

Seminar:

"ANREIZE IN UNTERNEHMEN"

Für Studierende im Diplom- und Magister-Studiengang

1. Insider Econometrics

Einstiegsliteratur:

Ichniowski, C. and K. Shaw. 2003. "Beyond Incentive Pay: Insiders' Estimates of the Value of Complementary Human Resource Management Practices," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17, pp. 155-180.

Lazear, E.P. and K. Shaw. 2007. "Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 21, pp. 91-114.

List, J.A. 2009. "Introduction to Field Experiments in Economics," *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, Forthcoming.

Shaw, K. 2009. "Insider Econometrics: A Roadmap with Stops Along the Way," *Labour Economics*, Forthcoming.

2. Leistungsentlohnung und soziale Beziehungen am Arbeitsplatz

Einstiegsliteratur:

Bandiera, O., I. Barankay, and I. Rasul. 2009. "Social Connections and Incentives in the Workplace: Evidence from Personnel Data," *Econometrica* 77, pp. 1047-1094.

Bandiera, O., I. Barankay, and I. Rasul. 2009. "Social Incentives in the Workplace," *Review of Economic Studies*, Forthcoming.

Bandiera, O., I. Barankay, and I. Rasul. 2007. "Incentives for Managers and Inequality among Workers: Evidence from a Field Experiment," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 122, pp. 729-773.

Bandiera, O., I. Barankay, and I. Rasul. 2005. "The Evolution of Cooperative Norms: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment," CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5358.

Bandiera, O., I. Barankay, and I. Rasul. 2005. "Social Preferences and the Response to Incentives: Evidence from Personnel Data," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 120, pp. 917-962.

3. Welche Betriebe nutzen Leistungsbeurteilungen?

Einstiegsliteratur:

Addison, J.T. and C. Belfield. 2008. "The Determinants of Performance Appraisal Systems: A Note (Do Brown and Heywood's Results for Australia Hold Up for Britain?)," *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 46, pp. 521-531.

Brown, M. and J.S. Heywood. 2005. "Performance Appraisal Systems: Determinants of Change," *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 43, pp. 659-679.

4. Welche Arbeitnehmer erhalten Leistungsbeurteilungen?

Einstiegsliteratur:

Grund, C. and D. Sliwka. 2009. "Evidence on Performance Pay and Risk Aversion," *Economics Letters*, Forthcoming.

Grund, C. and D. Sliwka. 2009. "The Anatomy of Performance Appraisal in Germany," *International Journal of Human Resource Management*, Forthcoming.

5. Wirkungen von Leistungsbeurteilungen

Einstiegsliteratur:

Breuer, K., P. Nieken and D. Sliwka. 2008. "The Impact of Favoritism on Subjective Performance Evaluations – An Empirical Investigation," GEABA Discussion Paper No. 08-07.

Cornelissen, T., J.S. Heywood and U. Jirjahn. 2008. "Performance Pay, Risk Attitudes and Job Satisfaction," SOEPpapers No. 136.

Elvira, M. and R. Town. 2001. "The Effects of Race and Worker Productivity on Performance Evaluations," *Industrial Relations* 40, pp. 571-590.

Engelland, A. and R. Riphahn. 2009. "Evidence on Incentive Effects of Subjective Performance Evaluations," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Forthcoming.

6. Peer Effekte am Arbeitsplatz

Einstiegsliteratur:

Falk, A. and A. Ichino. 2006. "Clean Evidence on Peer Effects," *Journal of Labor Economics*, 24, pp. 39-57.

Mas, A. and E. Moretti. 2009. "Peers at Work," *American Economic Review* 99, pp. 112-145.

7. Ungleichheit und Motivation **(THEMA BEREITS VERGEBEN)**

Einstiegsliteratur:

Charness, G. and P. Kuhn. 2007. "Does Pay Inequality Affect Worker Effort? Experimental Evidence," *Journal of Labor Economics* 25, pp. 693-723.

Mohnen, A., K. Pokorny and D. Sliwka. 2008. "Transparency, Inequity Aversion, and the Dynamics of Peer Pressure in Teams: Theory and Evidence," *Journal of Labor Economics* 26, pp. 693-720.

8. Leistungsanreize und Multitasking

Einstiegsliteratur:

Griffith, R. and A. Neely. 2009. "Performance Pay and Managerial Experience in Multitask Teams: Evidence from within a Firm," *Journal of Labor Economics* 27, pp. 49-82.

9. Leistungsentlohnung und Einkommensungleichheit **(THEMA BEREITS VERGEBEN)**

Einstiegsliteratur:

Lemieux, T., W.B. MacLeod and D. Parent. 2009. "Performance Pay and Wage Inequality," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 124, pp. 1-49.

10. Leistungsanreize für Lehrer **(THEMA BEREITS VERGEBEN)**

Einstiegsliteratur:

Dee, T. and B. Keys. 2004. "Does Merit Pay Reward Good Teachers? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment," *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 23, pp. 471-488.

Eberts, R., K. Hollenbeck and J. Stone. 2000. "Teacher Performance Incentives and Student Outcomes," *Journal of Human Resources* 37, pp. 913-927.

Jürges, H. and K. Schneider. 2009. "Central Exit Examinations Increase Performance ... But Take the Fun out of Mathematics," *Journal of Population Economics*, Forthcoming.

11. Reagieren Frauen und Männer in gleicher Weise auf Wettbewerbssituationen? **(THEMA BEREITS VERGEBEN)**

Einstiegsliteratur:

Booth, A. 2009, "Gender and Competition," *Labour Economics*, Forthcoming.

Booth, A. and P. Nolen. 2009. "Choosing to Compete: How Different are Girls and Boys?" IZA Discussion Paper No. 4027.

Schwieren, C. and D. Weichselbaumer. 2008. "Does Competition Enhance Performance or Cheating? A Laboratory Experiment," IZA Discussion Paper No. 3275.

12. Globalisierung und Leistungsanreize in Unternehmen

Einstiegsliteratur:

Cunat, V. and M. Guadalupe. 2009. "Globalization and the Provision of Incentives inside the Firm: The Effect of Foreign Competition," *Journal of Labor Economics* 27, pp. 179-212.

Kurdelbusch, A. 2002. "Multinationals and the Rise of Variable Pay in Germany," *European Journal of Industrial Relations* 8, pp. 325-349.

Poutsma, E., P. Ligthart and U. Veersma. 2006. "The Diffusion of Calculative and Collaborative HRM Practices in European Firms," *Industrial Relations* 45, pp. 513-546.

13. Reziprozität und Motivation

Einstiegsliteratur:

Bowles, S. and H. Gintis. 2003. "Homo Reciprocans," *Nature* 415, pp. 125-128.

Carpenter, C., S. Bowles, H. Gintis and S.-H. Hwang. 2009. "Strong Reciprocity and Team Production: Theory and Evidence," *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, Forthcoming.

Carpenter, C. and E. Seki. 2005. "Does Social Preference Increase Productivity? Field Experimental Evidence from Fisherman in Toyama Bay," IZA Discussion Paper No. 1697.
Dur, R., A. Non and H. Roelfsema. 2008. "Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, TI 2008-080/1.

14. Managervergütung in Deutschland **(THEMA BEREITS VERGEBEN)**

Einstiegsliteratur:

Kraft, K. and A. Niederprüm. 1999. "Determinants of Management Compensation with Risk-Averse Agents and Dispersed Ownership of the Firm," *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* 40, pp. 17-27.
Kraft, K. und A. Niederprüm. 1999. "Ist die Vergütung von Managern im Zeitablauf flexibler geworden?" *Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung* 51, S. 787-804.
Schmidt, R. und J. Schwalbach. 2007. "Zur Höhe und Dynamik der Vorstandvergütung in Deutschland," *Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft* (Special Issue 1), S. 111-122.
Schwalbach, J. 2008. *Vergütungsstudie 2008. Vorstandsvergütung und Personalkosten der DAX 30-Unternehmen 1987-2007*. Institut für Management, Humboldt Universität Berlin.

15. Wovon hängt die Höhe der Managervergütung ab? **(THEMA BEREITS VERGEBEN)**

Einstiegsliteratur:

Abowd, J. and D. Kaplan. 1999. "Executive Compensation: Six Questions That Need Answering," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 13, pp. 145-168.
Guest, P. 2009. "Board Structure and Executive Pay," *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, Forthcoming.
Bertrand, M. and S. Mullainathan. 2001. "Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*.
Murphy, Kevin J., "Executive Compensation," in Orley Ashenfelter and David Card (eds.), *Handbook of Labor Economics*, Vol. 3b, Elsevier Science North Holland (1999), Chapter 38: 2485-2563.

Hinweise:

Die Seminarleistung setzt sich aus einer schriftlichen Hausarbeit, einem Referat und regelmäßiger Teilnahme zusammen. Die näheren Modalitäten werden in der ersten Semesterwoche im Wintersemester 2009/10 besprochen. Die genauen Termine der Seminarveranstaltungen werden noch per Aushang bekannt gegeben.

Die Teilnehmerzahl ist begrenzt (maximal 15 Teilnehmer). Vor Überschreiten der Kapazitätsgrenze haben Teilnehmer, die einen S-VWL-Leistungsnachweis anstreben, wegen begrenzter Wahlmöglichkeiten Präferenzen des Zugangs.

Die Anmeldung möge bitte nur erfolgen, wenn eine Teilnahme endgültig geklärt ist.

Ab sofort können sich die Teilnehmer für die Themen anmelden. Die Themenanmeldung möge bitte per Email an Frau Doris Holzträger (holztraeger@uni-trier.de) erfolgen. Bitte berücksichtigen Sie, dass die Themen nur einmal vergeben werden.

gez. PD Dr. Uwe Jirjahn