measure of *democratic institutions* by multiplying the vote share of the smallest political party by the percentage turnout. The result mirrors the degree to which contestation and participation are present in a country. The aim is to measure "polyarchy" as it is found in reality. In the latest version of the Vanhanen index, the maximum value for competition a country can achieve is 70.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> Freedom House (1990) *Freedom in the World: Political and Civil Liberties, 1989/1990*. New York, Freedom House. p. 589ff. Gastil, R. D. (1990) "The Comparative Survey of Freedom: Experiences and Suggestions". *Studies in Comparative International Development* 25 (1): 25-50. Freedom House, "FH Country Ratings." <<http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm>>. July 2002.

<sup>86</sup> The checklist for political rights includes: 1. Is the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected through free and fair elections? 2. Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections? 3. Are there fair electoral laws; equal campaigning opportunities, fair polling, and honest tabulation of ballots? 4. Are the voters able to endow their freely elected representatives with real power? 5. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings? 6. Are there a significant opposition vote, de facto opposition power, and a realistic possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections? 7. Are the people free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group? 8. Do cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups have reasonable self-determination, self-government, autonomy, or participation through informal consensus in the decision-making process? – The checklist for civil rights includes questions covering: Freedom of Expression and Belief, Association and Organizational Rights, Rule of Law and Human Rights, Personal Autonomy and Economic Rights.

<sup>87</sup> Jagers, K. & Gurr, T. R. (1995) "Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data." *Journal of Peace Research* 32: 469-482. Polity IV Project, "Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2000." <<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/>>. July 2002.

<sup>88</sup> Institutt For Sosiologi Og Statsvitenskap NTNU Trondheim, "The Polyarchy Dataset: Vanhanen's Index of Democracy." <<http://www.svt.ntnu.no/iss/data/vanhanen/>>. July 2002. Vanhanen, T. (1997) *Prospects of Democracy*. London, Routledge.

To allow for comparison, all five measures were transformed into a scale ranging from 0 for no democracy or rights protection to 1 for a fully developed democracy or rights protection as specified by individual authors.<sup>89</sup>

Figure 9 plots the means of the measures of democracy for the period from 1975 to 2000. They appear to be divided into two groups: *Gastil/Freedom House, Polity IV, and Vanhanen* indices of democracy assign low overall scores to Africa's democratic performance before 1990/91, after that they are rising considerably and indicate a momentous change in democratic reality. Stepan and Skach as well as Freedom House define countries with a value equal or higher than 0.65 "democratic" or "free".<sup>90</sup> Although they observe considerable progress in democratic regime transformation, all three democracy-measures diagnose African states on average to be autocratic still. Vanhanen's objective measure of political power contestation assigns the overall lowest values to African systems. According to Gastil's index of liberal democracy, overall African performance remained at the edge between "not free" and "partly free", moving more clearly into the "partly free" zone after 1991, but never reaching "free" scores. All three indices of democracy are strongly and highly correlated (Table 10).

This is not the case for their correlations with *Poe and Tate's* PIR indices, a fact that cannot merely be explained by the theoretical difference between democracy, defined as political system on the one hand, and protection of basic human rights on the other. Rather one can speculate how democratically substantial the observed rise in African democratisation is, if it is not highly correlated with a guarantee of minimum rights. According to Poe and Tate, during the 1970s and 80s the average African country was characterised by a limited amount of imprisonment for non-violent political activity. Torture and beating were exceptional and political murder rare. During the unrests after 1990 Africa moves towards more extensive political imprisonment; execution or other political murders and brutality became more common; unlimited detention, with or without trial, for political views became more frequent.

Figure 11 compares the evolution of personal integrity, political, and civil rights in Africa over the past decades. Until 1989 Poe and Tate's PIR scores and the Freedom House assessment of political and civil rights realisation in Africa run approximately parallel. When it comes to the transition years, in contrast, it is obvious that the concept of personal integrity deviates

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<sup>89</sup> Transformations: **Gastil:** To combine both political and civil rights scores Helliwell's probability of freedom (PFR) index is used.  $PFR = (14 - (\text{political liberties} + \text{civil liberties}))/12$ . Helliwell, J. F. (1994) "Empirical linkages between democracy and economic growth." *British Journal of Political Science* 24. **Polity IV:** (polity+11)/21. 11 is added to make the score range from 1 to 21 (and no information is lost by 0 scores that neither existed in the original scale). After division by 21 the score ranges from 0 to 1. **Poe & Tate:** Their scales are recoded from 1 to 5 (high). Next step: (recoded score\*2)/10. **Vanhanen's** index is divided by 70.

<sup>90</sup> Stepan, A. & Skach, C. (1993) "Constitutional frameworks and democratic consolidation: parliamentarism versus presidentialism." *World Politics* 46: 1-22.

considerably from - and therefore is not included in - data on African political and civil rights protection.

This result might indicate the toughness of times of transition: in the early nineties Africa experienced widespread popular protests, strikes, and fights, which in several countries amounted to civil wars, and consequently both PIR measures depict a rise in rights violation for this period. However, this conclusion contradicts the findings of Zanger that the higher the magnitude of democratisation, the less state violence occurs already in the year of transition.<sup>91</sup> By the end of 1993, the year in which Poe and Tate's scores end, most African countries experiencing political change had already undergone elections. Poe and Tate focus on personal integrity defined as the absence of governmental terrorism, e.g. murder, torture, forced disappearance, and imprisonment of persons for their political views – crimes that are incompatible with any minimum standard of liberal democracy. The results in table 10 and figure 11, therefore, support suspicion about the true democratic nature of these newly emerged African regimes.

What has been the role of economic development in contrast to political tradition in the processes of democratisation and rights protection? In the following the regression equation is specified to test the economic development hypothesis for Africa.

## 2. The Relationship between Economic Development and Democracy in Africa

The positive, stable relationship between democracy and development, which is claimed by modernisation theory, can appear in a linear or curvilinear functional form. First a linear relationship, then alternative functional forms are considered. Finally the results are analysed and interpreted (for SPSS data file see disc).

### *The Linear Relationship*

To avoid spatial and time-serial autocorrelation and unit effects in the OLS estimation, we integrate a lagged democracy variable and two regional dummy variables for North and West Africa in our model.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> Democracy is measured by Polity III, the forerunner of Polity IV. Zanger, S. C. (2000).

<sup>92</sup> Landman, Todd (1999). p. 617f.

Its predominantly Arab inhabitants distinguish North Africa from the rest of the continent (Country list 3). Arabs form nearly 100% of the Maghreb populations, and also in Sudan and Mauritania Arabs constitute the largest ethnic group. Moreover, the religion of Islam is a major unifying principle within the region. Thus, ethnicity and religion make North Africa “a self-contained Islamic civilisation in microcosm”. As the Western part of the Arab world, the region is culturally, politically, and economically connected with the Middle East. Unlike the majority of the Sub-Sahara, the World Bank classifies most of North African states as middle-income countries. They differ from the rest of the continent in their economic structure, since on the whole they have considerable additional income from oil-exports (e.g. Libya, Sudan, and Algeria), diamond industry (e.g. Mauritania), or tourism (e.g. Tunisia and Egypt). In the early 1980s social protests in several Northern states began to call for regime change and rights protection, reaching their peak in 1993/94, but eventually ending in a retreat of civil society and an expansion of state power via “iron-fisted security measures”. Islamist opposition movements, often armed, tried to force changes upon governments that were (and still are) rested on the army and intelligence sectors. Limited liberalisation was granted, but served as a vehicle to provide some minimal legitimacy to the regimes.<sup>93</sup> By 1993-94 disillusion set in as the promised changes failed to materialise. The experiments had been aborted by Morocco, co-opted by Mauritania and Tunisia, crushed in Algeria or were altogether absent in Egypt, Libya, and Sudan. Pressures for democratic change from within society have been met by the consolidation of state power. Today, all Northern African governments keep hold of executive supremacy, exercise strict control of the media, refuse to guarantee basic rights, engage in suspect elections, deny citizens equality before the law, and create extended constraints on voluntary associations.<sup>94</sup>

Within the Sub-Sahara, the majority of states classified as the West African area are distinguished from the rest of the continent by their comparatively higher performance in rights protection over the past quarter of a century (Country list 4). All selected states belong to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) founded in 1975. Its task has been to promote regional integration in all fields of economic and diplomatic activity, the aim being development through a single common market and a common tariff for all member states. However, so far there have not been significant economic gains from trade creation. Modelled after the European Union, the ECOWAS arrangement holds together some 200 million people

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<sup>93</sup> Mohamedou, M. (1999) “The Rise and Fall of Democratization in the Maghreb.” In: Magnarella, P. J. (ed. 1999). pp. 209-236. CIA, “The World Factbook 2001.” <<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/>>. August 2001.

<sup>94</sup> Sivan, E. (1997) “Constraints and Opportunities in the Arab World.” *Journal of Democracy* 8 (2): 101-113.

and operate through a conference of Heads of State, Council of Ministers, an executive secretariat, a development and cooperation fund and five specialised commissions dealing with a wide area of issues: besides cooperation in trade and finance matters, topics such as immigration, social, cultural, and administration topics on the agenda. Other sub-regional groupings binding several of the selected states together are the Mano River Union and the West African Economic Community (CEAO). Even though ECOWAS (and outside observers) assesses its achievements with respect to economic integration as “clearly below expectations”, cooperation in ECOWAS and other international regimes have led to regional spillover. Not only do the ECOWAS headquarters in Nigeria aspire to realise supranational principles of decision-making, but ECOWAS regulations also facilitate, contain and curtail intra-regional migration, which takes place within diverse political, economic, social and ethnic contexts. Related literature points out the transformation of brain drain into brain circulation and commercial migration in place of labour migration within the region. This exchange of human resources, knowledge, and political values makes the West African region outstanding on the continent.<sup>95</sup> These considerations on sub-regional variations result in the following regression model:

$$D_t = \alpha + \beta_1 D_{t-1} + \beta_2 E_t + \beta_3 NA + \beta_4 WA + \varepsilon,$$

whereby  $D_t$  is democracy or rights protection at time  $t$ ;  $D_{t-1}$  is democracy or rights protection in the previous year;  $E_t$  is the level of economic development at time  $t$ ; NA and WA are the North and West African dummies; and  $\varepsilon$  is the error term. To avoid multicollinearity, we run ten regressions all in all, two per index, five using (the natural logarithm of) income per capita and another five using (the natural logarithm of) energy consumption as independent variable. Appropriate checks for autocorrelation, homoskedasticity, and skewness were conducted. Table 12 estimates the parameters  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta_1$ ,  $\beta_2$ , and  $\beta_3$ . Economic development appears to have a significant, yet weak effect on rights protection, especially the protection of personal integrity. Poe and Tate’s two indices and Gastil’s Survey of Freedom score are positively influenced by a higher income per capita level, while Polity IV and Vanhanen’s index of democratic

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<sup>95</sup> Teunissen, J. M. (ed. 1996) *Regionalism and the Global Economy: The Case of Africa*. The Hague, Fondad, p. 23ff. See also: ECOWAS, “Economic Community of West African States.” <<http://www.ecowas.int/>>. August 2002. Adepoju, A. (2001) “Regional organizations and intra-regional migration in sub-Saharan Africa: Challenges and prospects.” *International Migration* 39 (6): 43-59. Jones, B. (2002) “Economic integration and convergence of per capita income in West Africa.” *Revue Africaine de Development* 14 (1): 18-47.

institutionalisation are not affected by African economic factors. However, none of the energy regressions lends support to the economic development hypothesis.

Those regressions describing significant effects of economic standing also show significant results for the West African dummy variable. The location of a country in Western Africa has a positive, significant influence on rights protection as measured by Poe, Tate, and Gastil; nevertheless, according to Vanhanen and Polity IV the region is not distinguished for its institutional progress of democracy. The North African dummy, on the other hand, has a negative and statistically significant impact on personal integrity protection as well as democracy captured by Vanhanen's index. As anticipated, the wave of change did not affect the countries in and around the Maghreb region as much as the other 44 observed African countries.

Democratic tradition clearly has the greatest impact on democracy. Regression equations including a democracy score return high R squared values between 73 and 86 per cent. If we choose basic human rights as the benchmark for democratic evolution, the independent variables will still determine around 50 per cent of a PIR record in any given year (Poe & Tate 1 for Amnesty International: R square = .51 / .49 and Poe & Tate 2 for the State Department: R square = .53 / .49).

The low, but significant result for the GNI per capita variable in the first Gastil regression contradicts earlier findings for Sub-Saharan Africa by Widner.<sup>96</sup> Many observers agree that it was economic decline rather than success, which led to deterioration in state legitimacy and an increase in popular protest, eventually catalysing political opposition.<sup>97</sup> Others believe that austerity policies launched by African governments in response to economic decline were the principle trigger for social unrest.<sup>98</sup> However, around one third of the new African democracies had no economic protest at all.<sup>99</sup>

Bratton and van de Walle, too, find no or little correlation between intensity of political unrest and economic trends.<sup>100</sup> Their regression explains 67 per cent of the variance observed in the dependent variable, democracy as measured by Gastil, and describes the causes of democratic transitions with the following independent variables, *all* of which are significant: intervention into the transition process by the military of the country in concern, frequency of political

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<sup>96</sup> Przeworski, A. et al (2000). p. 136ff. Widner, Jennifer A. (1994). p. 49ff.

<sup>97</sup> Bratton, Michael & van de Walle, Nicolas (1997). Ake, C. (1993) "The unique case of African democracy." *International Affairs* 69: 239-244.

<sup>98</sup> E.g. Olukoshi, A. & Laakso, L. (eds. 1996) *Challenges to the Nation-State in Africa*. Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikaninst. p. 10ff.

<sup>99</sup> Barkan, J. (1999) "Regime change in Africa." *Journal of Democracy* 10: 165-170.

<sup>100</sup> Bratton, Michael & van de Walle, Nicolas (1997). p. 219ff.

protest, opposition cohesion, and politically conditional overseas development assistance (whereby the impact of the latter variable was quite weak).<sup>101</sup> They conclude, “[A]ny explanation of democratisation must incorporate the initiatives and interplay of purposive political actors.”

So far we assume that there is no linear relationship between levels of economic development and institutionalised democracy in Africa while controlling for regional differences. However, there seems to be some limited support for a correlation between economic standing and protection of personal integrity rights. Next we will consider possible non-linear relationships.

### *The Non-linear Relationship*

Since we find firstly only weak bivariate correlations between Poe & Tate 1 and 2 and measures of democracy, and secondly, the relationship between development and personal integrity protection appears to be correctly described by a linear function, we will now focus on Gastil, Polity IV and Vanhanen measures for Africa over the observed period. There might be other possible functional forms that fit the modernisation hypothesis. Democracy as a function of economic development might follow for example a logistic curve, i.e. in the beginning democracy does not exist, but after some economic progress the political system of a country begins to incorporate more and more democratic features until democracy is fully established and consolidated and cannot improve further. Another possibility might be a step function that could visualize the idea of a sudden take-off to democracy, once a certain income level is achieved.

Table 13 lists the averages for the five democracy and rights measures by level of income. In accordance with the linear relationship PIR scores rise with higher income levels (however there seems to be some inconsistency in this tendency for countries with a per capita income higher than \$5000). - In contrast, the democracy scores of Vanhanen, Polity IV, and Gastil show an upward trend up to an income level between \$3001-3500, but beyond they are declining again sharply. Figures 14a and 14b depict these findings in diagrams and give the observed country-years by income as well as the average democracy scores by income (Gastil, Polity IV, and Vanhanen only). Comparatively rich African countries do not appear to have performed better than their poorer neighbours over the past 25 years. Rather it seems that on

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<sup>101</sup> Overseas development status might be interpreted as related to level of economic development. However, the effects of aid on the recipients’ country can be ambiguous, moreover the coefficient for this variable in Bratton and van de Walle’s regression is only .04. See also: Deger, S. & Sen, S. (1991) “Military Expenditure, Aid, and Economic Development.” In: World Bank (ed. 1991) *Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics*. Washington, D.C., World Bank. pp. 159-189.

average autocratic regimes in states, which are relatively well off, found it easier to avoid the establishment of democratic institutions.

Many African countries, however, are very poor, clustering in the \$0-500 GNI per capita group. For the sake of completeness, we should therefore check the income range between \$0-2000, which covers the majority of African states, for regularities in democratic evolution. Figures 16a and 16b visualise the results for the three democracy scores given in table 15. This more detailed investigation does not reveal any striking pattern connecting democracy and development in Africa. Neither the three democracy scores nor the two rights measures indicate a common variance between the two phenomena in the income group below \$2000 per capita. This result infirms Huntington's claim that democracies tend to "break out" in countries with per capita incomes that range from \$1000 to \$3000.<sup>102</sup>

Comparing country-years and mean democracy scores by groups of income as we do here means that we are dealing with an uneven number of observations in each income category. The scatterplots in figures 17 and 18 solve this problem and show the mean democracy scores for each country-year by (the natural logarithm of) per capita GNI measured on a continuous scale. Figure 6 refers to all three measures of democracy, while figure 7 shows the Polity IV and Vanhanen scores only, considering the fact that the Gastil data differ from the other two democracy scores, since they show a slightly higher correlation with the Poe and Tate's indices (.34 and .37) and moreover a weak, but still significant linear effect of development on democracy (.01).

A horizontal line divides both scatterplots at 0.65, the benchmark for "democratic" or "free".<sup>103</sup> However, there is no clear direction apparent in the African data on democracy and development. We cannot find any observable pattern such as a logistic, step or other functional form in these diagrams. Moreover, for either of the scatterplots we receive a very low R square value (.05. and .03 respectively).

All in all, measures of democratic institutionalisation, i.e. Vanhanen and Polity IV, do not support the economic development thesis with respect to Africa. Higher levels of economic development are no significant determinants of higher degrees of democracy, and democratic changes did not occur more often in comparatively better-endowed African countries as measured by income and energy consumption per capita. Democratic and economic successes

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<sup>102</sup> Huntington, Samuel P. (1991).

<sup>103</sup> Stepan, A. & Skach, C. (1993), p. 20.



seem to be independently spread over the African continent. The protection of rights, in contrast, seems to be significantly, yet weakly, influenced by economic standing.

### 3. Summarising the Statistical Results: Economic Factors, Democracy and Personal Integrity Protection

Three main conclusions can be drawn from the statistical analysis so far. Firstly, we can make statements on the *overall* nature of African political systems – knowing that such a statement cannot do justice to individually very different democratisation experiences in African countries. Though the timing, content, and consequences of recent political change in Africa clearly vary by country, as do countries' previous experience with democratic institutions, most of Africa's democracies appear to be hollow and merely procedural systems lacking in efficient rights protection and/or enforcement of the rule of law. Indices of personal integrity protection and measures of democracy are rather weakly correlated, revealing that incidences of state terrorism did not decline after new governments were elected. Therefore, even after the wave of democratisation that followed the fall of Soviet communism, most African political systems are not true liberal democracies. Old neo-patrimonial systems developed into pseudodemocracies, halfway stuck between authoritarianism and liberal democracy. Over the observed period North Africa always lagged behind in democratisation efforts in comparison with Sub-Saharan countries and rather reconsolidated autocratic state power. Considering the whole observed period, most countries in West Africa provided a better protection of political, civil, and personal integrity rights than others states on the continent. However, despite regional arrangements of economic and political integration, such as ECOWAS, the region as a whole is not distinguished for its progress in the institutionalisation of democracy.

Secondly, modernisation theory in its *strong* version is infirmed for Africa as a whole. Though most Northern states showed a better economic performance, they did not democratise as much as modernisation would expect. Moreover, none of our indices measuring democratic institutions proved significant. Half of the regressions did not show any effect of economic development on either democracy or rights protection. We conclude from these statistical results that economic successes do not explain African steps towards liberalisation or transition over the past decades. Good economic performance does statistically not appear as a necessary

prerequisite for the establishment of democratic institutions. Democracy seems to be mainly determined by the democratic tradition, a fact elaborated in the subsequent chapter about the political culture concept.

Thirdly, a *modified* version of modernisation theory, claiming that a young democratic regime, in order to remain in place beyond the initial transition stage and to consolidate into a genuine liberal democracy, requires positive economic growth, receives some, yet rather restricted support from our findings on Africa.<sup>104</sup> Economic explanations for personal integrity protection are weak but significant. Thus, we find some limited support for the hypothesis that in order to fill modern institutions, which are only the *formal* building blocks of democracy, with true spirit or genuine respect for rights, African economic development might be necessary. Transition as defined by fair elections was possible despite or on the basis of economic frustration; however, economic growth might be of help to young African democratic regimes trying to consolidate as liberal democracies.<sup>105</sup>

Most African countries had endured economic hardships through the late 1970s and 1980s, and yet they proceeded with different kinds of political liberalisation at different rates. Thus the connection between economics and political liberalisation remains misty.<sup>106</sup> The subsequent qualitative analysis of Ghana, Mali, and Benin intends to bring more light into the democratisation mystery by conducting a qualitative comparison of the political and economic history of these countries.

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<sup>104</sup> Przeworski, A. et al (2000). p. 136ff. Poe, S. C. & Tate, C. N. (1994). p. 861ff.

<sup>105</sup> Wiseman, Jennifer A. (ed. 1994). p. 8ff. Goulbourne, H. (1987) "The State, Development, and the Need for Participatory Democracy in Africa" In: Nyong, P. A. (ed. 1987) *Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa*. London, UN University/Zed Books.

<sup>106</sup> Gibson, C. C. (2002). p. 208f.

### III. History, Economic Developments and Political Culture

#### 1. Political and Economic Survey of Benin, Mali and Ghana

Benin, Ghana and Mali are situated in West Africa, a region the quantitative analysis distinguished from the rest of the continent. Statistically, these three countries might appear to be prototypes of modernisation theory, because on average they have shown positive economic and democratic progress. Comparing the average per capita income levels in the 1980s with those in the 1990s, all three countries have improved, and thus show the positive economic growth, which modernisation theory regards as necessary for democratic evolution.<sup>107</sup>

In the following, an overview is given of the historical experiences, democratic quality, and economic situations of Benin, Mali and Ghana (for orientation additional economic indicators and a time outline since independence are given in the appendix). This overview serves as a basis for the further analysis of political and socio-economic interconnections in these three countries.

#### Benin

According to oral tradition, a group of Adja migrated east during the 11<sup>th</sup> or 12<sup>th</sup> century and founded the village of Allarda. Allarda became the capital of Great Ardra, which reached the peak of its powers in the 16th century. Supported by European contacts and weapons, the kingdom was later split into three, with other capitals at Ajatche (later to become Porto Novo), and Abomey. The Abomey group organised into a strongly centralised kingdom, Dahomey, which flourished under the Fon kings during the late 17<sup>th</sup> century. They came to dominate the region, and pushed its borders as far as Nigeria to the east. This brought them into conflict with the powerful Yoruba kingdom of Oyo, which captured Abomey in 1738 and forced Dahomey to pay annual tribute.

The kings of Dahomey had gained a monopoly in the slave trade and raided neighbouring kingdoms for slaves. By 1700, about 20,000 slaves were being transported annually in

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<sup>107</sup> To assess positive economic and positive democratic developments the arithmetic means of GNI per capita and the Gastil/Freedom House Index were calculated for individual countries over the two periods 1979-1989 and 1990-2000. Ghana, Mali, and Benin belong to a group revealing positive evolutions in both categories.

exchange for European weapons. When Britain and France stopped the slave trade after 1815, King Ghezo (1818-1858) reorganised his empire and economy. Palm oil became the main export product. He freed himself politically from the Yoruba ruler Alafin of Oyo's supreme power in 1818 and signed a trade contract with the French in 1851, who held a base on the coast. They called the Fon region "Benin", though this was the name of an empire far more east in the delta of the Niger. In 1863, the coast state Porto Novo became a French protectorate. Thirty years later, they subjugated the ruling Fon King Béhanzin. Abomey had resisted French dominance in fierce warfare. In 1890, the whole region of today's Benin was named Dahomey and became part of French West Africa. Since the population quickly took over French school education, Dahomey was known as "quartier latin" in Black Africa. Administrative staff for several colonies was recruited here. Dahomey became a self-governing republic within the French Community in December 1958, and an independent state on 1<sup>st</sup> August 1960.<sup>108</sup>

Dahomey's first president was Herbert Maga, a respected statesman, who had been elected to the French parliament in 1951 and served as a junior minister of labour in the French cabinet before returning to Benin. However, economic troubles led to unrest, and the armed forces under General Christophe Soglo overthrew the government in 1963. He installed a civilian government, led by Sourou-Migan Apithy, Maga's former vice-president. Unrest in the north led to military intervention in December 1965 and the return of General Soglo. He was in turn overthrown by a coup led by Lieutenant Colonel Alphonse Alley, which placed Justin Ahomadegbé in power. Regional rivalries led to three successive military-supported coups between 1967 to 1970. The 1969 election produced a stalemate between the leaders of the three regions, the south, the centre, and the north. In May 1970 a three-man presidential council was established, consisting of Maga, Ahomadegbé and Apithy. Each member was to lead the country for two years. The first hand-over, from Maga to Ahomadegbé, was successful, but the military again intervened in October 1972. Major Mathieu Kérékou, who had been Maga's aide-de-camp in the 1960s, proclaimed himself president. The triumvirate were imprisoned until 1981, later they were exiled.

Kérékou established a ruling military council containing equal numbers of army officers from the three main regions, and declared Dahomey a Marxist-Leninist state. In December 1975 the country was officially re-named the "People's Republic of Benin" to underline its break from the colonial past. Banks and financial institutions were nationalised, and a single ruling party, the "Parti de la Révolution Populaire du Bénin" (PRPB), was established.

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<sup>108</sup> Decalo, Samuel (1987) *Historical Dictionary of Benin*. Metuchen, N.J., Scarecrow. p.37ff. Elwert, Georg (2001) "Benin." In: Mabe, Jacob Emanuel (ed. 2001), *Das Afrika-Lexikon*. Wuppertal, Hammer. p. 74-76.

Social and economic difficulties troubled the country, and by the 1980s the government began to replace its socialist philosophy with approaches to the West. By 1986, the worsening crisis had forced Kérékou to approach the IMF for help with aid and debt rescheduling.<sup>109</sup> Following two coup attempts in 1988, popular discontent came to a head during 1989, with prolonged strikes by teachers and civil servants, many of whom had not been paid since 1988. Kérékou allowed a Sovereign National Conference, which drew up a new constitution and provided for multi-party elections, but he remained as president and head of the armed forces. The conference also designated Nicéphore Soglo, an ex-World bank official, as prime minister, and an interim civilian government was appointed. This has been described as Sub-Saharan Africa's first "civilian coup". In 1991 the country's name was changed to "The Republic of Benin".

In March 1991, Kérékou was defeated at the polls for the presidency by Soglo and he retired without any resistance. The avowed aim of the new government of President Soglo was to rebuild the economy, after years of misallocation of resources. On 1<sup>st</sup> April 1991 a freely elected multi-party national assembly was inaugurated with 20 parties sharing 64 seats.<sup>110</sup>

The 1995 legislative elections, contested by 30 parties, were generally calm and fair although allegations of fraud meant that elections in 13 constituencies had to be rerun. Soglo's supporters found themselves in a minority in parliament. Presidential elections took place in 1996. The first round on 3<sup>rd</sup> March gave Soglo a narrow lead over Kérékou, although neither had the 50% necessary to prevent the second round. Third placed Adrien Houngbedji subsequently announced his support for Kérékou, and eventually Benin's constitutional court confirmed that Kérékou had won with 54% over Soglo's 46%. There were reports of "general satisfaction" with the electoral process. There was a good turnout (86% in the first round, 78% in the second). After some tension, and suggestions that Soglo would not hand over to the former dictator, President Kérékou was sworn in on 4<sup>th</sup> April 1996. Houngbedji was rewarded with the post of prime minister. In May 1998, Houngbedji resigned, together with the other three ministers from his Democratic Renewal Party (PRD). The PRD had been the biggest single party in the government coalition. Kérékou created a new government without PRD representation.

The latest presidential elections took place on 4<sup>th</sup> March 2001 and again the election results were contested, even though the electoral process itself appeared to have been free and fair. Seventeen candidates stood, including Kérékou, Soglo and Houngbedji. Over 87% of eligible

<sup>109</sup> Decalo, Samuel (1987). Westebbe, Richard (1994) "Structural Adjustment, Rent Seeking, and Liberalization in Benin." In: Widner, Jennifer A. (ed. 1994). p. 80-100. p. 81f.

<sup>110</sup> Allen, Chris (1992) "Benin: The Democratic Model." *Review of African Political Economy* 54: 43-58.

voters turned out - an exceptionally high number. Kérékou and Soglo gained the greatest share of the votes with about 47% and 29% respectively. Houngbedji came third with 12%, and Bruno Amoussou, Minister of State in Kérékou's government, came fourth (8%). Election observers said that there were discrepancies and logistical problems, but these were the result of inefficiency rather than fraud. As in 1995, the result was acknowledged as representing the will of the people. As no candidate won over 51%, there should have been a run-off between the top two candidates. But Soglo boycotted the second round against Kérékou, claiming election irregularities. The third-placed candidate, Houngbedji, also refused to enter. The run-off was therefore between Kérékou and Amoussou. Kérékou was inaugurated president on 6<sup>th</sup> April 2003. On 8<sup>th</sup> May President Kérékou announced his new cabinet; Amoussou was re-appointed as Minister of State.<sup>111</sup>

Although democratic renewal around 1990 was initiated and carried through by students, public sector workers, and the urban population, these groups had little say in party formation; government and parliament are highly elitist. However, voter turnouts at elections are high, suggesting a politically interested and active civil society. In spite of the re-election of Kérékou, Benin receives good grades for the quality of its democracy. In future, the democratic institutions will have to be improved and decentralised to adapt to Benin's circumstances.<sup>112</sup>

Benin has a population of 7.04 million; the median age is 16.4 years (in comparison: USA: 35.8 years, Germany: 41.3 years).<sup>113</sup> 40% of the population are Fon and Adja, 12% Yoruba, 9% Barba, 8% Betamarib, and the remaining inhabitants belong to other ethnic groups. Around 35% of the population holds indigenous religious beliefs, 35% is Christian, and 30% Muslim.<sup>114</sup> National language are Fon, Gengbe/Mina, Yoruba, Dendi and others. Official languages is French. Official capital is Porto Novo; Cotonou is the seat of government.<sup>115</sup>

Poor in natural resources, Benin is traditionally a trading nation and its economy is heavily dependent on the success of its much larger neighbour, Nigeria. A large part of Benin's economy is based on the re-export of goods to Nigeria. Benin holds position 147 among a total 162 countries recounted in the Human Development Index (HDI).<sup>116</sup> The agricultural sector

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<sup>111</sup> Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Country Profile Benin." <<http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029394365&a=KCountryProfile&aid=1019501123315>> August 2003.

<sup>112</sup> Allen, Chris (1992). p. 43-58.

<sup>113</sup> The World Fact Book, "Benin." <<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/bn.html>> August 2003.

<sup>114</sup> Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Country Profile Benin."

<sup>115</sup> The World Fact Book, "Benin."

<sup>116</sup> Elwert, Georg (2001). The *HDI* was developed by UNDP and measures deprivation in basic human development in a country. Variables included are the percentage of people expected to die before age 40, adult illiteracy rate, percentage of people without access to health services and safe water, and percentage of underweight children 5 years of age. (Definition from: Todaro, Michael P. p. 747f.)

contributes 38% of GDP and employs an estimated 55% of the labour force. The largest exports in value are cotton, cotton seed and palm oil. Agricultural diversification is regarded as inadequate with cotton accounting for over 80% of Benin's official exports and 40% of GDP. The production base is too narrow (cement is the only major industrial product).

Regime change has brought sustained economic policy reforms and political stability, both of which enabled Benin to achieve a 4.9% average annual economic growth in the period 1991 to 2001. The GDP growth rate in 2002 was 5.4%. GDP in 2002 was \$7.3 billion and GDP per capita was \$1,070 in purchasing power parity. Despite a decade of positive per capita income growth, rapid population rise has offset much of this increase. Benin's economy remains largely dependent on international aid. It is one of the first countries to benefit under the framework of the debt initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). It will receive around \$460 million in debt relief.<sup>117</sup>

## Mali

The name of the republic goes back to the Empire of Mali, founded by the Malinke in the 13<sup>th</sup> century. Sundjata Keita (around 1230-55), who is known as the first emperor of Mali, won over the King of Sosso in 1235, and conquered the area of Western Sudan between the Gambia, the Fouta-Djalou, and the city of Djenné on the Niger River. Mali reached the climax of its power under emperor Kankan Musa (around 1312-37), who enlarged his country, finally reaching from the mouth of the Gambia to Gao. He also became famous for his magnificent pilgrimage to Mecca in 1324-25. The cities Djenné and Timbuktu flourished and became important trading centres. In the 15<sup>th</sup> century Tuareg and Songhai attacked Mali, which shrank to a small state. Now the Songhai, who had their centre in Gao, gained hegemony in West Africa under their Sonni (saviour), Ali (around 1465-92), and their Aski (emperor), Mohammed (1493-1528). The Songhai were overthrown by Moroccans in 1591.

After 1660 the Bambara founded a state around the city of Ségou, which is south of the Moroccan sphere of influence. The Bambara state prospered under Biton Kulibali (1712-55). The Islamic reformist movement included many parts of Africa and led to the foundation of further states during the 19<sup>th</sup> century. In 1818 Amadu Hammadi Bubu (†1844) subjugated the Bambara and conquered Timbuktu and Djenné. In 1850 Omar Seydu Tall (1797-1864) called

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<sup>117</sup> Bierschenk, Thomas, Thiouliou, Elisabeth & Bako-Arifari, Nassirou, "Institutionalising the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) Approach in Benin." <<http://www.uni-mainz.de/~ifeas/workingpapers/Arbeitspapiere.html>> August 2003. World Bank, "Benin-Country Brief." <<http://www.worldbank.org/af/bj2.htm>> August 2003. The World Fact Book, "Benin."

for the foundation of a new Islamic empire. He conquered Ségou and Masina, but was not able to defeat either the Bambara nor the Fulbe. Omar's son and heir, Ahmadu (1833-98), came into conflict with France. After French troops had occupied Bamako and Ségou in 1833 and 1890, Ahmadu fled to Sokoto. Two years later, the French colony of "Soudan" was founded, which became part of West French Africa with administrative seat in Dakar. After 1899, Mali was part of the colony Haut-Senegal-Niger.

In 1910, Niger was carved out of this area to become a separate colony, whereas the parts of nowadays Mali were called "Soudan francais" until they became an independent republic on 22<sup>nd</sup> September 1960 under the leadership of President Modibo Keita. He declared a single party state and pursued Marxist socialist policies based on extensive nationalisation of the economy. Modibo Keita's regime was overthrown by a military coup in 1968.<sup>118</sup> From 1968 until 1991 Mali was governed by the single party military dictatorship of General Moussa Traoré. On 26<sup>th</sup> March 1991, Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré overthrew Traoré and a Transitional Committee (Comite de Transition pour le Salut du Peuple (CTSP)) was set up. Legislative elections finally took place in February and March 1992 and were won by ADEMA (Alliance for Democracy in Mali). Presidential elections in April 1992 were won by Alpha Oumar Konare from ADEMA. He was inaugurated as President on 8<sup>th</sup> June 1992.

Early 1993 saw discontent and frustration amongst a population with unrealistic expectations of the new democracy. This spilled over into violent student riots in Bamako on 5<sup>th</sup> April 1993. On 13<sup>th</sup> April, Prime Minister Touré and his government resigned. The outgoing Defence Minister Abdoulaye Sekou Sow was appointed as the new prime minister. A new coalition government was announced on 16<sup>th</sup> April 1993 which included the main opposition parties. However, internal problems within the ruling party led to a further reshuffle in November 1993 (the third since President Konare came to power in June 1992), and the resignation of Sekou Sow in February 1994. A new prime minister, Ibrahima Keita was appointed, and a fourth reshuffle completed in late 1994. The major opposition parties left the government.<sup>119</sup>

Presidential elections in May 1997 gave President Konare a further five-year term. The president received 84.36% of the vote. With 29%, the turnout was very low. Legislative elections in April 1997 were beset with technical problems, and after protests from the opposition parties were annulled by the constitutional court. They were rerun in July and August 1997 but were boycotted by the opposition. ADEMA won 131 of the 147 seats in the national assembly. Its allies, the Party for National Renewal and the Democratic and Social

<sup>118</sup> Imperato, Pascal James (1989) *Mali: A Search for Direction*. Boulder, Westview Press.

<sup>119</sup> Krings, Thomas (2001) "Mali." In: Mabe, Jacob Emanuel (ed. 2001). p. 373-375.



Convention, won eight and four seats respectively. The opposition refused to recognise the results.

Former President Konare was extremely active in the West African region as Chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 2000 and 2001. He was highly critical of undemocratic regimes and supported the peace process in Sierra Leone. He also inspired a regional moratorium on small arms. However, Konare faced criticism from opposition parties for spending too little time on domestic problems such as economy and education.

After two terms in power, Konare was succeeded as president in May 2002 by Amadou Toumani Touré (called ATT), leader of the democratic transition in 1991. Following ten years in power, and after losing the presidency, the legislative elections in July 2002 marked the end of the dominance of ADEMA over the political scene in Mali. Despite allegations of corruption and very low voter turnout, both the presidential and legislative elections last year were regarded as broadly free and fair. Toure's domestic priorities centre on: the struggling economy, Mali's unemployed and poorly educated youth, the fight against corruption, and expected food shortages following poor harvests in 2002.<sup>120</sup>

Clientelism has proven to be a major impediment to the consolidation of a democratic system. Moreover, there is a wide gap between urban and rural areas, between the politically dominating elites and the population, which is making it difficult for the political system to become differentiated.<sup>121</sup> But Mali's ambitious decentralisation process is developing satisfactorily. There are currently 703 communes with mayors and councils elected in 1999. The ministry in charge aims to get tax and service provision closer to the population who will therefore be able to see the direct benefits of local government. There is no guarantee that local communes can raise resources and more effectively than the central state. Both donors and the central government are helping the commune councils to build up their organizational abilities.

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Mali has a population of 11.6 million people with a median age of 16.3 years. The variable border between the rural world of the Sudanese, black African population in the south and the world of the lighter skinned Arabic-Berber nomads (*Tuaregs, Moors*) in the north runs right through the country. The politically dominating people in the South are the *Bambara* (33% of

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<sup>120</sup> Vengroff, Richard & Kone, Moctar (1995) "Mali: Democracy and Political Change." In: Wiseman, John A. (ed. 1995). p.45-70.

<sup>121</sup> Hanke, Stefanie (2001) *Systemwechsel in Mali: Bedingungen und Perspektiven der Demokratisierung eines neopartimonialen Systems*. Hamburg, Institut für Afrika-Kunde. p. 204ff.

<sup>122</sup> Vengroff, Richard & Kone, Moctar (1995).

the population), *Malinke* (6%) and *Sarakolle* (9%), which all belong to the Mande-tribes and form around half of the population. Also of Sudanese origin are *Senufo* (9%), *Bwa*, and *Dogon*. *Songhay* (6%) live in the area of Timbuktu-Gao and belong to the oldest inhabitants of Mali. The *Fulbe* farmers and their dependents, the *Rimaybe* and *Maccube*, live in the delta of the Niger River. Since the Middle Ages Islam has been the religious and cultural basis for around 90 percent of the population with the exception of the traditional Dogon and Bwa. Official language is French; other spoken languages are Bambara, Songhaz, Fulfulde, and Tamashek. The Malian capital is Bamako.<sup>123</sup>

Even for Africa, the living standard of Mali is low. The country ranges among the last ten in the HDI (position 153 amount 163 countries). Most of land-locked Mali being desert or semi-desert, economic activity is largely confined to the area irrigated by the Niger River. About 10% of the population is nomadic and around 80% of the labour force is engaged in farming and fishing. Mali's economy rests primarily on subsistence farming and animal husbandry, making it dependent on good rainfalls for its economic well-being. 2002 was a year of poor rainfall and the effects of this are now being felt. The gold mining sector is flourishing but the economy generally remains fragile. In 2002, GDP was \$9.8 billion, which equals \$860 GDP per capita in purchasing power parity. In the same year, GDP growth rate was 4.5%. 64% of the population live below the poverty line.<sup>124</sup> Mali's adherence to economic reform during the 1990s and the 50% devaluation of the African franc in January 1994 have pushed up economic growth to a sturdy 5% average in 1996-2002. In addition, devaluation brought some positive results to the rural population of Mali, including increased regional sales of beef and cereals. The conflict in Cote d'Ivoire, however, has led to an rise in the price of several basic consumer goods such as construction materials and fuel, and alternative trading routes have now to be used for imports.

Mali remains heavily aid dependent. Net aid receipts constitute 20% of GNP, with France being the main donor. In September 2002, France announced the cancellation of 38% of debts owed to her by Mali. Mali is eligible for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor countries Initiative (HIPC).<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>123</sup> Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Country Profile Mali."

<sup>124</sup> OECD, "African Economic Outlook 2002/03. Country Studies - Mali".

<[http://www.oecd.org/infobycountry/0,2646,en\\_2649\\_201185\\_1\\_70618\\_119663\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/infobycountry/0,2646,en_2649_201185_1_70618_119663_1_1,00.html)> August 2003.

Stephanie Hanke (2001). p. 70f.

<sup>125</sup> OECD, "African Economic Outlook 2002/03. Country Studies – Mali."

## Ghana

Not before ca. 1200, Akan-speaking peoples immigrated into the area of today's Ghana. In 1471 Portuguese seafarers reached the coast and after that the Portuguese (until 1624), English (after 1553), Dutch (1612-1871), Danes (1658-1850), and the Elector (Kurfürst) of Brandenburg (Groß-Friedrichsburg; 1683-1717) founded trading bases along the "Gold Coast". The main export product was the gold dust found in the hinterland. During the 18<sup>th</sup> century, slave trade became a more important economic activity. Mainly Ashanti warriors caught the slaves in the countryside and sold them via middlemen to Europeans. After the abolishment of slavery by the British parliament in 1807, the British government successively took over direct administrative functions and proclaimed the colony "Gold Coast" in 1850. Before, several Fanti chiefs had attempted an independent development under British protection. The Fanti, stemming from the area between the coast and the Ashanti land, had tried to take over elements of European constitutionalism and rule of law. Between 1844 and 1870 they had also founded a confederation.

In 1863-1901, the British crown colony of the Gold Coast fought several wars against the Ashanti until their land and other areas further North were integrated as "protectorates".<sup>126</sup> To draw the borders of nowadays Ghana, the remaining Dutch and Danish coast areas were integrated. Moreover, border contracts with France (1898) and Germany (1899) were signed. Under a League of Nations mandate, part of neighbouring German Togoland was included in 1919.

Already in 1939 and during World War II, chiefs and native intellectuals called for admission of Africans to higher positions in the administration and, moreover, for inner autonomy of the colony. In 1947, the "United Gold Coast Convention" (UGCC) was founded, a party dedicated to the aim of independence. Its leader, J.K.K.B. Danquah (1894-1965) also proposed to rename the Gold Coast "Ghana". The UGCC appointed K. Nkrumah to become its General Secretary. While a purely African commission was working on a draft for a constitution, Nkrumah left the UGCC and founded the activist "Convention People's Party" (CPP). After CPP had won the first elections, Nkrumah became prime minister in 1951 and in 1954 the Gold Coast became independent - the first British dependency in sub-Saharan Africa to attain independence.<sup>127</sup>

Nkrumah became the pioneer of "African socialism" and advocated the application of European socialism, modified to take account of the circumstances of Africa. Nkrumah gradually developed close ties with the Soviet bloc. In 1966, he was overthrown in a military

<sup>126</sup> Thomi, Walther (2001) "Ghana." In: Jacob Emanuel Mabe (ed. 2001). p. 226-228.

<sup>127</sup> Schmidt-Kallert, Einhard (1994) *Ghana*. Gotha, Justus Perthes Verlag. p. 21ff.

coup. The new rulers' aim of rectifying Ghana's problems before returning it to civilian rule were undermined by deep-rooted political and economic malpractice. The military handed over the problematic political business to a civilian government under Kofi Busia, who was again ousted by a military coup. What followed was an extended period of authoritarian rule under three successive military regimes. The first was Ingatius Kutu Acheampong's National Redemption Council/Supreme Military Council (NRC/SMC) from 1972 to 1978. The Council reactivated various state enterprises left uncompleted or abandoned after Nkrumah's overthrow. The chief attribute of the military governments was a single-minded, even slavish, devotion to personal wealth accumulations. Public dissatisfaction over the regime's politics rose to peak in 1978, and Frederick Akuffo saw his time coming. He overthrew the regime with a military coup and reconstituted SMC (1978-1979). In the same year, he was ousted by Jerry Rawlings' Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) (1979). He abolished the constitution, dissolved parliament and proscribed opposition political parties.<sup>128</sup>

However, by the mid-1980s, stability had returned to Ghana and its economy had started to recover with the help of a IMF adjustment programme. Following pressure for political reform, Rawlings lifted the ban on opposition parties. A new constitution was drawn up and approved in a referendum in April 1992. The constitution follows the presidential executive system and guarantees democratic freedoms.<sup>129</sup>

In November 1992, the first presidential elections for 13 years were held. Rawlings, standing for the National Democratic Congress (NDC) won with 58% of the vote. The elections were declared free and fair by international observers, including the Commonwealth and Organisation for African Unity. However, opposition leaders were unhappy with the conduct of the elections and subsequently boycotted the parliamentary election in December 1992. As a result the NDC won 189 of the 200 seats.

In December 1996, President Rawlings was re-elected for a second term with 57.5% of the vote. His nearest rival, John Kufuor of the New Patriotic Party (NPP), gained 39%. The opposition Grand Alliance (NPP and Peoples Convention Party) contested the parliamentary elections, winning 65 seats on the National Assembly. The ruling NDC won 133. The turnout was 76% and international observers agreed that the conduct of the elections was a credit to the development of democracy in Africa.

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<sup>128</sup> Rothchild, Donald (1995) "Rawlings and the Engineering of Legitimacy in Ghana." In: Zartman, I. William (ed. 1995), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*. Boulder, Lynne Rienner. pp. 49-65. p. 51f.

<sup>129</sup> Horner, Simon (1994) "Ghana: Striving to keep up the momentum." *The Courier* 144: 20-24.

On 7<sup>th</sup> December 2000, President Rawlings stood down in accordance with the terms of the Constitution which allows for just two terms of office. In the presidential elections which followed, his NDC party was represented by the vice-president, Professor John Atta Mills and the opposition NPP party was lead by John Kufuor. In a second round of elections, Kufuor won with 57% of the vote. He was formally sworn in as president on 7<sup>th</sup> January 2001. The parliamentary elections were run in tandem. Kufuor's NPP won 101 of the 200 seats, the NDC took 92. The turnout for both elections was 62%.

Observers had criticised the weakness of Ghanaian opposition, which were not able to pose an alternative to Rawlings until 2000. Ghana's pluralistic political system showed its strength when for the first time in its history, it witnessed the election of an opposition party, Kufuor's NPP. What followed was a smooth transition of power.<sup>130</sup>

Ghana, with its 20.5 Million inhabitants (median age: 19.8 years), is home to more than a hundred ethnicities, which speak around 75 different languages. The Kwa-speaking peoples, forming around 70% of the population, live in the South: the *Akan*-peoples (*Asante*, *Fanti*, *Brong*), *Ewe* and *Ga-Adangme*. Around 20% of the population belong to the Gur-speaking ethnicities, such as *Mole Dagbane*, *Gurma*, and *Grusi*. Official languages is English; Ghana's capital is Accra. Around two third of the Ghanaians are Christians, one fifth Moslems, and the rest belongs to traditional religions.

Well endowed with natural resources, Ghana has roughly twice the per capita output of the poorer countries in West Africa (HDI position: 119/162).<sup>131</sup> GDP in 2002 equaled \$42.5 billions and GDP per capita was \$2,100 in purchasing power parity. In the same year the GDP real growth rate was 5.8 percent. Gold, timber, and cocoa production are major sources of foreign exchange. The Ghanaian economy is still strongly oriented towards primary production with 60% of the work force employed in this sector.

Tough structural adjustment measures have been implemented and a liberal economic framework has been put in place after 1992. Throughout the 1990s, Ghana's GDP continued to grow at around 4% per year. A declining trend was seen from 1998 to 2000, but under the new Kufuor government the economy started to display once again increasing growth rates. In 2001 Ghana applied to the IMF for heavily indebted poor country (HIPC) status in order to obtain

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<sup>130</sup> Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Country Profile Ghana." <<http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029394365&a=KCountryProfile&aid=1019672601848>> August 2003. Haynes, Jeff (1995) "Ghana: From personalist to democratic rule." In: Wiseman, John A. (ed. 1995). p. 92-115.

<sup>131</sup> Thomi, Walter (2001).

debt relief. After much delay the application was finally approved in February 2002. In 2002, Ghana received \$6.9 billion aid. Despite growth, remaining problems are the high unemployment and a deepening poverty among vulnerable groups, particularly food crop farmers. Therefore, Ghana will require the necessary technical expertise to tackle the economy and its financial management.<sup>132</sup>

## 2. African Political-Economic Experiences and their Impact on Political Culture in Benin, Mali and Ghana

African political cultures are characterised by their diversity and fragmentation. In the course of history, a range of traditional institutions and cultural customs interacted with colonial structures and values and with the mechanisms and principles of independent states. Institutional multiplication has gone along with cultural diversification. The subsequent comparison methodically analyses these historical processes and exemplifies their specific manifestations in the Beninese, Malian, and Ghanaian past. This will allow to explain the failure of the early post-independence democracies, the eventual collapse of authoritarianism, and the sources of contemporary democracy in these three countries.

### 2.1. Pre-Colonialism

In many respects, both politically and culturally, pre-colonial Africa offered a wealth of many little traditions that did not generate one great tradition similar to those that flourished in Asia, Europe, and the near East. As described for Benin, Mali, and Ghana, still today, populations in basically all African countries consist of many different ethnicities with their own languages, religious affinities, and – most importantly – different *political traditions*.

Concerning **Benin**, Fon, Gun and Yoruba are related by a solid tradition of hierarchically oriented politics. However, Max, Toli, Adja, Ayizo and Xwla and the Gur-speaking tribes are organised in a segmented political form, i.e. they form a ethnic, religious, and lingual quite

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<sup>132</sup> International Monetary Fund (ed. 2000) *Ghana: Economic Development in a Democratic Environment*. Washington DC, IMF. The World Fact Book, “Ghana”.

<<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/gh.html>.> August 2003. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Country Profile Ghana.”

homogenous group, but there is little communication amongst the various living communities and villages. Mina, Anii and Deni, on the other hand, prefer forms of self-government, which include a strong element of publicity.<sup>133</sup> Up to the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the kingdom of Borgou in northern Benin worked on the basis of a kind of permanent wartime economy. The Wasangari, mounted warriors, formed the top of the social pyramid, followed by non-noble farmers (Routuriers and Bariba), traders in the caravanserais along the big trading routes (named Hausa or Dendi), various groups of slaves (Gando), and the Fulbe shepherds. These status groups developed a unique political system to organise their society, in which raids and redistribution of robbed goods alternated with each other. The Wasangari collected tributes from the other groups in raids, plundering, and war, which formed not only the basis for social but also for economic differentiation. Nowadays the system works without violence but local politics are still determined by a combination of appropriation and redistribution.<sup>134</sup>

The conventional social structure of most **Mali** peoples was extremely hierarchical. Up to the 1940s dependent slaves, professional castes, and free farmers were differentiated from the aristocracy.<sup>135</sup> **Ghanaian** ethnicities are commonly organised in chiefdoms, which play a central role in social life especially in the north. Since nearly all landownership is distributed on the basis of ethnicity, membership and individual willingness to identify with ethnicity are important prerequisites for having rights to cultivation and economic privileges.<sup>136</sup>

Despite the extraordinary diversity of African polities in the pre-colonial era, several common strands can be detected. At the heart of all African pre-colonial political units were well-defined “myths of origin” explaining the miracles of life, such as creation of the world, birth and death, and giving an orientation to realise a harmonious life with ones fellow people. African myths often narrate that the first man and woman came out of a cave or a reed and became original ancestors of a certain group. Other myths mirror traditions of matrilinear law: they relate how the first man came to the village of women. There he discovers his sexuality and decides to move in with the women. Alternatively, myths in which women enter the private sphere of men reveal patrilinear organisation.<sup>137</sup>

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<sup>133</sup> Elwert, Georg (2001). The World Fact Book, “Benin.”

<<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factobook/print/bn.html>.> August 2003.

<sup>134</sup> Bierschenk, Thomas (1997) *Die Fulbe Nordbenins: Geschichte, soziale Organisation, Wirtschaftsweise*. Hamburg, Lit Verlag. p. 29ff.

<sup>135</sup> Krings, Thomas (2001). The World Fact Book, “Mali.”

<<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factobook/print/bn.html>.> August 2003.

<sup>136</sup> Thomi, Walter (2001). The World Fact Book, “Ghana.”

<sup>137</sup> Forde, D. (ed. 1963) *African Worlds. Studies in the Cosmological Ideas and Social Values of African Peoples*. London, Toronto. p. 12ff.

In spite of their colourful variety, all these myths emphasised the centrality of the human being in the social order and they proposed an essentially pragmatic perspective on political life. Moreover, they provided the key concepts for political culture by outlining a philosophy of social differentiation, division of labour, and access to resources. These values of society were interpreted and conveyed by authority figures such as religious leaders or chiefs. They interacted in many different ways with representatives of communal life, i.e. lineage heads, representatives of age and gender groups, etc., to form “different types of political centres and to support many specific varieties of political interaction”.<sup>138</sup>

The centre of West African societies was the extended family, who were obliged to mutual assistance. Education, marriage wishes, presents for the bride and similar matters of life were discussed and decided in the whole clan. Thereby, marriage politics were a means to exert influence or solve conflicts. Several extended families lived together in a village. Solidarity is a central value in West African communities and accounts for complex system of reciprocal support of help and duties unique to Africa.<sup>139</sup>

Traditionally, the public affairs of West African village communities were discussed in a council of elders. Commonly well-respected younger village members, too, were allowed to speak here. Priests, medicine men, producers of metal, rich farmers, elders, bards (“griots”), and narrators formed the elite. Usually, the council ensured that all clans were represented among its members. Problems were solved through discussion (‘palaver’) or sometimes through ritual practices, rarely through violence. In this way, the villages organised celebrations, religious feasts, and often their own jurisdiction, too. At communal celebrations, bards repeatedly seized the opportunity to ironically criticise the elite (one is reminded of the origins of German carnival). Thus, it was possible to form a public opinion. – Since the communities were politically and economically independent, the leaders of ethnicities mainly joined with that of others only for special occasions, such as military intervention.

Europeans often misunderstood the role of women in traditional African societies. In West African communities men and women belonged to two distinct groups: societies were divided into a male and a female society. In contrast to the Arab world, however, this separation did not automatically equal a subordination of women. Patriarchy was not as common as today. The gender societies were especially important in West Africa. For example, a woman’s social status did not depend on that of her husband. Even economically, marriage partners were nearly independent from each other. Rules of inheritance differed, but matrimonial regulations

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<sup>138</sup> Chazan, Naomi (1994). p. 61f.

<sup>139</sup> Elwert, Georg (1983) *Bauern und Staat in Westafrika: Die Verpflechtung sozioökonomischer Faktoren am Beispiel Benins*. Frankfurt/Main, Campus. p. 209ff.



were wide-spread.<sup>140</sup> Although habits varied from region to region, the juxtaposition of different levels of consultation, i.e. gender, age, family, and tribe, created opportunities to utter individual opinions, discuss competences, and obstructed egoistic or authoritarian machinations of the elites.<sup>141</sup>

Attempting a categorisation of *democratic characteristics* in pre-colonial African societies, four principles can be distinguished. The first principle was that of *public involvement in decision-making*. In segmentary societies, e.g. in **Benin**, adults participated directly in the planning and implementation of communal affairs. More complex political entities deeply embedded notions of representation. The Asante in **Ghana**, for example, held ruling councils, whose members were delegated by different factions in society, such as youth, traders, artisans, religious leaders, and heads of kin groups.<sup>142</sup> The great empires of **Mali** and Songhay, on the other hand, practiced a form of indirect government that gave considerable autonomy to local communities.<sup>143</sup> Thus, even in highly centralised states consultation was a custom, and “values of participation, representation, and involvement were evident in a multiplicity of political settings”<sup>144</sup>.

The second principle was the *notion of consensus*. Extensive debates that eventually lead to decisions, blurring of opposites to find the middle road and to ensure agreement were essential features of earlier African politics.

Thirdly, traditional African polities tended to emphasise the *importance of the community above the individual*. In result, unlimited individualism or unchecked authoritarianism was rejected on the basis of the high value attributed to human relationships and communal harmony. A strong sense of balance provided for an atmosphere of compromise and often hindered a withdrawal of the elites from the rest of the population as it was common in Europe. By custom, rich Africans had to have many children; they were obliged to represent and to give feasts. In consequence, the accumulation of great inheritances and the creation of power imbalances was impeded.<sup>145</sup> To provide for the good of the community, many African societies, such as the **Beninese** Yoruba states, established a system of checks and balances to keep an eye on their rulers, monitor their actions, and hold them responsible if they failed to fulfil their duty. “Diffuse sanctions” against the abuse of power were, for example, the spread

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<sup>140</sup> Diarra, Abdramane (ed. 1990) *Westafrika zwischen autochthoner Kultur und Modernisierung: Ein Afrika-Reader*. Frankfurt/Main, Peter Lang Verlag. p. 15ff.

<sup>141</sup> Elwert, Georg (1983).p. 231f.

<sup>142</sup> Chazan, Naomi (1994). p. 62.

<sup>143</sup> Imperato, Pascal James (1989). p. 22ff.

<sup>144</sup> Chazan, Naomi (1994). p. 62f.

<sup>145</sup> Diarra, Abdramane (ed. 1990). p. 14f.

of rumours and gossip, mockery, and the withdrawal of services. “Institutional sanctions” comprised private and public criticism and admonitions, provisions for expressing grievances, and sophisticated means for the removal of unwanted rulers from office.

Fourthly, there existed practices to *balance the various pressures for popular autonomy with the rulers’ demand for control*:

“Decentralization, financial independence, and/or large measures of local self-government were integral features of even the most hierarchical political institutions in the precolonial period.”<sup>146</sup>

Nevertheless, certain *antidemocratic features* were also clearly evident in traditional West African politics, for example in such states that showed militaristic tendencies. In general, rulers assumed a highly personal aura. Power positions were held by certain authority figures, and although they were carefully checked and monitored, rulers were able to develop paternalistic structures or even authoritarian styles. In addition, filial commitment to the leaders was expected. Faith in the wisdom and justice of the leader was regarded as paramount to the belief in laws and procedures. The ideals of mutual responsibility were often overshadowed by the custom of deference or seniority, i.e. the obedience to elders, officeholders, clan heads, and village chiefs. In societies which maintained strict hierarchies and valued group affiliation as the basis for social interaction the concept of individual liberty was markedly absent.<sup>147</sup> Under these circumstances, the formation of formal opposition was impossible, and in fact, unsolved conflicts often led to fragmentation as was illustrated for the ancient **Beninese** kingdom of Great Arda, which was split into three.<sup>148</sup>

In consequence, democratic traditions and practices varied from region to region and were mixed with authoritarian norms in very different ways. West African diversity of political cultures ranged from highly participatory to heavily autocratic and repressive forms of government.<sup>149</sup> By the time European colonialists arrived in Benin, Mali, and Ghana, many of their societies were open to the participatory elements of Western democracy while some others were not.

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<sup>146</sup> Chazan, Naomi (1994). p. 61ff.

<sup>147</sup> Chazan, Naomi (1994). p. 61ff

<sup>148</sup> Thomi, Walther (2001).

<sup>149</sup> Chazan, Naomi (1994). p. 63f.

## 2.2. Colonialism

In **Benin** as elsewhere in Francophone Africa, the establishment of a colonial state monopolised the use of force on the side of the colonial power, i.e. France. Bierschenk illustrates the resulting social changes among the Beninese Fulbe and Wasangari described in the previous section (the former also inhabit southern Mali; for geographic distances see Map 1). Having relied on military strength, the Wasangari supremacy over other groups in the Borgou area suddenly ended. The French promoted a policy called “politique des races”: misunderstanding the “caste system” of Bourgou society, the French assumed that all Africans belonged to different tribes (tribus), and in the colonial future, each of these were to have autonomy from the others. The complex relations of subordination and superordination between various status groups were dissolved, and individual groups were subjected to the colonial state only. Taxes were to be paid directly to the state; even if earlier the post of a chief was not existent in certain status groups, each of them were to receive such a position, whose incumbent was to act as mediator to the colonial administration (commandement indigène). This equalled the transformation of professional groups into a tribe or ethnicity respectively; moreover, it meant a complete reorganisation of economic relationships.

Since France was unable to assert its authority in the first decades, the cattle-breeding Fulbe often had to pay taxes twice, to the Wasangari warriors and to the colony, too. Moreover, there were irregularities during the census, which was the basis for taxation. Some French civil servants only counted the number of Fulbe within a “mixed” villages, who then had to pay the tax for the whole village, one cow for each farmstead. Such imprecise regulations opened the door to misuse. The Wasangari when raiding villages often claimed to act in the name of the colonial power; in fact, the French African army (tirailleurs sénégalais) and their translators did the same. In political reports of the colony the latter are known to be notorious plunderers. Such events were the beginning of many serious ethnicity conflicts in today’s Africa.<sup>150</sup>

The “commandement indigène” or administrative chiefdom caused further problems. From the French point of view this new institution logically extended the administrative chain ranging from Paris over the general governor of French West Africa in Dakar, the governor of Benin to the district commandant (commandant du cercle). Below this level, the “commandement indigène” was organised in three steps: a few “chefs supérieurs” on the district level, then the canton chiefs, and eventually the village chiefs. The latter were to be elected by the village elders and subsequently had to be acknowledged by the colony. The role of the chiefs remained

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<sup>150</sup> Bierschenk, Thomas (1997). p. 39ff.

ambivalent during the whole colonial period. On the one hand they had to put through the colonial orders, on the other hand they needed a minimum of popular respect to be efficient.

Their tasks were numerous:

“They continuously receive orders: To carry out censuses, to levy troops, to collect taxes, to recruit forced labour, to summon persons to appear in court, to search for soldiers liable for military service or for wives of active soldiers, to recruit workers for street building projects, for bearers for the military, to organise work on the fields or the cotton plantations, etc. etc.”<sup>151</sup>

For power, the chiefs rested to a large extent on the colony. The burdens, which they had to impose on the population in the name of their colonial masters, could be selectively distributed by them; this offered the opportunity to punish disliked persons and reward supporters. Such practices became wide-spread and constituted the first steps to systematic political clientelism in Africa.<sup>152</sup>

Colonial rule in **Mali**, another province within French West Africa, was similar to that in Benin; however, the colonial administration of the so-called French Sudan was more centralised. The colony was divided into administrative districts or “cercles”, which in turn were divided into cantons, headed by local African leaders. The Malian canton chiefs were the central administrative agents and had the judicial and tax-collecting responsibilities, recruited men for forced labour, and served as intermediaries between the administration and the people.<sup>153</sup> Canton chiefs were chosen by the French rulers from among the ranks of traditional ruling families. However, individuals who had not such a legitimate claim to traditional authority would sometimes be chosen if they were able to read and write French and had proved loyalty to the colonial rulers. Often the population viewed the canton chiefs as nothing more than the puppets of the French; representation was not genuinely intended in the system.<sup>154</sup>

The canton chiefs reported to the French district commandant, who in turn reported to the governor. District commandants had broad authority and could order the arrest and detention of Africans without trial even for petty offences. Punishment was usually imposed for non-payment of taxes, refusing to work on labour gangs, and showing disrespect towards colonial officials. The legitimacy of forced labour was justified on the grounds that it was generally used for public projects such as road building. Key administrative posts in the capital of the colony and at the district headquarters were occupied by the French. Africans largely were support personnel, i.e. clerks, typists, messengers, house servants, and interpreters.

<sup>151</sup> Archive Nationales du Bénin, *V Bourgou n. r.. Cercle du Borgou, RP IV/1925*. Porto Novo, 1997. Translated from: Bierschenk, Thomas (1997). p. 47.

<sup>152</sup> Bierschenk, Thomas (1997). p. 45ff.

<sup>153</sup> Imperato, Pascal James (1989). p. 46f.

<sup>154</sup> Hanke, Stefanie (2001). p. 80f.

The 1904 decree creating French West Africa ordered also the establishment of advisory councils to the provincial governors. In French Sudan, this council consisted of mostly French senior civil servants and unofficial representatives, such as traders and canton chiefs, chosen by the local chamber of commerce and a limited African electorate. After 1939, military veterans and the rich holders of commercial licences were given membership, too.

French Sudan was served by several very able governors, among whom William Ponty (1899-1908), who later became governor-general of French West Africa, is praised for his numerous economic and military policy achievements. He made special efforts to stamp out indigenous slavery, created liberty villages for freed slaves, and fostered trade, development, and education. The “Ecole William Ponty”, named after him, was the first institution of higher learning in French West Africa. Ironically, many members of the later independence movement were trained at this and similar European schools.

In its colonies, France had initially followed a policy of “assimilation,” whose goal it was to educate Africans to assimilate to French culture considered superior to Islamic and indigenous cultures. Due to the variety and number of people living in the French overseas territories, “assimilation” was replaced by “association” after World War I. “Association” intended to allow African peoples and cultures to encounter the French culture so that they would evolve from a primitive state towards the French ideal of civilisation. The policy thus legitimised colonial rule by decree and the absence of elections. Moreover, the philosophy served as justification to limit higher education in French West African territories. The colonial authorities needed only a small number of assimilated Africans to communicate with the masses of associated Africans, and consequently not many secondary schools were established. The underlying racism of both “assimilation” and “association” provoked a counterreaction of African pride and culture in the so-called “négritude” movement whose members often became leading figures in anti-colonialism. In addition, under such circumstances colonial powers repeatedly had to face different forms of armed indigenous resistance, for example, a Dogon uprising in 1908, the Oulleminden Tuareg revolts in 1914 and 1916, religiously based resistance and other anti-colonial sentiments in French Sudan.<sup>155</sup>

Comparing the colonial styles of France and Britain, Lord Lugard is renowned for having developed the British principle of indirect rule, while Albert Sarraut worked out the French doctrine of direct rule. Ideally, both concepts are different in that direct rule tries to include customary systems into the colonial power system and intends a minimal interference with the government of traditional chiefs. France, on the other hand, was of the opinion that Africans

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<sup>155</sup> Imperato, Pascal James (1989), p. 46f.

should become French through education and the ideology of assimilation mentioned above. However, in reality it was often impossible to distinguish both styles. The British as well as the French reserved themselves the right to acknowledge and dismiss chiefs. Thus they, too, fundamentally changed the foundations of this position. In fact, British and French colonial styles were situation-orientated, pragmatic, and depended mainly on the colonial context, which was influenced by many variables.<sup>156</sup>

Hence, the alignments with traditional chieftaincy structures, created by British “indirect“ rule in **Ghana** (or the Gold Coast), resembled tinkering, too. In Ashanti, for example, the rationalisation of chieftaincy led to the dissolution of old hierarchies. Moreover, the colonial administration inevitably rewarded some constituencies and offended the sensibilities of others. The winners and losers sought to support or alter their respective positions by referring to history, in which separate origins and experiences were proclaimed. As the contestants stressed the supposedly ancient descent of their claims, politics acquired “a sharper ethnic flavour“. In some cases new identities crystallised around newly created structures of chieftaincy, e.g. Lobi-Dagarti in Nandom, Lobi in Lawra, Dagarti in Jirapa and Sisale in Lambussie evolved as new ethnonyms in northern Ghana.<sup>157</sup>

What is more, the British administration attached communities such as the northern Konkomba, who traditionally did not elect a leader to existing states such as Dogomba, who, however, now formed a minority within their own society. Combined with the division of the Konkomba territory through colonial borders, rapid population growth and poverty, the forceful union between Dogomba and Konkomba constitutes the origin of an ethnic conflict resulting in a civil war in 1994. Since 1981 the concerned region around the Oti river at the Ghanaian border to Togo has been the scene of the bloodiest clashes Ghana experienced since its founding.<sup>158</sup>

Likewise, when land became particularly valuable, i.e. it was wooded like in the south, suitable for cocoa plantations, or gold or diamonds were found, rival claims to the land were justified with one’s own longest-lasting settlement in the area, and “natives“ were distinguished from “strangers“. One consequence of excluding strangers from acquiring land rights, was that migrants tended to protect their own links with home. The pre-colonial flexibility that allowed newcomers to change their languages and to assimilate to a new region was lost. Decendancy became a very important socio-economic variable. Though Ghana’s modern history cannot be

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<sup>156</sup> Hanke, Stefanie (2001). p. 81f.

<sup>157</sup> Lentz, Carola & Nugent, Paul (2000) “Ethnicity in Ghana: a comparative perspective.” In: Lentz, Carola & Nugent, Paul (eds. 2000) *Ethnicity in Ghana: The Limits of Invention*. London, MacMillan Press. pp. 1-28. p. 18f.

<sup>158</sup> Bogner, Artur (2000) “The 1994 civil war in northern Ghana: the genesis and escalation of a ‘tribal’ conflict.” In: Lentz, Carola & Nugent, Paul (eds. 2000). pp. 183-203.

written without referring to ethnic factors, many African countries had to suffer from this problem to a greater extent.<sup>159</sup>

With regards to development, colonial rule did not aim at a cohesive development strategy for its dependencies. The British endeavour was to secure the reserves of raw materials for the colonial motherland and to open new markets for the mass products of the British industry. There existed no clear vision of the future social and economic development of the Gold Coast. However, historians praise governor Gordon Guggisberg for introducing a system of strategic development planning for the first time in British colonial history in 1919. Although a strict supporter of colonialism, Guggisberg at least tried to define development aims from the Gold Coast's perspective. He set up a ten year plan for the years 1920 to 1930, which provided for investments in technical and social infrastructure. In 1928 the Takoradi harbour was finished, which facilitated export trade. Several railways and 3400 kilometres of new streets were built across the whole country. Moreover, the big investments in education, which Guggisberg regarded as a key to development, indeed gave Ghana a start before all other African colonies. No other African country had as many university graduates when it became independent. But the building up of a self-reliant Ghanaian industry was never under discussion. Not before 1944, only a few years before the Gold Coast became independent governor Alan Burns set up another important development plan, which provided financial backing for small and medium sized consumer goods industry.<sup>160</sup>

In summary, French and British institutions can be described as instruments largely used to dominate Benin, Mali, and Ghana economically as well as politically. In many respects, the administrative systems complicated democratic ambiguities inherent in the pre-colonial political culture.

The colonies had an administration, not a political system. The former lacked reciprocity between the rulers and the population, it emphasised functional utility and neglected any kind of true participation. Where pre-existing institutions survived, they became subject to coercive colonial devices. Though largely incompatible with the social structures of Africa, the colonial architecture stressed Western concepts of sovereignty and territoriality; the principles of nationality within certain borders and legitimacy of government were blatantly embezzled. Thus, concerning political culture, colonial rule had four major consequences that proved to be fatal when most African territories became independent during the 1960s:

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<sup>159</sup> Lentz, Carola & Nugent, Paul (2000). p. 19f.

<sup>160</sup> Schmidt-Kallert, Einhard (1994). p. 41ff.

Firstly, arbitrary borders and supraterritorial administrations imposed on civil communities had “balkanised” traditional social networks. In most countries, *ethnicity* had been established as an instrumental and conflictual way of social and economic exchange; the newly independent states were far from being nation states.

Secondly, European powers had penetrated into Africa, extracted natural resources and manpower, and brought *African economies* – though inadequately prepared, bureaucratised, and mainly non-monetarised – into close and unequal contact to the global economy.

Thirdly, over decades the colonial system had conveyed a remote and bureaucratic image of politics to the population; for a long time, the question for the *legitimacy* of government had been suppressed. In addition, the state had come to be regarded and used as the primary source of social mobility. The *proximity to state power*, accessible via professional chieftdom or education and Christianity, defined societal status. Moreover, the administrative system had nurtured existing patrimonial strengths and laid the foundations for wide-spread *clientelism and corruption*.

Fourthly, the *educational system*, established to educated mediators between the colonial power and the African masses, had spread some of the European democratic ideals and had led to the creation of urban based elites, which organised in political groups. Surely unintended by the colonial powers, these movements should prove vital during the independence struggles. Eventually, the contradiction between European democratic philosophy and colonial reality combined with the costs of World War II forced the colonial systems to dissolve.<sup>161</sup>

## 2.3. Anti-Colonialism and Democratisation

Central actors in the independence process were the former colonial powers, other international powers, the leaders of African anti-colonial movements, civil associations of professionals (lawyers, doctors, journalists, intellectuals, the tiny group of wealthy African traders) and also chiefs and civil servants. Anti-colonialist movements were commonly urban based civil associations, which would form “National Congresses” with the aim of determining their countries’ future political design. These congresses tried to include as many social groups as possible to justify their claim to social representation, whereby demographic inclusiveness was paramount to individual involvement.

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<sup>161</sup> Chazan, Naomi (1994). p. 63ff.



The last phase of decolonisation dealt with the transfer of political power, the drafting of the principles of decision-making, and the creation of corresponding political institutions. The core challenges were (and are up to today): (i) the establishment of workable regime principles, of channels of political interaction and of a suitable political apparatus, (ii) consolidation of a new community despite ethnic pluralism, (iii) questions of economic development, social inequality and welfare, and (iv) the formation of new sovereign identities in the international political arena.

Compared to the former British territories applying federal or quasi-federal systems, the former French colonies emerged as more centralised states. British and French territories designed their new constitutions following either the Westminster Model of majority rule or the presidential system of the French Fifth Republic. The new political systems, although attempting to account for local circumstances, were foreign in design and origin and focused on the establishment of formal democratic institutions while neglecting procedural and cultural aspects of democracy.<sup>162</sup>

### *The Failure of the Early Democracies*

During the first decade of independence, like all colonies **Benin** experienced significant political instability. Three civilian governments came to power, led by dominant leaders from the southern, central, and northern regions; their terms ended with military coups. The 1969 elections resulted in the establishment of the Presidential Council of the three regional leaders Maga, Ahomadegbé, and Apithy. Continued unrest and an attempted military mutiny incited the senior officer corps to dissolve the council and to appoint Mathieu Kérékou, a military officer from the north, as president in 1972. At the beginning the new regime was welcomed and regarded as benign. Stability was restored and the government emphasised national unity as the core of an independent economic and social identity. But from 1975 onwards Benin was changed into a “mini Marxist state on the Eastern bloc” model, and “Dahomey” became the “People’s Republic of Benin”.<sup>163</sup>

At least three well-established, major political actors had called for a radical change to socialism: the trade unions, the teachers and other intellectuals influenced by French socialism, and some militant members of the younger generation from the Savelou region, the so-called “liguers”, who were impressed by the student riots in Paris in 1968. These three groups were

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<sup>162</sup> Chazan, Naomi (1994). p. 65ff.

<sup>163</sup> Allen, Chris (1992). p. 43ff.

joined by young officers fancying a new, unifying philosophy that attributed the country's economic woes to the influence of the West and gave the prospect of breaking post-colonial ties.

The USSR regarded Benin as a useful ally, as a potential base for aircraft flying to Angola, and as a marine base on the west coast of Africa. In 1975, the "Party of the People's Revolution" was created. The party and its Central Committee kept hold of all key policymaking power and dominated the Council of Ministers, which was the nominal governing body. In 1977, a new constitution was adopted, and two years later elections were held. Subsequent governments, all under president Kérékou, were mostly civilian, although throughout the 1980s military officers held influential positions in education, public enterprises, and finance.<sup>164</sup>

The winners of the first elections usually were the key figures of the anti-colonial movement, who – not to hold up the retreat of the colonial powers – had accepted whatever constitutional arrangements proposed; they intended to decide on the details of politics later and without the Europeans. In their rush to independence, the European powers had often supported the largest anti-colonial movements, and thereby contributed to the establishment of one-party rule.<sup>165</sup>

**Mali's** presidential system of 1960, for example, granted the president much more powers than its model, the French constitution. Moreover, there existed only one party the RDA (Rassemblement Démocratique Africain). The first president, the charismatic Modibo Keita, based his government on the popular party wing, US-RDA. He took over the centralised colonial organisation in an attempt to transform a subsistence-oriented country into a modern socialist nation, and he maintained close relations with communist and socialist governments throughout the world. His vision of socialism was based on a strong idealisation of traditional socio-economic communities with such values as solidarity, willingness to make sacrifices, and collective responsibility. According to the motto, "A good Muslim is a Socialist", Malian socialism can be described as a symbiosis of Marxist, Islamist, and traditional elements.<sup>166</sup>

The US-RDA absorbed all political opposition parties and most voluntary organisations. Thus, there remained no organised groups outside of the party structure capable of expressing political dissent. The parliament had no significance and normally decided unanimously. Within the party, there existed a restricted degree of democracy to appease conflicts that might threaten internal stability. On all levels there was a strong linkage between administration and the party. On the village level the functions of village council and party committee were usually connected via personal union. The chiefs of districts and arrondissements were ex

<sup>164</sup> Westebbe, Richard (1994). p. 81f.

<sup>165</sup> Chazan, Naomi (1994). p. 68ff.

<sup>166</sup> Hanke, Stefanie (2001) p. 88f.

officio members of the Political Bureau and were held to cooperate closely with the party organisation. Decisions were taken collectively and were binding for all levels. Besides vertical party organisations, horizontal associations provided a wide involvement of the population, such as the general union “Union Nationale des Travailleurs Maliens” (UNTM) for workers, the “Union Nationale des Jeunes du Mali” for the youth, and the “Union Nationale des Femmes du Mali” for the women. But although the number of party members officially increased tenfold between 1958 and 1962, party organisation in the countryside was only formal in character. In fact, the intellectual elite grown up in colonial times determined the politics for whole Mali. A mobilisation of the rural population came to nothing and the differentiation between centre and periphery increased.<sup>167</sup>

To **Ghana**, instability in the aftermath of independence came rather as a surprise. The former Gold Coast had been considered the “black star” of Africa. Per capita income was high by African standards (Ghana’s average income was then about the same as that of Mexico or South Korea) and the country enjoyed a medium income international classification. As world leader in the production of cocoa, the economy appeared buoyant, with growing output, inflation of under 1%, and large accumulated external reserves. The country was endowed with an impressive transportation system, a highly educated work-force, and a British-trained, professional public service bureaucracy.<sup>168</sup>

In accordance with African socialism, Kwame Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party (CPP) government centralised the country and eliminated intermediate and regional political structures. Convinced of this strategy, Nkrumah stated, “Multipartyism is antithetical to national integration and social progress.” Thus, domination was supposed to be sanctified as developmental dictatorship.<sup>169</sup>

But much of the optimism was dissipated by economic incompetence, political authoritarianism and widespread denials of basic human rights by Nkrumah’s government. The pattern of fledgling civilian government aborted by military intervention continued to dog Ghana, culminating in the coup of 1979 led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings. On that occasion Ghana was returned to a civilian government after a few months. However, another coup in 1981 saw him overthrow the civilian government of Dr Hilla Limann and take power again. He assumed chairmanship of the ruling Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC). In the first phase of his rule, Rawlings followed the post-colonialist socialist class-based view

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<sup>167</sup> Imperato, Pascal James (1989). p. 58ff.

<sup>168</sup> Overseas Development Institute (1996) *Briefing Paper: Adjustment in Africa: Lessons from Ghana*. London, odi. p. 1.

<sup>169</sup> Chazan, Naomi (1994). p. 74f.

with all its statist\* assumptions: he launched a socialist revolution, abolished the constitution, dissolved parliament and proscribed opposition political parties.<sup>170</sup>

The comparison shows that the *anti-Western sentiments* involved in anti-colonialism provoked scepticism of European democracies, which were also looked upon as the sources of *imperialism and capitalism*. The relationship with Europe was tense precisely at a moment when the dissemination of democratic norms was required. The resulting picture of democracy was abstract and aggregate in character, primarily psychological and rhetorical, heavily future-directed and outward orientated. *Socialism* and its promise of equitable growth seemed to be more in line with African expectations of independence than European capitalism. Many governments, therefore, sought good relations with the USSR or China.

In general, anti-colonialism was perceived as the arrival of the African age of democracy by recurring to the basic democratic value of freedom in contrast to the servitude of colonialism:

“Anticolonialism was equated in the eyes of its champions with the democratic coming of the age of the continent. Liberation from foreign domination through political independence was viewed as the outward expression of the most fundamental human desire to determine one’s own future. [...] Political mobilization, organization, and protest were the means to achieving this universal democratic goal of freedom.”<sup>171</sup>

Back then, freedom was defined as the internal formation of a peoplehood in the face of external control. Consensus was stressed at the cost of tolerance and self-expression; loyalty to and identification with the national question were more important than protection of individual rights; political boundaries rather than democratic procedures were at the heart of the discussion. Thus, the demand for full citizenship overshadowed the question for a particular form of government in the future. Democracy was seldom filled with substantial contents, but was a disguise for *nationalism*. Faced with a variety of sectional pressures and with exaggerated hopes for successful, independent economic development, many governments in the first year of independence found their weaknesses painfully uncovered. To avoid loss of authority, they chose to uphold control through domination.<sup>172</sup> For these reasons, Benin, Mali and Ghana opted for African socialism with the following consequences:

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\* *Statism* is the direction and control of economic and social affairs by the state. The economic aims are to promote industrialisation and protect the country’s economy from foreign competition. Inspired more by nationalism than by socialism, statism is compatible with state capitalism. Other names are “dirigisme” or “étatisme”. From: McLean, Ian (1996). p. 477.

<sup>170</sup> Rothchild, Donald (1995). p. 51f.

<sup>171</sup> Chazan, Naomi (1994). p. 66.

<sup>172</sup> Chazan, Naomi (1994). p. 67f.

The **Beninese** socialist economic rationale was to employ the state to sponsor the welfare of the people by preventing their exploitation by domestic and foreign capitalists. Economic growth and development were to be accelerated by state control of the means of production. Most formal sector activity became managed by the state, including distribution, secondary-sector enterprises, and financial institutions. Public enterprises were founded in all sectors with large industrial investments, which were financed with foreign borrowing from Bulgaria, East Germany, and the Soviet Union. State monopolies organised the marketing of export crops. Prices, import licenses, quotas, and wages were strictly controlled by an all-encompassing regulatory system. The output of the education system was significantly increased at the secondary and university levels, but the quality of education suffered. All university graduates were guaranteed jobs in the expanding public sector. Between the 1960s and the 1980s, the number of civil servants tripled. Between 1977 and 1982 growth accelerated to 4 and 5% in real terms and a substantial level of internal and external stability accompanied these years.

A principal reason for this growth was the public capital investment programme, of which 40% was allocated to the industrial sector. Public services grew by 8% mainly due to new employment, which itself rose by 15% annually during this period. In result, national savings, declined and around 90% of investment was financed with foreign capital. The other main source of growth was not due to socialist restructuring but stemmed from the revenues and customs from transit trade, which was based on re-exporting Beninese imports to Niger and Nigeria, whose infrastructures were inadequate to handle an oil-induced import boom.<sup>173</sup>

Benin's political course was not an exception: it simply followed the conventional development strategies known in the 1960s, which regarded economic development as paramount to the establishment of democracy.<sup>174</sup> Like many other Africans after independence, the Beninese believed that government intervention in the economy was necessary to mobilise resources to compensate for the lack of developed private sector activity and deficits in basic infrastructure. This was to prevent market failure or private rent-seeking. "Economic planning was to be a means of achieving internally oriented, rapid economic growth; and the state was the instrument of such planning."<sup>175</sup>

The **Malian** government, too, argued that a multiparty system and free market principles were incompatible with the country's socio-economic reality. They were perceived as generating instability, hindering rapid growth and nation-building. The Malian socialist economic success,

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<sup>173</sup> Allen, Chris (1992). p. 44f.

<sup>174</sup> See for example: Rostow, W. W. (1960) *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*. London, Cambridge University Press.

<sup>175</sup> Westebbe, Richard (1994). p. 82f.

however, did not develop. By 1967, the economic situation worsened and the government had to cut its expenditures. In the same year, the Malian Franc, a non-convertible currency issued in 1961 effectively destroying regional trade, had to be devaluated by 50%. In addition, Keita's youth organisation, the armed Popular Militia, inspired by the Chinese Red Guards, spread fear and terror among the population. The military, fearing for its position and watching the country's economic decline, deprived Keita of his power in a bloodless coup on 19<sup>th</sup> November 1968.<sup>176</sup>

In the following years, the military government under Moussa Traoré took over most of Keita's centrally organised system, brutally ridded itself from Keita's followers, ruthlessly dissolved labour unions and student associations. Agriculture and trade were officially liberalised, but state-run enterprises continued to provide the necessary resources for the nomenclature, whose beneficiaries were mainly the same as under Keita – only the government had changed. Increasingly, politics became the business of a tiny elite, leaving the population, especially in the countryside, far from influence. In the meanwhile, Traoré consolidated his highly autocratic position. Between 1968 and 1978, he established a political apparatus, whose key positions were held by military officers or members of his family, e.g. his wife Mariam controlled the complete trade in the country. If new positions were needed to reward supporters, they would be created. Mali was controlled by a well-organised secret service, the police, and a state security service until 1991.<sup>177</sup>

Despite varying political regimes, also **Ghana** generally followed the socialist course. From 1972 to 1978, the military government under Ingatius Kutu Acheampong reactivated various state enterprises left uncompleted or abandoned after Nkrumah's overthrow. The chief attribute of the military governments was a single-minded, even slavish, devotion to personal wealth accumulations. The bureaucracy was overbloated. The liberalisation efforts of the following civilian Limann government were widely fruitless.<sup>178</sup> In 1981, Rawlings' PNCP, espousing African socialism, attempted to translate dependency theory into policy terms by imposing a wage and price freeze. There were calls for nationalisation. At the beginning, Rawlings' government was not dependent on any of the key organised professional groups in the country; it rested on socialist movements, students' movements, workers, a young neo-Marxist intelligentsia, and militant trade unionists. Since it drew its backing almost exclusively from

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<sup>176</sup> Imperato, Pascal James (1989). p. 58ff.

<sup>177</sup> Hanke, Stefanie (2001). p. 84-98.

<sup>178</sup> Rothchild, Donald (1995). p. 51ff.

urban quarters, also Rawlings' government - though involving different agents – reflected the state-centric bias of preceding governments.<sup>179</sup>

In summary, the transition to authoritarianism was realised – sometimes under considerable political instability – through the dismantling of competitive institutions on the one hand, and the expansion and strengthening of the central administration on the other hand. Thus, political elites adopted the bureaucratic systems inherited by colonialism. The reasons for the *failure of the democratic systems* installed at the eve of independence were numerous:

- (i) Used to the colonial system, citizens had not had much democratic political experience nor had the rather quick independence process allowed for much democratic practice. Moreover, an economically autonomous middle class did not exist or was very small, and thus the social foundations for effective political competition and capital accumulation away from the state were missing. The only way into politics was through domination of the state apparatus.
- (ii) The complicated post-colonial constitutional arrangements failed to take account of centrifugal tendencies and regional cleavages.
- (iii) Authoritarian forms of government were prominently legitimised with economic visions of the public good. For the sake of rapid economic development, governments thought it appropriate not to be politically dependent on consensus with opposition parties.
- (iv) The cause of “Africanisation” justified to get rid of the alien institutions proposed by the former European colonial powers. Democracy served as a disguise for nationalism.
- (v) Personal ambitions of African rulers were an important variable, too. The popularity many had gained during the independence movements allowed them to change political systems facing only little resistance.

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<sup>179</sup> Chazan, Naomi (1991) “The Political Transformation of Ghana Under the PNDC.” In: Rothchild, Donald (ed. 1991) *Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery*. Boulder, Lynne Rienner. pp. 21-48. p. 23.

Thus, three core conditions for democracy were absent: a *committed leadership, suitable political institutions*, and a *political culture nurturing democracy*.<sup>180</sup>

### *The Failure of Authoritarianism*

In the decades following the establishment of single-party dictatorships, African political cultures developed along two discrete lines, *popular* versus *elite*. **Popular political culture** was based in traditional social order and its central theme was economic survival; popular culture maintained and created autonomous social and economic relations away from a repressive state. In contrast, **elite political culture** revolved around the state and its institutions; though consisting of a tiny number of people, the elite dominated politics during the first twenty years after independence, and within the elite, it were adherents of *statist*\* trends that decided the governmental course. With the notable exception of Ghana in the years 1979 to 1981, the **liberal** elite culture was systematically excluded from regime power:<sup>181</sup>

The **Ghanaian** civilian government in 1979 to 1981, led by Hilla Limann and the People's National Party (PNP), floundered after 27 months in office. Two factors damaged regime stability: the unwillingness and inability of the Limann government include major societal groups within the ruling coalition, and the government's insufficient use of its temporary opportunity to make the hard decisions necessary to restore the economy. Perceived as elitist and overly hesitant, the Limann regime was unable to exploit the initial political advantage it gained from an election victory to lay the basis for sustained democracy.<sup>182</sup> – In 1981, Rawlings seized power for the second time. Hastily assembled Citizens' Vetting Committees, public tribunals, and investigative bodies hauled in supposed offenders of the state and meted out rigid sentences without proper process. Specific individuals were persecuted and their property was confiscated, and evidence of harassments, beatings, and even official killings mounted. Until around 1988, the security apparatus was used in abandon. The government continued to employ violent techniques, including torture and summary executions, to suppress any sign of opposition.<sup>183</sup>

The opposition in **Benin** had been comparatively weak before 1988, had met hard suppression (especially unofficial student bodies linked to the underground Communist Party of Dahomey

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<sup>180</sup> Chazan, Naomi (1994). p. 71f.

\* for definition see footnotes five pages further up.

<sup>181</sup> Chazan, Naomi (1994) p. 68f.

<sup>182</sup> Rothchild, Donald (1995). p. 51.

<sup>183</sup> Chazan, Naomi (1991). p. 24, 31.



(PCD)), or respectively, it was lulled into silence with lucrative jobs or by the official network of sectional and representative institutions.<sup>184</sup>

In **Mali**, Traoré's secret and security services were organs of state terror and provided the systematic repression of any opposition. Imprisonment and deportation of unionists, students, and oppositional intellectuals were part of the daily agenda provoking an atmosphere of intimidation.

In summary, liberal citizens and oppositional intellectuals of all three countries – though under varying circumstances – had to learn the same bitter lecture:

“[...]the main lesson emanating from the failed attempts of the past was that the battle against unjust and arbitrary regimes was qualitatively different from the struggle for freedom, justice, and democratic government.”<sup>185</sup>

The post-colonial state assumed *neopatrimonial* characteristics typical for Africa (see also chapter I.1.): the executive branch held extensive powers, and the political system was highly bureaucratic and coercive. Pluralism was strictly reduced and the public arena politicised. Highly personalistic forms of rule were combined with the monopolised control of public resources. Clientelism and corruption flourished. The statist elite was a so-called “*state class*”, i.e. power and resources of the state were the primary means for the accumulation of private wealth. Thus, as had been common during colonial times, the state remained the determinant of class formation and relations.<sup>186</sup> – All in all, the reasons for the collapse of these authoritarian systems during the 1980s were complex, but declining economies played a prominent role:

In 1983 the oil and uranium booms sustaining **Benin's** thriving transit trade ended; much public investments had proven unsustainable and stopped. The economy entered a period of low growth and financial decline. While the real GDP growth rate was below 1%, annual population growth was at 3% between 1983 and 1987. The public finance gap rose to 9% of GDP and the balance of payment gap to 7%. Agricultural productivity decreased due to declining rain fall, old machinery, and subsidies to grain imports. Food output was not able to meet the demand in urban areas, and cereal imports rose from 34,000 tons in 1976 to 110,000 tons in 1981. Apart from economically adverse changes, rent seeking is commonly held as a primary cause of Benin's economic collapse.

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<sup>184</sup> Allen, Chris (1992). p. 46.

<sup>185</sup> Chazan, Naomi (1994). p. 73ff.

<sup>186</sup> van de Walle, Nicolas (1994) “Neopatrimonialism and Democracy in Africa.” In: Widner, Jennifer A. (ed. 1994) *Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press. pp. 129-157.

Despite World Bank encouragement, the Kérékou government only reluctantly changed its economic policies. Authorities found it difficult to accept a model that involved “capitalist” methods such as farmer incentives and efficient market-oriented distribution. The World Bank’s 1984 “Country Economic Memorandum” for Benin concluded that the country had a comparative advantage in agriculture and industry (cotton, corn, and yams) for the domestic and large neighbouring markets. It also suggested improvements in human resources as basis for growth. The memo devastatingly criticised central planning, budgetary controls, and the badly managed, over-staffed public enterprises.

But not before 1986-87, when the evidence for the failure of its central planning was overwhelming, the Political Bureau dropped its opposition. In these years, revenues declined so sharply, that the government used its deposits in the banking system to finance the budget deficit. By 1984, the government was net debtor to the banks, by 1987, its internal debt was 70 billion CFA francs, and in 1986, delays in government payroll began. By late 1988, revenues fell below 10% of GDP and the financial crisis reached its peak. External debt reached over \$240 million. Domestic bank accounts and deposits were frozen and a massive flight of available liquidity took place. However, official rent seeking was massive not only in the banking sector. Systems of complicity for sharing bribes and rents were common under high-level agents in the customs and internal revenue services; members of the Political Bureau managed the huge Benin-Nigeria sugar enterprise and their rent seeking lead to financial irregularities and late payment of workers; also the social security fund, operating at excessive costs, was misused, but the most omnipresent form of rent-seeking was the inflation of the civil service and the military payrolls. – It was clear that only a radical reform in economic policy would enable Benin to get through the crisis. The Political Bureau eventually handed economic policy over to a coordinating committee of ministers preparing a structural adjustment programme with the help of the World Bank and later the International Monetary Fund.<sup>187</sup>

**Mali**’s socialist economy suffered dreadfully from severe droughts, the oil crisis and consequences of the world economic crisis during the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, an excessively bloated state bureaucracy, undercapitalisation of a number of industries, limited markets for goods and services, and wide-spread corruption weakened the economy. The state retreated further from providing basic services for the population and increasingly leaned on clientelist networks for support. In 1980, the World Bank declared, that the structure of Mali’s economy was characterised by complex mechanisms favouring the state bureaucracy and the

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<sup>187</sup> Westebbe, Richard (1994). p. 87f.

students, who consumed more than 90% of the state budget.<sup>188</sup> In the following years, Mali underwent structural adjustment programmes of the IMF. In 1987, Zoumana Sacko became the new minister of economic affairs, endowed with the task to provide for the transparency of the state finances and a balance of the national budget. A tribunal against corruption was established which, however, rather served the elimination of political opponents. Nevertheless, Sacko successfully uncovered several cases of corruption. In consequence, he was immediately removed from office.

The situation of the rural population facing the problem of mere survival was disastrous. An increasingly antisocial tax system redistributed income from the poor to the rich, e.g. direct taxes increased by 30% from 1959 to 1989. The unequal tax load amplified the problematic contrast between urban elite and the countryside and pushed up a total rejection of politics among the rural population. – Nonetheless, it was the relatively privileged stratum of urban civil servants that became crucial for the political change, when they noticeably felt their living standard decline during the austerity programme. Then, the chronic weakness of the Malian clientelist state became apparent.<sup>189</sup>

When the **Ghanaian** PNDC assumed power on 31<sup>st</sup> December, 1981, the country was already in the midst of a multifaceted crisis of political weakness, social fragmentation, and economic decline. The “retrogressive cycle” starting from the beginning of independence resulted in the steady loss of sovereignty by the state, which had been pervaded by increasingly particularistic and personal interest. The state organisations had been misused by a series of feeble and capricious rulers, by an overstuffed administration, and by greedy patrons. Problems of state autonomy were complicated by state incapacitation. Since many individuals and social groups no longer viewed the state as an important source of benefits, they worked out means to stay away from its extracting reach. State-society relations were in almost total disorder, and the country was impoverished.<sup>190</sup>

The “socialist” measures taken by Rawlings frightened away the few potential investors left and further undermined Ghana’s bargaining position in the international economic arena. The measures used by the PNDC and the violent style in which they were conducted contributed considerably to the confusion and turmoil associated with this stage. In its attempt to clear the state of corrupt elements, the PNDC ousted almost all skilled administrative personnel. By the beginning of 1983, more than two-third of Ghana’s top-level professionals had left the country. Moreover, in order to incorporate the people into the revolutionary governing process, an wide

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<sup>188</sup> Imperato, Pascal James (1989). p. 107ff.

<sup>189</sup> Hanke, Stefanie (2001). p. 105f.

<sup>190</sup> Chazan, Naomi (1991). p. 22f.

network of popular institutions were established, e.g. the People's Defence Committees (PDCs) and Workers' Defence Committees (WDCs). These popular structures coexisted with the formal administration and formed a dualistic decision-making framework which made policies unreliable and often contradictory. The absence of resources magnified the limited capabilities of formal institutions. – Already by late 1983, however, Rawlings, in contrast to Benin's Kérékou and Mali's Traoré, managed to engineer not only economic growth, but also legitimacy by liberalising the political system in response to popular demand. Also in Ghana's case, political events during the 1980s led to the end of authoritarianism and the strengthening of civil society; however, they did not immediately lead to the end of the ruling regime.<sup>191</sup>

In summary, the *end of authoritarianism* can be attributed to the following reasons:

- (i) Since state power was perceived to equal the will of the people or majority rule and because it was regarded as a symbol for national unity, unanimity, and consensus, which served the common good, there was no room for constructive criticism or even active involvement in politics. This situation eventually led to government incapacity and failure or considerable political concessions (see also below) and often violent popular protest.
- (ii) Statist elites had an instrumental view of the state that was “highly pragmatic, grossly inequitable, and tremendously costly”; the state was a means of extracting resources from the population, which were redistributed according to political rather than economic considerations. Bureaucratic corruption, clientelism, and abuses of offices were regarded as natural, but in the end proved a primary source of instability.
- (iii) Economic growth was paramount to other political goals. Accordingly, governments tied their legitimacy primarily to economic performance. Thus, the profound crisis during the 1980s equalled the end of those regimes, which were no longer able to sustain their immensely costly networks of supporters (more details below).<sup>192</sup>

The end of authoritarianism does not equal the beginning of democracy, which requires more. An overriding problem of African post-independence politics has not only been the type of government but also its degree. Consolidation of power did not imply full control; while the

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<sup>191</sup> Chazan, Naomi (1991). p. 29; Rothchild, Donald (1995). p. 51ff.

<sup>192</sup> Chazan, Naomi (1994). p. 75f.

majority of the population had no political influence, they were not easily controlled by the existing government. Thus, centralisation had had to substitute consent, and regimes became “excessively authoritarian, in order to disguise the fact that [they were] inadequately authoritative.”<sup>193</sup> Restrictions to African authoritarianism were the cultural heterogeneity of its populaces and a strong organisation of civil society. Moreover, to secure personal survival, possibilities for material accumulation away from the state increased.

### *Sources of Democratic Transformation*

Everywhere in Africa, the true cost of economic crisis were paid by the rural and urban poor suffering from declining consumption, falling real incomes, and the continual imposition of austerity programmes by regimes of greedy politicians. The last means of escaping economic crisis, government repression, or civil war was migration; thus, Africa holds the highest numbers of refugees in the world. Nonetheless, an incredible variety of civil associational forms of organisation in African societies allowed for the self-preservation of communities independent from the state; they are the bases of *popular political cultures*:

“What distinguishes associational life in Africa is its diversity, vitality, and centrality in organising social relations. Each grouping is based on substantive pacts that have real meaning for the daily lives of its members.”<sup>194</sup>

Most notably, these communities developed numerous strategies to gain economic autonomy from the state. There were silent ways of resistance and disregard for arbitrary laws; a rapidly expanding informal (often illegal) sector became the most important channel for distribution of goods and provided demand for the products and services of small-scale manufacturers and agriculture. In **Benin**, smuggling reduced the anger about the government at least in the southeast. When relative prices were good and the border was not closed or guarded, great amounts of goods were illegally exchanged with Nigeria. Though thereby the income of food producers and small-scale traders increased, it also led to a massive negative trade balance. At times up to an estimated 90% of all trade was generated by smuggling. Another way of dealing with the economic crisis has been self-encapsulation of rural village communities that shifted from export to food cropping. Beninese peasants maintained their consumption by drifting into

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<sup>193</sup> Mazrui, Ali A. (1983) “Political Engineering in Africa.” *International Social Science Journal* 35 (2): 285-306. p. 293.

<sup>194</sup> Chazan, Naomi (1994). p. 80ff.

food production, which rose after 1978. Thus, while there were worker and student protests in 1979 to 1981, peasant protests were almost unknown.<sup>195</sup>

Moreover, religious life for example in Benin, notably the Catholic Church (which survived the dictatorship especially in the coastal areas), gained a new impetus during the deepening economic crisis in the 1980s. Around two thirds of Benin's hundred religions organisations have been created since 1982 and thus were part of a new religious movement in Africa. Following an ethic of self-reliance, local development societies organised the self-provision of services including schools and hospitals. Also local cultural bodies revived in large numbers in the 1980s. The state – in a misplaced hope to reinforce his waning legitimacy – granted them a reluctant blessing. Thus, “the obverse of the collapse of the regime's own structures was the revival of civil society.”

All in all, Benin had an enormous variety of private institutions representing and mediating urban, rural, national, and local interests. When in 1989 the organising committee for the 1990 Conference invited organisations to state their positions for economic and political reform, it received hundreds of submissions from political organisations, unions, professional bodies, and development associations. They all firmly supported a liberal democratic system.<sup>196</sup>

In **Mali**, however, it was the worsening situation in the centre that led to political change. Though the oppositional movement was characterised by the dissatisfaction of a wide social stratum, the call for a multiparty system and democracy was primarily raised by urban intellectuals, especially those who were excluded from the state's distributional system. Since the mid-1980s associations developed which were declared to be “cultural” organisations, but in truth they constituted political discussion platforms for dissatisfied urban strata. In the “Centre Djoliba” and in “L'Espace Culturel Jamana”, teachers, students, and intellectuals met with members of clandestine opposition groups. Though the regime must have noticed the true nature of these associations, Traoré's scope of action was limited. As incumbent president of the Organisation for African Union (OAU) he found himself under pressure of the heads of other African states to deliver the “free”, credit granting Western world an acceptable human rights record.

In contrast to the cities, the rural population showed a deep-rooted distrust towards a new democratic form of government. Many farmers would see the traditional social order endangered if everyone in the village was allowed to have a say in the nomination of the chief. The concepts of democracy and human rights remained highly abstract to the majority of the

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<sup>195</sup> Allen, Chris (1992). p. 45.

<sup>196</sup> Allen, Chris (1992). p. 55.

rural population. In fact, over decades the best way in which the state had legitimised itself was through its non-interference and absence from these people's daily lives. Any changes were feared as the return of a corrupt state power.<sup>197</sup>

An important exception from this popular rule of political indifference were the Touareg. Due to their nomadic lifestyle, they had successfully opposed any attempt for their inclusion in a modern state system since the colonial era. During the 1980s, however, they had considerable influence on the transition process fighting for the improvement of their own socio-economic situation. In postcolonial times, they had led an existence parallel to the political system of Mali. Since the first conflicts in the 1960s, which were brutally brought down by Keita, the northern region remained a crisis area. The situation aggravated, when there were to huge migration movements due to the two great Sahel draughts in 1969-75 and 1984-86. Tens of thousands of Malian and Nigerian Touareg migrated to Algeria and Libya. Returning at the end of the 1980s, there were violent clashes with the Malian army. Whereas the ecological situation before had allowed the Touareg to support themselves largely independently, the draughts and the years in the emigration camps had led to a considerable reduction of cattle and pastures. Thus, most Touareg faced the problem of survival. However, as a result of their fight against the incorporation into the state, they were represented neither in clientelist networks nor in any organisations of civil society. In colonial times they had rejected formal education and had held no post in administration. Therefore, the Touareg had no means of articulating their position on the national or at least regional level. Thus, they turned to the only solution that promised success: an armed revolution.<sup>198</sup>

In **Ghana**, social cleavages were exacerbated and political reforms delayed by economic liberalisation and development due to an ambitious IMF adjustment programme launched by Rawlings' government in late 1983. However, the Ghana's political evolution accompanied by enduring positive economic growth developed in straight contradiction to the expectations of *modernisation theory* (see chapter I.2.): with the aim of generating legitimacy by restoring Ghana's economic and political stability, Rawlings introduced the Economic Recovery Programme, restructured his government to include heads of major official agencies, public corporations, and the army, and overhauled the official network of popular organisations. Thus, political representation of any opposition was effectively foreclosed.

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<sup>197</sup> Hanke, Stefanie (2001). p. 101f, 106f.

<sup>198</sup> N'Diaye, Ahmadiou (1996) *L'Urne et le Glaive*. Bamako, Doniya. p. 231f.

However, political institutions were separated from bureaucratic and judicial ones, and the chase of educated groups was stopped.<sup>199</sup> Yet, a major social consequence was the further expansion of the network of voluntary and local associations that had increased considerably during Ghana's political unreliability before 1981. As occupational, service, community, and religious organisations grew significantly, new interest groups were created, e.g. human rights associations. The diversification of the associational setting and its gradual institutionalisation was amplified by the flow of resources from abroad. Within these networks, specific concepts of authority, community, distributive justice, and conflict resolution were defined. Moreover, participatory values were inspired and experience gained in the small-scale. Since many of the new groups were founded at the intermediate level, the associational boom also had potential of aggregating local interests. In fact, institutional life in the country became pluralised.

Moreover, economic activities in the informal sector flourished: micro-industries and small manufacturing cooperatives developed, local markets revived, there were shifts in patterns of agricultural production, and new distribution networks were created. By the mid-1980s, the informal sector accounted for approximately 85% of employment. Social service activities, too, developed around the second economy. Some of the new enterprises got involved in the housing market, and others worked in health, education, sanitation, and infrastructure development. Despite the social inequalities emerging from the informal sector, the vitality of activities in the parallel market was in itself “an act of political assertion.”

The combination of associational growth and informal economic activity also shaped a different type of elites. These strata began to form an important political counterweight to state-based elites and represented new bargaining potential missing in clientelist networks. The emergence of organisational forms of pluralism resulted in a greater degree of social interlinking at the grassroots as well as intermediate level.<sup>200</sup>

Exactly these civil associations, which had allowed a life out of authoritarian reach, were the once that turned the mid-1980s crisis into a *popular struggle for a change of the form of government*. In a situation of profound socio-economic emergency, the state lost its residual *legitimacy*: popular movements gained in momentum and started to dominate the political scene. Bratton and van de Walle argue that the call for *democratisation* came especially from groups who had been excluded or (as a result of economic austerity programmes) were supposed to be excluded the regime's clientelist networks in the future. The only way to gain

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<sup>199</sup> Rothchild, Donald (1995). p. 53f.

<sup>200</sup> Chazan, Naomi (1991). p. 32f.



access to the state's resources was to introduce new political rules for this access – which should be guaranteed with the introduction of *democratic* rules. This understanding of democracy, however, does not explicitly exclude misuse of political positions or corruption – a problem many African democracies are still facing today.<sup>201</sup>

What were the events leading to democratisation in the three exemplified countries? Which agents and institutions were the moving forces of political change? In **Benin**, the government accepted a radical programme of structural reform and economic liberalisation with support of World Bank and IMF in 1989. Important measures included import tax changes, an end to the automatic recruitment of graduates, reductions in grants for civil service and military housing, management reform of public projects, the liquidation of twelve public enterprises, the closure of failed banks and a plan for a sound banking system, the liberalisation of food and export crop markets, and a reduction in price controls. – Although the World Bank did not establish political conditions, many Beninese did.<sup>202</sup>

The immediate cause of the political crisis in late 1989 was the government's inability to pay civil service workers' and teachers' salaries, which went on strike after not having been paid for several months. The students, who had been on strike in 1985 and 1987 already and had endured numerous political arrests and deaths, joined them immediately. Other groups on strike were plantation workers at the Savé sugar complex and medical staff at Porto Novo. Of all these the teachers, led by the more and more radicalised and confident university lecturers union, SNES, were the most resolute.<sup>203</sup> When on 29<sup>th</sup> November 1989, Kérékou held a public speech on the crisis, thousands demonstrated in Cotonou and Porto Novo and the presidential guard opened the fire. The crowds were destroying symbols of the old regime and the demonstrations extended far beyond the cities.<sup>204</sup>

Control of the military also broke down. Kérékou could no longer rely on pay and promotion, ethnic balancing, or the use of his security organisations. This had led to two attempted coups in 1988, involving officers from the presidential guard and the security team as well as officers from the 1972-75 opposition to Kérékou. In addition, an increasingly free and self-assured press spread the news of corruption scandals and heated up public opinion. Equally important was the behaviour of the official unions, whose leaders were unwilling to press their members' demands. In reaction, an unofficial network within the union rapidly developed and linked

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<sup>201</sup> Bratton, Michael & van de Walle, Nicolas (1997). p. 160ff.

<sup>202</sup> Westebbe, Richard (1994). p. 95.

<sup>203</sup> Allen, Chris (1992). p. 46ff.

<sup>204</sup> Westebbe, Richard (1994). p. 95.

occupations and regions across the country. “Slogans on pay, grants and conditions began to be joined by others on human rights, liberal freedoms, and democracy; and the strike movement became a mass movement for ‘democratic renewal’” (for further democratisation process see chapter III.1.).<sup>205</sup>

In **Mali**, the events that led to the coup of Traoré went down in history as “les événements” (the events). The general union UNTM played an important role in the struggles. Although it had aligned itself with the politics of the party since 1978, from time to time it became apparent that there was also disagreement. On 28<sup>th</sup> and 29<sup>th</sup> May 1990, UNTM openly called for the introduction of a multiparty system and political reforms at a special meeting of its general board. Immediately other social groups joined to criticise the regime in public. In this situation, the 1988 law that had allowed the foundation of an independent press proved to be a crucial factor for the further transformation process. On 4<sup>th</sup> August 1990, the association of lawyers made a public statement demanding to keep human rights and civil liberties, especially the freedoms of association and opinion. On 7<sup>th</sup> August 1990, the independent newspaper “Les Echos” published an open letter to the president calling for the introduction of a multiparty system, which was signed by more than 200 representatives of most different social groups.

Traoré attempted to control the situation with well-tried methods of repression and rejected any political dialogue. In reaction, the existing underground opposition groups united in two democratic associations, ADEMA and CNID. At the same time the students joined to form the new democratic “Association des Elèves et Etudiants Malien” (AEEM). Because the state was bankrupt, a whole generation saw itself deprived of grants, scholarships, and guaranteed jobs in a future that promised economic chaos. Already in 1980 there had been massive student riots, but back then they had been the only oppositional group daring to fight the regime publicly. Now the situation was different. The majority of intellectuals supporting these groups were teachers, who had been increasingly marginalised within the state system during the 1980s. Salary delays of up to two years had been quite common.

In addition, Traoré’s regime came under attack from a second side: the Touareg. There was a planned and coordinated rebellion, starting with armed attacks on administrative posts in the north in July 1990. In the whole country, the Touareg had set up weapon arsenals and networks of arms and munitions; military, civil and administrative institutions were attacked. The government army struck back hard. But under pressure from human rights organisations such as Amnesty International the regime eventually agreed to start a political dialogue.<sup>206</sup>

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<sup>205</sup> Allen, Chris (1992). p. 48.

<sup>206</sup> Hanke, Stefanie (2001). pp. 102ff, 110f.

Despite vacillation among party members, Traoré was still convinced that a liberal system was in contradiction to Malian tradition. In December 1990, he ordered a new press censorship and nominated two military officers as ministers for domestic affairs and judiciary. Their first official act was to abolish all supposedly “cultural” associations. – This was to give the starting signal for popular unrest. In January 1991, UNTM called a general strike for three months. Public life came to a standstill and the tension rose. From January to March 1991 numerous demonstrations and protests took place. When on 22<sup>nd</sup> March the army tried to dissolve a peaceful demonstration with armed force, it came to violent unrest. Between 22<sup>nd</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> March, 200 people died. Crucial for the end of the fights was the reaction of the army: they refused Traoré’s order to bombard the UNTM building, the centre of resistance. The army’s behaviour became the decisive factor and ended a further escalation of the country’s situation. On 26<sup>th</sup> March, Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré entered the presidential palace and arrested Traoré and several members of his family and government (the subsequent democratisation is described and assessed in chapter III.1.).<sup>207</sup>

As has been shown above, **Ghana’s** government under Rawlings constantly faced the problem of regime legitimacy. The majority of the population distrusted the state and had organised an autonomous associational and economic life out of its reach. This eventually led to the granting of elections on the district level, a gesture, that contributed to stabilising PNDC rule and allowed the Rawlings government to breathe a sigh of relief. In reaction, however, the PNDC had to face pressures from groups organised at the intermediate level. They claimed that the local government reforms were an only incomplete answer to the much wider need for democratisation, which implied nationwide elections.<sup>208</sup>

The government came also under long-lasting pressure of leaders of domestic opposition groups, particularly of the umbrella Movement for Freedom and Justice (MFJ) and the smaller socialist Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards (KNRG). From its founding in the mid-1990s until early 1992, most anti-PNDC organisations were synchronized by the MFJ, which later split up. The Movement criticised Rawlings’ regime for four reasons: failure to distribute the gains of economic growth relatively equitably, the deteriorating standard of higher education and social services, the decline of the rule of law, and finally the absence of a civilian, elected government guaranteeing human rights. The MFJ was established in August 1990, at a time when the government was calling for a widespread discussion on the future frame for politics in Ghana. Many saw it as a fairly serious threat to the PNDC’s continued

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<sup>207</sup> Hanke, Stefanie (2001). p. 102ff, 108ff.

<sup>208</sup> Chazan, Naomi (1991). p. 34ff.

supremacy, because it was supported by politicians from Ghana's two main political traditions: the Convention People's party of Kwame Nkrumah and the United Party of the late Kofi Busia. Their leaders formed an extraordinary mixture of socialists and liberals, who had been committed to the re-establishment of party political rule for a long time.

Around 1990/91, the international trend of opinion and events was powerfully towards democratisation: "Latin America, the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, East Asian and parts of Africa were all undergoing democratisation 'experiments'." Rawlings realised that in such a climate further economic growth and the attraction of international finance under an authoritarian government was unlikely. In 1991, the interim results of Ghana's nation-wide debate on the political future of the country were presented. By then, the trend was steadily towards a multiparty system. The results were to form the basis for discussions on the content and form of a new Ghanaian constitution. It was to be drafted by the end of 1991 by a 258-member Consultative Assembly, appointed by the government but made up largely of representatives of corporate groups. – After two re-elections under rather dubious circumstances, "Rawlings' decade of purposive, effective, dynamic and relatively uncorrupt personalist rule" eventually ended in 2003 (for more details see chapter III.1.).<sup>209</sup>

Thus, the *democratisation movements in the 1980s and early 1990s* nearly always involved a great variety of actors: (1) occupational networks (professionals, farmers, workers, trader organisations), (2) associations based on age, gender, or religion (voluntary services, recreation, savings, and special interests groups, women's and students' associations), and (3) groups with pre-colonial roots, i.e. so-called primary associations, such as households, villages, kinship units, ethnic groups, local development societies, and traditional political systems, united on geographic, affiliate, historical and mythic grounds. A comparison between the *post-colonial independence movements* and the *popular struggles for political change in the 1980s and 1990s* can conclude:

"The call for freedom during decolonization was presented in the most abstract terms on a grand macroscale; the move to avert official oppression assumed personal and concrete meaning at the microlevel. Thirty years previously the entire colonial system was challenged, in the popular cultures purveyed in the 1980s the issue was not the boundaries of political control but its character. The nationalist search for self-determination was conducted by elites in potential; recent agitations have possessed a mass quality."<sup>210</sup>

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<sup>209</sup> Haynes, Jeff (1995). p. 96ff.

<sup>210</sup> Chazan, Naomi (1994). p. 81.

Themes common to *popular cultures* in Africa are criticism of individual leaders and their governments' economic and political performance. Moreover, popular cultures perceive several overlapping boundaries in the political sphere, i.e. village or town, region, ethnic group, and country. All popular cultures seem to be alienated from the state system. Hence, the validity of state power is constantly questioned. But though there is broad consensus on rejection of an authoritarian, exploitive state, social groups differ widely in their own set of norms, characteristics, and visions.

Nevertheless, due to its history and associational vitality, Africa's potential for democracy is more credibly revealed by the formation of small collectives established and controlled by rural and urban groups than by parliaments and parties.<sup>211</sup>

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<sup>211</sup> Chazan, Naomi (1994). p. 78f.

## Conclusion

As has been shown, the political changes most African countries underwent during the 1980s and 1990s did not result in fully grown liberal democracies. Frequently, precluded or flawed transitions and pseudodemocracies were the consequence. Benin, Mali, and Ghana, however, belong to the small group of those countries, which can claim to have liberal democratic forms of government. Therefore, they provide prototypes for an analysis of the sources of successful democratic change in Africa.

The statistical analysis as well as the qualitative comparison of the three West African countries inquired the claims of *modernisation theory*, expecting democracy to be a result of – or at least to be accompanied by – positive economic growth. The results rather emphasise the significance of a *democratic political culture* among the elites and the population of a country. In fact, the impact of economic developments on politics has proven to be twofold: long-lasting negative growth weakens the legitimacy of *any* regime, while positive economic development strengthens the ruling government – independent from the nature of this government. However, in contrast to authoritarian regimes, democracies do not rely on economic success alone. Their specifically democratic organisation and the political output in the form of human rights provides them with an additional legitimising basis.

Therefore, as expected, the quantitative investigation, by using five alternative measures of democracy and rights protection in combination with two indicators of economic development, inquired the strong version of modernisation theory for 51 African countries (i.e. all recognised states with the exception of Eritrea) over the period 1975 to 2000. However, the hypothesis that democracies, too, require positive economic growth in order to thrive and consolidate beyond their initial stage, received some statistical support.

The qualitative country comparison revealed that the *absence of economic development* eventually contributed to the collapse of authoritarian systems. Moreover, the *interconnections between economics and politics* in Africa – besides contradicting the expectations of the economic development hypothesis – are not as simple as modernisation theory claims. It was not an increasingly prospering middle class demanding more rights and freedoms from the state, but clientelist networks deprived of their privileges and a collapsing civil service together with a population alienated from the state and supporting themselves with informal sector activity that toppled dictators and fought for democracy. Among these groups, especially those who had remained outside the system of authoritarian privileges, forced a change of the system

of government, not merely a change of the regime. These events and the behaviour of the agents involved can be explained by political culture formation in the past.

Africa's history has been hard and relentless for centuries. Having undergone cultural developments separate and different from Western Renaissance, Industrialisation, and nation-building, African societies were swamped with European colonialism. What followed was an extensive phase of exploitation of resources and populations, uprooting of existing social orders, and institutionalised degradation of Africans in general. Democratic elements of traditional political cultures were frustrated, while colonial structures caused and supported the proliferation of ethnic tendencies and clientelist activities. Human rights or popular participation in politics, let alone coherent economic development strategies to build up or to increase the potential of various African regions, widely were of no concern to the colonial masters. Colonies worked as centralised, administrative systems, not as political units.

In the aftermath of World War II, which produced not only extensive costs to the Western world, but also generated a general international atmosphere of liberation, the colonies fought to be and became independent states. However, the nation state principle was pulled on African societies. Within the new borders, hundreds of languages, customs, and religions were gathered, and a small, Western-educated African elite was left alone with performing democratic politics for populations entirely inexperienced in such philosophy. Suitable, integrating political institutions and politically active civil societies did not exist. Turning away from the European concepts of capitalism and democracy, most anti-colonialist, nationalist governments opted for African socialism, whose values such as solidarity, unity, and community seemed to suit better African tradition and the demands of the moment. This choice involved the centralisation of the political apparatus and the economy for the aim of building new competitive entities in the international arena, a strategy in line with contemporary development approaches in East and West, which regarded state intervention as necessary for the engineering of rapid growth.

But during the first post-colonial decade the political, cultural and economic conditions were adverse to sustaining democracy or success in international markets. The new African states suffered from political instability, authoritarianism, and economic decline. Politics was dominated by *statist elites*, which had a functional view of the state and regarded it as means of extracting resources from the population for its own ends. Dictators rested on clientelist networks of grants and favours to uphold their rule. Like in colonial times, the proximity to the state defined social status. Thus, the political elite was a so-called "state class". *Liberal elites* and the *population* were excluded from power and anti-regime activities violently suppressed.

During the decades of African authoritarianism, populations had to find ways of surviving out of the reach of their repressive governments. This resulted in large informal economic sectors, offering markets for small-scale activities and cheap employment, and the continuation or creation of associational groups, often traditional or religious, providing for community and economic support. All these associations and organisations were characterised by deep distrust of the state. Often the state legitimised itself most with remaining absent from people's daily lives. Thus, not only the character of government, but also its scope is a problem many African states are still facing today. Through most of the post-colonial time, African governments were excessively authoritarian to conceal that they are not sufficiently authoritative.

At the beginning of the 1980s, most countries found themselves in the midst of a complex economic, social and political crisis. The reasons for this emergency were multifaceted: corruption, an unmanageable state bureaucracy, no provision of public services in the face of serious food scarcity, and/or regime incapacity and perceived illegitimacy that had led to serious problems of "governability".

In this situation liberal elites and civil societies gained in momentum. During the three decades since independence, they had had to learn the bitter lesson that the fight for a government truly guaranteeing freedom was qualitatively different from the struggle for independence. Thus, while anti-colonialist movements were widely elitist, the popular struggles for political change during the 1980s and early 1990s usually included a wide variety of social strata. Moreover, very often the behaviour of the military opting to support the popular struggles was a decisive factor in the further course of events. Among the agents involved it were primarily those groups who had been excluded from clientelist systems that called for democratisation.

But the consolidation of democracy requires time and many problems remain also in those countries where democracy emerged successfully. Problems of ethnicity and corruption remain. Moreover, the variety and fragmentation of African civil societies involves wide differences in values and viewpoints among diverse groups. Therefore, stateness faces two problems in Africa: at the national level, inherited state institutions still have to go through a process of decolonisation and devolution to link democracy, the rule of law, and development with the people. On the level of civil society, intermediary organisations have to be established to link different social groups with each another and with the state.<sup>212</sup>

The challenge is to connect the various fragments of democratic activity with each other in a suitable political framework to sustain a democratic culture and democracy. Equitable economic growth and the decentralisation of funds and powers will be an important task in

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<sup>212</sup> Chazan, Naomi (1994). p. 87f.



order to account for the socio-economic circumstances of the mainly agriculture-oriented African countries.<sup>213</sup> If the consequent introduction of capitalist strategies combined with Africa's insecure position in the international economic sphere will contribute to internal political and societal stabilisation of African countries is by now an open question.<sup>214</sup>

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<sup>213</sup> Dreger, Mirka (2003) "A Call for Development Partnerships in the Framework of current Decentralization Processes in West Africa." In: Dreger, Mirka & Hueninghaus, Anke (2003) *Social Research on Transformation in Developing Countries*. Bochum: Institut für Entwicklungsforschung und Entwicklungspolitik der Ruhr-Universität Bochum. pp. 65-73.

<sup>214</sup> For discussion see: Bussmann, Margit, Scheuthle, Harald & Schneider, Gerald (2003) "Die "Friedensdividende" der Globalisierung: Außenwirtschaftliche Öffnung und innenpolitische Stabilität in den Entwicklungsländern." *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 44 (3): 203-324. Elwert, Georg (1980) "Überleben in Krisen, kapitalistische Entwicklung und traditionelle Solidarität. Zur Ökonomie und Sozialstruktur eines westafrikanischen Bauerndorfes." In: *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*. 9 (4): 343-365. Todaro, Michael (2000). p. 459ff.

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**Country List 2: Africa (51 countries)**

Angola	Madagascar
Algeria	Malawi
Benin	Mali
Botswana	Mauritania
Burkina Faso	Mauritius
Burundi	Morocco
Cameroon	Mozambique
Cape Verde	Namibia
Central African Republic	Niger
Chad	Nigeria
Comoros	Rwanda
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Sao Tome and Principe
Congo, Rep.	Senegal
Cote d'Ivoire	Seychelles
Egypt	Sierra Leone
Equatorial Guinea	Somalia
Ethiopia	South Africa
Gabon	Sudan
Gambia, The	Swaziland
Ghana	Tanzania
Guinea	Togo
Guinea-Bissau	Tunisia
Kenya	Uganda
Lesotho	Zambia
Libya	Zimbabwe
Liberia	

**Country List 3: North African countries(N=7):**

Algeria	Morocco
Egypt	Sudan
Libya	Tunisia
Mauritania	

**Country List 4: West African countries (N=14):**

Benin	Guinea-Bissau
Burkina Faso	Liberia
Cape Verde	Mali
Cote d'Ivoire	Nigeria
Gambia, The	Senegal
Ghana	Sierra Leone
Guinea	Togo


**Table 5: Transition Outcomes, Africa, 2002:**

<b><i>Precluded Transitions (n=4)</i></b>	<b><i>Blocked Transitions (n=12)</i></b>	<b><i>Flawed Transitions (n=22)</i></b>	<b><i>Democratic Transitions (n=9)</i></b>
Egypt	Algeria	Burkina Faso	Benin
Liberia	Angola	Cameroon	Cape Verde
Libya	Burundi	Central African Republic	Ghana
Sudan	Chad	Congo	Madagascar
	Ethiopia	Comoros	Mali
	Guinea	Cote d'Ivoire	Namibia
	Nigeria	Djibouti	Sao Tome & Principe
	Rwanda	Equatorial Guinea	Seychelles
	Sierra Leone	Gabon	South Africa
	Somalia	Guinea-Bissau	
	Tunisia	Kenya	
	Zaire	Lesotho	
		Malawi	
		Mauritania	
		Mozambique	
		Morocco	
		Niger	
		Swaziland	
		Tanzania	
		Togo	
		Uganda	
		Zambia	

**Source:** Table based on data up to 1994 from: Bratton, Michael & van de Walle, Nicolas (1997) *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. p. 120.

Additional Sources: (i) Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Libya, and Tunisia have been categorised according to: Magnarella, P. J. (ed. 1999) *Middle East and North Africa: Governance, Democratization, Human Rights*. Aldershot, Ashgate. (ii) Transition table was updated to 2002 on the basis of the Freedom House ratings: Freedom House, "FH Country Ratings." <<http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm>>. September 2003.

**Figure 6: Mean per capita GNI and per capita Energy Consumption**



**Sources:**

World Bank Group (ed. 1978-1998), *World Development Reports 1978 – 1998*. New York: Oxford University Press.

DAC Online, "International Development Statistics Online."

<<http://www.oecd.org/htm/M00005000/M00005347.htm>>. July 2002.

**Table 7: Bivariate Correlation Matrix of Measures of Economic development**

	<b>p.c. GNI</b>	<b>p.c. Energy Consumption</b>
<b>GNI p.c. Atlas \$</b>	1.00 (1279)	.79** (710)
<b>p.c. Energy Consumption in kg of coal/oil equivalent</b>		1.00 (740)

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. Number of observations in parentheses.

Source: see table before.

***Table 8: Measures of Democracy***


Score	Years	Type of Measure	Democratic Qualities	Range of Measure
Poe & Tate 1/AI	1976-1993	Subjective	Rights protection	1 to 5 (low)
Poe & Tate 2/SD	1976-1993	Subjective	Rights (and institutions)	1 to 5 (low)
Gastil/FH	1975-2000	Subjective	Rights protection	1 to 7 (low)
Polity IV	1975-2000	Subjective	Institutions	-10 to +10
Vanhanen	1975-1998	Objective	Institutions	0 to 70 (high)

**Sources:**

Poe, S. C. & Tate, C. N. (1994) "Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 88: 853-900.

Freedom House, "FH Country Ratings." <<http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm>>. July 2002. Polity IV Project, "Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2000." <<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/>>. July 2002.

Institutt For Sosiologi Og Statsvitenskap NTNU Trondheim, "The Polyarchy Dataset: Vanhanen's Index of Democracy." <<http://www.svt.ntnu.no/iss/data/vanhanen/>>. July 2002.

***Figure 9: Means of Measures of Democracy***


Source: see table 8.

***Table 10: Bivariate Correlation Matrix of Democracy Measures***

	Poe & Tate 1	Poe & Tate 2	Gastil	Polity IV	Vanhanen
Poe & Tate 1	-	.79** (897)	.34** (897)	.12** (845)	.09** (897)
Poe & Tate 2		-	.37** (897)	.12** (845)	.08* (897)
<i>Gastil</i>			-	.76** (1262)	.64** (1231)
Polity IV				-	.76** (1159)
Vanhanen					-

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. \*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. Numbers of observations in parenthesis.

Source: see table 8.

***Figure 11: Comparison of political, civil, and personal integrity rights in Africa:***

Source: see table 8.

**Table 12: Parameter Estimates for Economic Development and Democracy in Africa**  
**(Dependent Variable = Democracy)**

	POE & TATE 1 (1976-1993)		POE & TATE 2 (1976-1993)		GASTIL (1975-2000)		POLITY IV (1975-2000)		VANHANEN (1975-1998)	
<i>Constant</i>	.06 (1.88)	.13** (4.81)	.05 (1.47)	.13** (4.29)	-.02 (-1.28)	.02 (1.33)	.02 (.99)	.04** (2.58)	-.005 (-.19)	.02 (.88)
<b>Dt-1</b>	.65** (23.5)	.68** (21.35)	.69** (25.73)	.7** (21.58)	.92** (79.65)	.93** (53.53)	.94** (84.83)	.94** (57.27)	.9** (57.83)	.9** (40.51)
<b>LnPCGNI</b>	.02** (3.83)	-	.02** (3.29)	-	.008** (2.62)	-	.002 (.60)	-	.006 (1.33)	-
<b>lnPCENERGY‡</b>	-	.008 (1.66)	-	.008 (1.53)	-	.002 (.54)	-	-.0008 (-.23)	-	.003 (.63)
<b>West Africa</b>	.03** (2.79)	.02 (1.53)	.03** (2.90)	.03 (1.86)	.01* (1.96)	.003 (.33)	.003 (.42)	-.006 (-.7)	.006 (.69)	.01 (1.06)
<b>North Africa</b>	-.05** (-3.42)	-.03 (-1.68)	-.04* (-2.43)	-.03 (-1.7)	-.01 (-1.66)	-.02* (-1.96)	-.02 (-1.77)	-.02 (-1.32)	-.03* (-2.27)	-.02 (-1.57)
<b>R squared</b>	.51	.49	.53	.49	.86	.82	.88	.84	.78	.73
<b>Degr. Of Freedom</b>	788	567	788	567	1203	696	1124	697	1071	695
<b>F</b>	202.74* *	135.91 **	220.03 **	134.88**	1872.39* *	782.11**	1985.14* *	889.36**	922.81**	471.88**
<b>Durbin Watson</b>	2.2	2.15	2.28	2.31	1.84	1.83	1.75	1.67	1.96	1.92

\*p<.05 \*\*p<.01. Standardised Coefficients reported, t-values in parentheses.

D<sub>t-1</sub>: Democracy score lagged by one year.

lnPCGNI: Natural log of per capita gross national income.

lnPCENERGY: Natural log of per capita energy consumption.

West Africa: Dummy variable coded 1 for West African countries and 0 for all other African countries.

North Africa: Dummy variable coded 1 for all North African countries and 0 for all other African countries.

‡ Energy regressions: The following countries were excluded because of missing data: Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Gambia, Lesotho, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Swaziland. For Poe & Tate 1 & 2 energy regressions is also Guinea-Bissau missing.




***Table 13: Democracy by Level of Income (Comparison of Means)***

<b>INCOME</b>	<b>POE &amp; TATE 1</b>	<b>POE &amp; TATE 2</b>	<b>Gastil</b>	<b>POLITY IV</b>	<b>VANHANEN</b>
<b>0-500</b>	.58 (526)	.61 (526)	.26 (781)	.34 (700)	.15 (675)
<b>501-1000</b>	.58 (172)	.63 (172)	.33 (242)	.32 (220)	.18 (214)
<b>1001-1500</b>	.71 (58)	.74 (58)	.43 (88)	.38 (79)	.15 (68)
<b>1501-2000</b>	.47 (15)	.50 (15)	.38 (28)	.48 (27)	.21 (22)
<b>2001-2500</b>	.68 (17)	.71 (17)	.44 (29)	.60 (24)	.20 (19)
<b>2501-3000</b>	.58 (19)	.66 (19)	.39 (21)	.58 (18)	.32 (16)
<b>3001-3500</b>	.73 (8)	.75 (8)	.62 (22)	.68 (21)	.35 (14)
<b>3501-4000</b>	.77 (6)	.77 (6)	.57 (15)	.59 (14)	.32 (12)
<b>4001-4500</b>	.70 (2)	.80 (2)	.34 (7)	.23 (7)	.30 (7)
<b>4501-5000</b>	.70 (2)	.70 (2)	.22 (3)	.33(1)	.34 (2)
<b>More than 5001</b>	.54 (19)	.52 (19)	.32 (26)	.20 (15)	.17 (24)
<b>total country years</b>	846	846	1262	1126	1073
<b>F-Statistic</b>	4.81**	4.64**	11.43**	10.21**	2.63*

Cells contain mean democracy measure and number of country years (N) in parentheses.  
 \*\*p<.01, \*p<.05


Source: see figure 6 and table 8.

***Figure 14a: Country-years by Income***



Source: see figure 6 and table 8.

***Figure 14b: Democracy by Income (including Gastil, Polity IV, and Vanhanen)***




Source: see figure 6 and table 8.

***Table 15: Democracy by Level of Income below \$2000 (Comparison of Means)***

<b>INCOME</b>	<b>POE &amp; TATE 1</b>	<b>POE &amp; TATE 2</b>	<b>GASTIL</b>	<b>POLITY IV</b>	<b>VANHANEN</b>
<b>0-200</b>	.51 (127)	.50 (127)	.18 (206)	.31 (205)	.10 (191)
<b>201-400</b>	.60 (314)	.64 (314)	.29 (469)	.35 (440)	.16 (427)
<b>401-600</b>	.59 (135)	.65 (135)	.29 (185)	.32 (172)	.17 (169)
<b>601-800</b>	.57 (62)	.62 (62)	.35 (93)	.33 (90)	.17 (90)
<b>801-1000</b>	.63 (60)	.66 (60)	.34 (70)	.28 (65)	.17 (68)
<b>1001-1200</b>	.74 (40)	.76 (40)	.42 (54)	.40 (50)	.17 (50)
<b>1201-1400</b>	.66 (15)	.71 (15)	.44 (28)	.35 (24)	.20 (23)
<b>1401-1600</b>	.57 (3)	.63 (3)	.34 (14)	.42 (14)	.23 (11)
<b>1601-1800</b>	.43 (8)	.48 (8)	.29 (10)	.41 (9)	.17 (10)
<b>1801-2000</b>	.53 (7)	.53 (7)	.55 (10)	.61 (10)	.30 (10)


Cells contain mean democracy measure and number of country years (N) in parentheses. \*\*p<.01, \*p<.05  
**Source:** see figure 1 and table 3.

**Figure 16a: Country-years by Income (GNI p.c. below \$2000)**




Source: see figure 6 and table 8.

**Figure 16b: Democracy by Income (GNI p.c. below \$2000; including Gastil, Polity IV, and Vanhanen)**




Source: see figure 6 and table 8.

***Figure 17: Mean Democracy and per Capita GNI in Africa (including Gastil, Polity, and Vanhanen)***



Source: see figure 6 and table 8.

***Figure 18: Mean Democracy and per Capita GNI in Africa (including Polity and Vanhanen)***



Source: see figure 6 and table 8.

## Economic Indicators: The Republic of Benin



<b>Currency:</b>	CFA (Communaute Financière Africaine Francs)
<b>GDP:</b>	\$7.3 billion (purchasing power parity in 2002)
<b>GDP real growth rate:</b>	5.4% (2002)
<b>GDP per capita:</b>	\$1,070 (purchasing power parity in 2002)
<b>GDP composition:</b>	agriculture 38%, industry 15%, services: 47% (2002)
<b>Population below poverty line:</b>	37% (2001)
<b>Agricultural products:</b>	cotton, corn cassava (tapioca), yams, beans, palm oil, peanuts, livestock
<b>Main exports:</b>	cotton, crude oil, palm products, cocoa
<b>External debt:</b>	\$1.6 billion (2000)
<b>conomic aid:</b>	\$342.6 million (2000)



## Economic Indicators: The Republic of Mali



<b>Currency:</b>	CFA
<b>GDP:</b>	\$9.8 billion (purchasing power parity in 2002)
<b>GDP real growth rate:</b>	4.5% (2002)
<b>GDP per capita:</b>	\$860 (purchasing power parity in 2002)
<b>GDP composition:</b>	agriculture 45%, industry 17%, services: 38% (2001)
<b>Industries:</b>	food processing, construction, phosphate and gold mining
<b>Main exports:</b>	cotton, gold
<b>Labour force by occupation:</b>	agriculture and fishing 80% (2001)
<b>Population below poverty line:</b>	64% (2001)
<b>External debt:</b>	\$3.3 billion (2000)
<b>Economic aid:</b>	\$596.4 million (2001)



## Economic Indicators: The Republic of Ghana



<b>Currency:</b>	GHC (Cedi)
<b>GDP:</b>	\$42.5 billion (purchasing power parity in 2002)
<b>GDP real growth rate:</b>	5.8% (2002)
<b>GDP per capita:</b>	\$2,100 (purchasing power parity in 2002)
<b>GDP composition:</b>	agriculture 36%, industry 25%, services: 39% (2000)
<b>Industries:</b>	mining, lumbering, light manufacturing, aluminum smelting, food processing
<b>Main exports:</b>	gold, timber, cocoa
<b>Labour force by occupation:</b>	agriculture 60%, industry 15%, services 25% (1999)
<b>External debt:</b>	\$7.2 billion (2002)
<b>Economic aid:</b>	\$6.9 billion (1999)



**Sources:** CIA, "The World Fact Book: Benin, Mali, Ghana." <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/>. August 2003.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Country Profiles: Benin, Mali, Ghana."

<http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1017048844090>. August 2003.

**Table 19: Freedom House Index for Benin, Mali and Ghana, 1974/75-2001/02**

Symbols: NF=not free, PF=partly free, F=Free; Countries whose combined averages for political rights and for civil liberties fall between 1.0 and 2.5 are designated "free"; between 3.0 and 5.5. "partly free"; and between 5.5 and 7.0 "not free."

Year	Benin	Mali	Ghana
1974-75	7,6,NF	7,6,NF	7,5,NF
1975-76	7,7,NF	7,7,NF	7,5,NF
1976-77	7,7,NF	7,7,NF	7,5,NF
1977-78	7,7,NF	7,7,NF	6,5,PF
1978-79	7,7,NF	7,7,NF	6,4,PF
1979-80	7,6,NF	7,6,NF	4,4,PF
1980-81	7,6,NF	7,6,NF	2,3,F
1981-82	7,6,NF	7,6,NF	2,3,F
1982-83	7,6,NF	7,6,NF	6,5,NF
1983-84	7,6,NF	7,6,NF	6,5,NF
1984-85	7,7,NF	7,6,NF	7,6,NF
1985-86	7,7,NF	7,6,NF	7,6,NF
1986-87	7,7,NF	7,6,NF	7,6,NF
1987-88	7,7,NF	7,6,NF	7,6,NF
1988-89	7,7,NF	6,6,NF	6,6,NF
1989-90	7,7,NF	6,6,NF	6,5,NF

1990-91	6,4,PF	6,5,NF	6,5,NF
1991-92	2,3,F	6,4,PF	6,6,NF
1992-93	2,3,F	2,3,F	5,5,PF
1993-94	2,3,F	2,3,F	5,4,PF
1994-95	2,3,F	2,4,PF	5,4,PF
1995-96	2,2,F	2,3,F	4,4,PF
1996-97	2,2,F	2,2,F	3,4,PF
1997-98	2,2,F	3,3,F	3,3,PF
1998-99	2,2,F	3,3,F	3,3,PF
1999-00	2,3,F	3,3,F	3,3,PF
2000-01	2,2,F	2,3,F	2,3,F
2001-02	3,2 F	2,3 F	2,3 F

**Source:** Freedom House, "FH Country Ratings", <http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm>. September 2003.

# *Benin – Time Outline*

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**1960**

**1<sup>st</sup> August 1960:**

Independence;  
first president:  
Herbert Maga

**1963:**

First military coup  
by Christophe Soglo,  
civilian government  
under Sourou-Migan  
Apithy installed

**1965:**

Second military coup  
led by Soglo, who is  
in turn overthrown  
by military coup led by  
Alphonse Alley;  
new president: Justin  
Ahomadegbé

**1970**

**1967-1970:**

▶ three-men  
Presidential Council

**1972:**

Military coup by  
Mathieu Kérékou,  
▶ establishment of a  
Marxist-Leninist state

**1975:**

Dahomey becomes  
the “People’s Republic  
of Benin

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**1980**

**1980:**

economic problems,  
West-orientation

**1990**

**1991: Free elections:**

Kérékou defeated by  
Soglo

**1988:**

two coup attempts

**1995: 2<sup>nd</sup> elections:**

Kérékou becomes  
president again

**2000**

**elections:**

**1989: “Civilian Coup”**


popular unrest,  
National Conference,  
▶ new democratic constitution

**2003: 3<sup>rd</sup>**

Kérékou re-elected



## *Mali – Time Outline*



## *Ghana – Time Outline*

1950	1960	1970
<p><b><u>1954:</u></b> Independence; first president: K. Nkrumah ▶ African Socialism</p>	<p><b><u>1966</u></b>-----<b><u>1974</u></b> military coups and fledgling civilian governments alternate each other</p>	<p><b><u>1974:</u></b> military coup by Jerry Rawlings ▶ establishment of civilian government under Hilla Limann</p>
1980	1990	2000
<p><b><u>1981:</u></b> Rawling's 2<sup>nd</sup> coup ▶ single-party state ▶ economic recovery in 1980s</p>	<p><b><u>1992:</u></b> regime liberalises, ▶ democratic constitution ▶ first elections for 13 years: won by Rawlings</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>1996: 2<sup>nd</sup> elections:</u></b> Rawlings re-elected</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>2001: 3<sup>rd</sup> elections:</u></b> new president: John Kuofur</p>