

Opportunities for redistributive policies?

Voting behavior and cross-pressures between economic and cultural lines of conflict

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1 Introduction

Growing discrepancies in income and wealth distribution alone do not promote public support for redistributive policies or make corresponding tax and social policy programs acceptable to the majority. Thus, the extent of redistributive policy is less than actual inequality would suggest (Lierse 2019). Various social science explanations point to this discrepancy: a distorted perception of income and wealth gaps (Schneider 2022), a lack of responsiveness on the part of politicians (Elsässer/Schäfer 2016; Horn et al. 2024), low political mobilization of the lower income group (Mahler/Jesuit 2006, Pontusson/Rueda 2010), a middle class that avoids coalitions with the lower class (Lierse et al. 2021), meritocratic values (Sauer et al. 2016, Adriaans/Liebig 2018), or media and political elites that activate frames for the migration of companies and jobs and influence public opinion (Dallinger 2021; Hilmar/Sachweh 2022).

Relevant surveys show broad support among the population for reducing income disparities. In relation to hesitant redistributive policies, this may seem puzzling. However, a look at voting behavior may help. The roughly two-thirds of citizens who agree with government measures to reduce the gap between high and low incomes do not necessarily vote for traditional or new post-materialist left-wing parties that advocate redistributive programs. Research on the processes between economic inequality and ultimately established policy ends too soon because there is little analysis of whether and how general sympathy for equality translates into party choice (Bradley et al. 2003; Kenworthy/McCall 2008; Finseraas 2010; Dallinger 2010; Brady et al. 2013; Breznau et al. 2025). However, only the voting decision clarifies how citizens weigh their criticism of injustice in relation to other salient issues. Political science has long emphasized that various political issues and multiple lines of conflict influence party choice (Stokes 1963; Kriesi 1998).

This paper expands the *political economy of redistribution* to include approaches that look at the interplay between economic and cultural dimensions of political conflict and the impact of this interplay on voter behaviour. Political economy only looks at the first conflict dimension, that is, state intervention in the economy and the consequences (including those for distribution). Voters, however, consider other political lines of conflict that lead to *cross-pressures* when differing parties support a voter's political preferences on various issues. This paper is based on the concept of multiple dimensions of political conflict, thus contributing to solving the puzzle of the broad consensus on equality on the one hand and the political outcomes on the other. It comes to the conclusion that distribution policies are "*not the only game in town*".

In the following I will look at how cultural issues in the second conflict dimension (immigration, climate change) interact with the socioeconomic issue to influence political behaviour (Häusermann/Kriesi 2015). I ask whether cultural issues determine party choice along the left-right axis to a greater extent than the classic issue of distribution does. Do positions on immigration or ecology issues make it less probable that voters will select parties that support redistributive

tax and social spending policies? Analysing multiple issues that determine voter behaviour helps clarify why citizens' sensitivity to too-large income gaps does not seem to result in a political demand for "leftist" parties that support greater redistribution.

The paper also contributes to innovative methods in redistribution research. The item commonly used in research on support for redistributive policies, "The government should reduce the gap between high and low incomes," results in a left-skewed distribution of responses, with (depending on the survey) between 66% and 75% of respondents supporting government intervention to reduce income inequality. However, this group does not vote entirely for parties that are "friendly to social spending." The generic item rather captures the value placed on equality in modern societies (Marshall 1952) or the effect of semantics used as a valence issue in political competition (Stokes 1963). Broad support for less inequality only partially translates into support for redistributive parties. The GLES item for the socioeconomic dimension examined in this paper avoids an unspecific taste for equality, as it also formulates the burden for the economy and citizens that is present in political debates and influences public opinion.

First, I will discuss research on political lines of conflict and *cross-pressures* in postmodern societies, followed by an introduction of the GLES data, indicators and analysis methods used. The results section shows how issue positions shifted during the time frame from 2009 until 2023: While there was dwindling support for taxes and social benefits (economic dimension), on the topic of immigration, support for restrictions increased. Climate as a dimension of conflict was first characterized by more sympathy for climate protection in direct competition with economic growth, but starting in 2015 preferences for economic growth became more prominent. The conflict dimension on increasing or reducing restrictions on immigration was the issue with the greatest degree of polarization over the entire time period.

Multinomial logistic regression models are used to analyse how the choice of parties is influenced by positions on socioeconomic and cultural issues. The effect of cross-pressures on the electoral chances of parties is then determined using interactions between issues and logistic regression. Finally, the role of issue positions and long-term determinants of voter behaviour is analysed. In particular, I examine the extent to which the effect of the issues on party choice is mediated by political ideology. The conclusion reflects on how research on politics of redistribution, which is focused on socioeconomic conflict dimensions, can benefit from expanding to include additional conflict dimensions.

2 Dimensions of political attitudes and cross-pressures

Between income inequality and redistributive politics, there lies a **multi-stage process** that is the subject of comparative political economy research (Campbell et al. 1960; Schmidt-Catran 2016:120). Attention has been given to citizens' *subjective perceptions* (Engelhardt/Wagener 2018; Giger/Lascombes 2019) and factors of the *political system* such as the power of political parties and the government, the strength of unions (Korpi/Palme 1999; Manow 2016), voter turnout in lower socioeconomic classes (Mahler/Jesuit 2006), or party systems and majority rules (Iversen/Soskice 2006). Research has also found that modern political conflicts are no longer focused on issues of distribution and the relationship between the state and the market; instead, political space has become two-dimensional (Hellwig op. cit.: 597).

Finseraas (2010) asked how redistribution policies change if there is competition from non-economic issues. Whether inequality induces political demands for redistribution depends on the salience of moral issues (abortion, homosexuality). When opposing parties polarize these topics, then voters de-prioritize economic interests. Finseraas did not look into the *electoral consequences* of polarized competing issues, however, which is what this paper aims to do. It relies on the concept of *cross-pressures* from the cleavage theory, that is, political lines of conflict among large social groups with specific interests and ideologies.

The “second cultural dimension” of political conflict changes voters’ party choice and affects the chances of traditional parties that primarily take up left-right issues. When topics from a cultural dimension increasingly determine voter behaviour and influence which party they choose in addition to topics from the economic dimension, then this has consequences for the feasibility of realizing redistributive policies. It is assumed that cultural issues supersede the economic dimension or conflicts about the relationship between the market and the state. Distribution issues are “forgotten” in a *cosmopolitan* discourse that is becoming increasingly dominant (Merkel 2016; Lux/Mau/Mewes 2024: 53).

In line with the **cleavage theory**, election research presupposes conflict dimensions that undergo long-term changes as social structures transform. Interest organizations—and political parties in particular—establish themselves around the lines of conflict, but their social structures are anchored in the interests of social groups. Democratic countries in the post-World War II era were characterized by an *economic conflict* centred on wages, social security, income distribution or the regulation of the labour market. Institutions that regulate socio-economic issues—industrial relations, social welfare state—were intended to pacify this conflict dimension. The guiding question was: “How much government intervention in the economy should there be?” Downs (1957:116).

The transformation towards a post-industrial society promoted the emergence of a second conflict dimension in politics (Lipset/Rokkan 1967; Inglehart 1977; Kriesi 1998; Bornschier 2010; Inglehart/Norris 2016; Merkel 2021). Globalization, expansion of education, a higher level of prosperity, the tertiarization of employment, and immigration received more attention as issues in the cultural dimension. Immigration, nationality, tolerance or rejection of other cultures, ecology, private lifestyles and sexual orientations became salient in political debates. The traditional party system reflecting the economic dimension became more diverse as parties focusing primarily on cultural issues were established. As a consequence, the party system is fragmented and the former “people’s parties” have lost voters. Besides the traditional Left party, there is a post-material green faction of the left that takes up ecological conflicts and distribution issues. Among conservatives, right-wing populist parties have arisen that politicize immigration and national identity.

The transformed party system places new demands on the electorate. According to the spatial model (Downs 1957), voters cast their vote for the party whose ideological position best reflects their own. When both left-right and cultural topics structure the political landscape, it becomes more difficult to orient oneself. Voters need to determine which party best fits not only with their economic preferences, but also with their cultural preferences. This leads to **cross-pressures** if different parties best fit with the different preferences. “Cross-pressures result from policy preferences across the two dimensions that push voters in the direction of different parties”

(Hillen/Steiner 2020: 336). Because the parties' programmes do not differ greatly in terms of how they view the state-market conflict, the more controversial topics in the cultural dimension can dominate (Häusermann/Kriesi 2015). The economic dimension can still come to the fore during crises, and topics such as inflation, energy prices, economic growth or minimum wage can become salient (Stövsand et al. 2022).

When they vote for a party, voters (indirectly) weight which issue they believe has priority. Because inequality is not the only issue at stake, but is only one among several political lines of conflict, this paper is interested in determining whether cultural issues influence voting decisions to a greater extent than economic (redistribution) issues do, meaning that the cultural issues supersede the economic issues. This question will be answered using a cross-sectional analysis. The weighting of the individual topics arises from their empirical predictive power when forecasting the election results of certain parties (see the discussion below for further determinants of party choice.) The *first hypothesis* is therefore: Due to the reconfiguration of conflict lines, party choice is determined to a greater extent by cultural issues than by the economic dimension. This can be seen when comparing the explanatory power of cultural and economic issue dimensions.

Reconfiguring the political lines of conflict might result less in a shift in the issue positions themselves than a shift in the *salience*, that is, the subjective importance of the various issues. It is postulated that, due to their high degree of institutionalization, economic issues are perceived as being less salient than controversial topics such as immigration, ecology or gender. It is these controversial topics that are then decisive for the election (Stövsand et al. 2022). *Cross-pressures* among issues are resolved through salience: When cultural issues are more salient than economic issues, the party that embodies the topic perceived as being more salient is elected even if that party does not correspond to the voters' economic preferences (Lefkofridi et al. 2014; Hillen/Steiner 2019).¹ The *second hypothesis* is: The perceived salience influences the voting decision to a greater extent than the issue position.

The hypotheses are additive and ask how topics in the economic and cultural dimension influence voter behaviour. They look at the *relative weighting* of individual issue positions when selecting a party. However, *multidimensional* conflict dimensions also have a mediated effect on citizens' political preferences; they interact and create cross-pressures. This concept is lacking in research on attitudes towards the welfare state, which typically uses factor analysis to determine various assessment dimensions (objectives, scope, efficacy) of the welfare state (Roosma et al. 2013). The idea of trade-offs was introduced in an attempt to integrate ambivalences and conflicting goals in preference formation. Citizens' attitudes were evaluated by looking at the *prioritization* of expenditures for alternative fields in education and social policy. Should the limited funds available for social issues be used to reform the education sector or to support the statutory pension fund (Busemeyer/Garritzmann 2017; Häusermann et al. 2018)? These trade-off questions go a step farther than the traditional *one-dimensional* view of *welfare preferences*, but their concept of multi-dimensionality is too narrow. Political

¹ As is the case with salience, the "most important problem" (MIP) approach also looks at the subjective weighting of issues and how this affects voting behaviour. With the MIP, however, respondents are asked to name the most important problem without being provided with categories. The statements are then categorized.

discourses are often not about more spending for education or nursing care, but instead about *prioritizing* within lines of conflict as they are described in the cleavage theory: More social spending versus less state intervention, less climate protection in favour of more economic growth, etc.

Studies on *value priorities* examine the demand for redistributive policies within the framework of the conflict between *universalism and particularism*. These terms mark *value priorities* that represent clusters of the population. These groups, also called liberals versus authoritarians (or anywheres and somewheres), represent typical “opinion packages” on gender roles, immigration, the economy and state, or climate change. The sociopolitical attitudes that are measured empirically with multiple items are bundled in a factor analysis that confirms the existence of more cosmopolitan-minded or communitarian-minded groups (Reckwitz 2019; Hillen/Steiner 2020).

Häusermann and Kriesi (2015) cluster the sociocultural and political orientations in both conflict dimensions and analyse the extent to which they are grounded in social structures and explain voter behaviour. The items available for factor analysis are suboptimal, however: the cultural lines of conflict (gender, immigration) can be operationalized broadly,² but the socioeconomic (state-market) dimension is only captured by a few items. Besides the usual suspect of “Political demand for lower income gaps”, these include “State provides job for everyone”, “State provides child care” or “In a just society differences in living standards must be small”. The economic issue also includes growth, inflation and unemployment that are unfortunately missing in many studies. The coherence of the economic factor is therefore low. Voter behaviour may be explained, but the effects of cross-pressures among the factors are not taken into account.³

Universalist or communitarian attitudes play a significant role in explanations of why right-wing populist parties are elected and why *public opinion is polarized* (Merkel 2016). In contrast, this paper integrates conflicting political dimensions in redistribution research. The *third hypothesis* is: *Cross-pressures* between economic and cultural issues make it less probable that parties in favour of taxation and social spending will be elected. This characteristic of multidimensional preferences is analysed by looking at interactions.⁴

The tradition of cleavage theory includes the link between issue positions (and the ideas upon which they are based) and socio-structural groups (education, profession, class) (Lipset/Rokkan 1967). Current adaptations of the cleavage theory use the revised socio-structural link (Oesch 2016). The new social basis consists of globalization winners and losers (Kriesi et al. 2008), the service and knowledge professions in post-industrial society (Oesch/Rennwald 2018) or contrasting experiences of mobility in upper and lower middle classes (Reckwitz

² With items on human rights, attitude toward immigration, ethnic and sexual diversity.

³ Hillen/Steiner (2019) conceptualize the economic dimension similarly: Job for everyone; standard of living for the unemployed; reduced income differences; fair society small differences. Cultural dimension: cultural life enriched/undermined by migrants; EU has gone too far; harsher sentences; gay and lesbians free to live as they wish.

⁴ Election research also analyses *cross-pressures* from networks or the social environment (Lazarsfeld et al 1968[1944]: 60-64) or from interests that arise from belonging to certain socioeconomic groups (Dassonneville 2023).

2019).⁵ These universalist or communitarian orientations play a major role in explanations of the election of right-wing populist parties and polarized public opinion (Merkel 2016; Mau et al. 2023).⁶

According to the *funnel of causality* in social-psychological election research, issue positions are determinants at the end of the decision-making process. Before that, party identification, candidate orientation, and, in particular, long-term factors mediated by education, social class, and ideology come into play. They influence political socialization, in which specific dispositions are acquired (Campbell et al. 1960). It is assumed that social position and political ideology are now only weak predictors of party choice (Inglehart 1990; Kriesi 1998). Since this paper focuses primarily on the electoral consequences of cross-pressures, the concluding look at the role of education and ideology serves only to classify the effects of the issues (Häusermann/Kriesi 2025; Oesch/Rennwald 2018). An analysis of the obvious interactions between the two is reserved for future work.

3. Data and methods

To analyse the socioeconomic and cultural dimensions of the political conflict on party choice, I used data from the GLES long-term tracking module (GLEStrack09-23Cum ZA6832_v2). This is an online survey based on a quota sample with approximately three waves per year and 1,100 cases each. Not every wave includes the items required here, but at least one wave is available each year. The cumulative sample covers the period between 2009 and 2023 (T8-T54). Additional individual waves (T56, 58, 60) extend the period covered in descriptive analysis to 2025.

The dependent variable is voting intention – i.e., the party that respondents would vote for with their second vote if federal elections were held next Sunday. For various reasons, the distribution of responses to the parties in surveys is not entirely comparable with the distribution of votes according to official election results. This is not a problem for an explanatory analysis such as the one in this paper. The GLES has the advantage that the data on AfD voting is realistic, whereas in other surveys the proportion of this voter group is too low. In the GLES, CDU/CSU voters are underrepresented in relation to official election results. This does not appear to skew the positions to the “left,” as critical attitudes toward the welfare state and migration are strongly represented (see Fig. 1).

The key *explanatory variables* are the respondent’s issue positions on the socioeconomic and cultural dimensions of political conflicts. These *issue positions* were collected in a two-page question format in the GLES (see Table 1). The items offer controversial positions in political

⁵ Another trend analyses the shift from the interests and ideologies of the new groups to the emergence of parties that take up and represent them. The lack of parties with leftist economic preferences and culturally right-wing, populist orientations will not be discussed here, as parties are not the subject of the paper (on this topic, see Lefkofridi et al. 2014; Hillen/Steiner 2019).

⁶ In addition to the debate on the changing lines of conflict shaping the political arena in cleavage theory, issues play a major role in concepts of party competition (De Sio 2017; Franzmann et al. 2020; De Sio/Lachat 2020). Based on Stokes’ criticism of explaining voting behavior solely in terms of the left-right dimension, questions were raised about the electoral effects of issues. According to this view, parties can gain votes by focusing on issues that are important to them (Budge 2015:764).

debates, and bipolar response scales record the attitudes. The market-state dimension has the poles lower taxes and contributions, and therefore fewer benefits. Or: more benefits, and therefore higher taxes and contributions. The items on less or more immigration and on the priority for climate protection or economic growth are composed in a similar way. The choice to subsume climate policies and immigration under culture could be questioned, and it is also possible to criticize the contrasting options, but they are what shape political discourse.⁷

Table 1: Issue-Positions: Question wording and scales of answers.

Issue pos.	Wording	Scale answers
Socio-economic	<i>„Some want less taxes and levies, even if this means lower welfare state benefits, other want more welfare benefits even if that means more taxes and levies. Where do you stand with this question?“</i>	(1) lower taxes and levies, even if this means less welfare state benefits. (11) more welfare state benefits, even if that means more taxes and levies.
Immigration	<i>„Now it’s about the immigration opportunities of foreigners. Should immigration opportunities for foreigners be made easier or more restricted? Where do you stand with this question?“</i>	(1) Facilitate immigration opportunities for foreigners (11) Restrict immigration opportunities for foreigners.
Environment	<i>„Some believe that combating climate change should definitely take priority, even if it harms economic growth. Others believe that economic growth should definitely take priority, even if it makes combating climate change more difficult. How is your position on fighting climate change or promoting economic growth?“</i>	1 Priority for economic growth, even if it is more difficult to combat climate change - 11 Priority climate, even if it hurts economy (scale partly reversed)

The salience of each issue is assessed according to the rating of the issue positions using a 5-point Likert scale.⁸ Salience judgments are understood as being open in terms of their content, that is, they are not linked to the issue positions. Believing that a topic is salient does not necessarily mean that one has a certain position, for example on the topic of climate protection or limiting immigration. Instead, salience reflects the urgency of topics and is the result of interest groups and the media mobilizing public opinion (agenda-setting). In theory, the relationship to the party choice should be diffuse: People who find immigration to be salient could elect parties that support immigration or parties that are critical of immigration. Empirically, however, the two dimensions correlate.⁹ In addition, according to GLES survey data, the majority of

⁷ From the perspective of socio-psychological measurement of attitudes, the standard item and the GLES format are not optimal because they are a single item. Multiple items are recommended (Ansolabehere et al. 2008).

⁸ “And how important is topic xxx to you?” Answers: very important, rather important, partly important, not that important, completely unimportant.

⁹ The correlations are specific to the issues: Respondents who prioritized climate protection also always assessed it as highly salient. Especially respondents who prioritized restricting immigration stated that the issue is highly salient, but respondents who supported easier immigration also did so. Those who took up a neutral position were typically undecided about the salience of immigration. The correlation between salience and position on taxes / benefits is weak and becomes insignificant starting in 2019. It is only on this issue that the issue position and salience are relatively independent.

respondents rate each of the three issues as (very) salient. Around 66% consider taxes/social benefits or ecology to be (very) important, while 54% consider immigration to be (very) important. So there is some overlap. This response pattern may be due to the fact that these three issues are often equally important, or it may be due to the respondents' desire not to commit themselves. In order to capture salience in a meaningful way, a nominal variable was recoded: 1) migration is more important than taxes and social benefits; 2) both issues are important; 3) socio-economic issues are more important. Although this only covers two issues, it should be a satisfactory solution for an item that contributes little to explaining variance.

The descriptive analysis shows the *intertemporal* development of the respondents' positions on the topics "relationship state/market, immigration and ecology" between 2009 and 2025 (Sec. 4.1). An established method for representing changes in public opinion is used for this purpose (Soroka/Wlezien 2005, 2014). It calculates the difference between the proportion of agreement and disagreement received by rating questions on policy options or attitude questions. By subtracting the proportion of those who, for example, want to facilitate migration from those who want to restrict it, we obtain an indicator of the dominant attitude. This works with different scales: Soroka/Wlezien, for example, formed public opinion on the economic situation with the item "So you think that the general economic condition of the country will improve, stay the same, or get worse over the next 12 months?" The difference between positive and negative assessments expresses the direction (do negative or positive attitudes predominate?) and the strength (how big is the gap?). The method shows which "side" or option has the majority, is the median voter, so to speak (although forming a government is, of course, more complex). Figure 1, which shows trends in dominant issue positions among the population, is based on the difference between the proportion of responses with a negative assessment and the proportion with a positive assessment.

The middle of the scale or the middle option does not apply. In the debate about a polarized public, the polarization thesis is criticized with reference to mostly middle-of-the-road attitudes. The population tends to take a balanced view on controversial issues (market/state, migration, ecology). However, the issues differ significantly in terms of the size of the middle or more extreme positions. Migration proves to be polarized, while many take a "both/and" stance on the issue of social spending versus economic growth. But what is interesting here is the change in issue positions over time, for which the method used is appropriate. Alternative representations, such as mean values of the response scales for the respective issue items (Stövsand et al. 2023) or a polarization index (Lux/Gülzau 2022; Mau et al. 2023), are more aggregated and do not reflect the movement of the "camps" as well.¹⁰

Multivariate analyses were used to examine the influence of socioeconomic and cultural issue positions on party choice using multinomial logistic regressions and plots on the average marginal effects. The parties that are voted for most frequently were included (CDU/CSU, SPD, BÜNDNIS 90/Die GRÜNEN, Die Linke, AfD, FDP).¹¹ The items on positions on the topics of

¹⁰ In survey research, the middle category is also considered a strategy used by respondents when they lack information or are uncertain. A frequently chosen middle category therefore also results from the desire of respondents not to commit themselves.

¹¹ In the following, the CDU/CSU are sometimes referred to as the Christian Democrats and the SPD as the Social Democrats. BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN is referred to as the Green party, and Die Linke as

expanding or reducing taxes / benefits, making immigration easier or limiting it, and prioritizing climate protection or economic growth were used as full 11-point scales. They were recoded so that high numbers meant a greater agreement with the option named second, that is, with fewer taxes / benefits, limited immigration and priority on economic growth.

Since interactions are not possible in multinomial regression, the consequences of cross-pressures are analyzed using logistic regression to determine the probability of voting for individual parties and marginal effect plots. To avoid overcomplicating matters, they focus on social democrats and greens, who pursue redistributive programs. If their electorate is distracted by cross pressures, the chances of implementation decline due to cultural issues. The spectrum of possible cross pressures is limited to those that are empirically frequent between economics and migration, and between ecology and economic growth.¹²

In order to control for long-term factors influencing party choice (Campbell et al. 1960), school education and political ideology are taken into account. The education item was recoded as a dummy variable with the categories a) lower secondary school, general secondary school, no secondary school (primary), b) intermediate school-leaving certificate and intermediate secondary school (secondary), c) qualification entitling holder to study at a university of applied sciences, higher education entrance qualification, upper secondary school-leaving certificate (A-level). The respondents' political ideology was captured using the standard self-assessment on a left-right scale.¹³ For multivariate analyses, the metric response scale was recoded as dummy variables with left (1–4), centre (5) and conservative-right (6–11) political orientation.

The analyses use a cross-sectional perspective for the most part. Most analyses take a cross-sectional perspective. Temporal effects of the survey waves of the cumulative data set are controlled for using a time variable (fixed effects). This is the appropriate method, as this paper does not focus on temporal change (such as the predictive power of different conflict dimensions). This is reserved for future analyses.

In addition, respondents' age and gender (dummy 1=female) are included as control variables but not shown in the presentation of the results. A weight-variable (t0003_2) is used, which excludes "speeders" and corrects socio-demographic characteristics in the sample (Gesis Variable Report 10/2024/ [ZA6835_cdb.pdf](#)).

the Left. The AfD is referred to as the right-populist party, and the FDP as the Liberal party (due to their fiscally liberal programme).

¹² Of course economic growth and ecology do not contradict each other – neither per se nor objectively. Ecological transformation can create economic growth. This item is about the conflict in political discourse.

¹³ "Where would you place yourself on this scale?"

4 Results


Citizens' attitudes on the socioeconomic lines of conflict are not the only factor when it comes to party choice, and they must be considered together with topics along the cultural conflict axis. That is why we will first look at the development of the various issue positions and then use a multivariate analysis to determine how issue positions influence party choice and what effect cross-pressures have.

4.1 Positions on political lines of conflict over time

The assumption that, in addition to socio-economic issues, topics related to cultural conflict are also (increasingly) influencing voting decisions expands research on the “politics of redistribution” and helps to understand the puzzle that remarkably few equalizing policies are being established in relation to the development of inequality. This section describes the development of citizens' attitudes toward political lines of conflict up to 2025 and significantly updates the time span considered in earlier studies (Stövsand et al. 2023; Lux/Gülzau 2022).

Figure 1 summarizes which policy alternatives are prioritized in the three areas of conflict and which option public opinion tends toward over time. It is based on the difference between the proportions of respondents who agree with each of the two options for the two-sided issue items. The differences for individual waves reveal annual changes. (For an explanation, see the Methods chapter.)

Figure 1: Priorities for positions on policy issues, 2009 to 2025



Note: The figure shows the difference between the percentage of respondents who agree with alternative positions per year. The legend labels are chosen so that the result of the subtraction is verbally recognizable: for example, “less taxes and transfers” means that the percentage of respondents who want lower taxes and transfers was subtracted from the percentage who want higher taxes and social transfers. Since the red dotted line is mostly above zero, more respondents support limited social benefits at almost all points in time. An example for 2009: The proportion of respondents who prioritize lower taxes and social benefits is 20% higher than the proportion who want more social benefits. If the line is below zero, the proportion of those who want higher taxes and social benefits is greater. The other legends should be read accordingly.

Source: GLES tracking 2009-2021 combined with GLES tracking T56, T58 and T60.

When it comes to the socio-economic conflict line on the question of whether citizens favor lower or higher taxes and social transfers, the difference is usually above zero. Accordingly, the desire for lower taxes/levies and social benefits dominates, albeit moderately, as the differences only fluctuate between 1 and 10 percent. Since 2021, the proportion that prioritizes fewer social benefits has increased significantly. The value rarely falls slightly below zero. In such cases, supporters of higher taxes and social benefits are so few in number that it is more accurate to speak of a balance. In absolute terms and on average across all waves, 41.9% are against higher taxes/social benefits, while 28.8% of respondents want more social benefits. In the middle, 22.1% are in favor of the status quo or are indifferent. The issue positions are relatively unpolarized and the priority for dismantling the welfare state is not very pronounced. The sharp increase in supporters of lower social spending in 2021 could be attributed to the citizen's income reform and its widespread criticism in the media, where political communication apparently polarized opinion.

In contrast, the issue of migration is clearly dominated by the priority of restriction: the difference between those who are less in favor of migration and those who would like to facilitate it is between 20% and 50% (black line, legend: restrict immigration). Since 2015, policies limiting migration have been increasingly prioritized; this group has grown in relation to the group of migration advocates to date; an interim decline around the 2020s has now been offset. In absolute terms, 20-30% of respondents are in favor of easier immigration. The middle ground is weak, with only 10.6% of respondents in 2025; in contrast, approximately 65% are in favor of restrictions. The issue of migration is characterized by polarized attitudes.

The positions taken in the conflict between climate protection and economic growth, which have only been surveyed since 2013, show that public opinion in 2013 clearly prioritized climate protection, but this has been steadily declining since 2017. From 2023 onwards, parity between the two camps will be achieved, with the group that gives priority to economic growth becoming similar in size to the group that considers climate protection to be more important. From 2024 onwards, the line will dip below zero: the proportion of those who favor economic growth will now be slightly larger. Here, too, political communication and media coverage of the poor economic situation are likely to play a role.

4.2 Conflict dimensions and voter behaviour


This paper aims to contribute to the question, often posed in research on the political economics of redistribution, of why politics of redistribution are not as expansive as the citizens' criticism of economic inequality seems to call for. To add to existing responses, I integrate election research theories on the *second dimension* of political conflict. This contradicts the expectation that citizens' attitudes on economic issues (the government should reduce income inequalities caused by the market) lead them to vote for parties that support more social spending. I will therefore show the results of an empirical analysis of the following question: What weight do the issues in the two dimensions (socioeconomic and cultural, with the latter represented by immigration and ecology issues) have on party choice?

Figure 2 shows the average marginal effects (AMEs) from multinomial logistic regressions with predictors for vote choice. The predictive power is shown by average marginal effects: A

1-point change on the taxes-and-benefits scale increases the probability of voting for the respective party by x percentage points. According to AMEs, a 1-point change on the taxes-and-benefits scale (independent variable) increases the probability of voting for a traditional left party by about 1 percentage point, the Left reaches 1.5 %, the Green party just 0.7 %. The figures seem small. However, real social groups tend to differ not by only 1 point but by 4 or more points. So the effect is larger, but still not considerable ($4 \times 1.5 = 6 \%$). On the other hand, those who are in favour of more taxes/benefits (=higher value on the socioeconomic scale) are less likely to choose the conservative (CDU/CSU), fiscally liberal (FDP) or right-populist (AfD) parties (about 1 %). The explanatory power of the economic dimension is therefore limited, which supports the thesis that distribution issues are not “the top priority” or the driving force behind party choices.

Positions regarding *immigration* (1=facilitate on one end of the scale versus 11=limit at the other end) and *ecology* (1=priority for economic growth versus 11=priority for climate) have greater effects, and coefficients are highly significant. The stronger the voters' preference for restricting immigration, the more probable it is that they will vote for the AfD, and the less likely it is that they will vote for the other parties. The more strongly the respondents prefer restrictive immigration, the less probable it is that they will vote for the Green party or Social Democrats. For the other parties (CDU, FDP, Left Party), the likelihood of being elected is less strongly influenced by the issue of migration: a 1-point higher position on the scale in favor of restricted migration only slightly reduces the likelihood of being elected. Compared to these parties, the issue of migration plays a greater role for voters of the Green Party and the Social Democrats. Even compared to their positions on taxes and social benefits, the issue of migration carries more weight in voting decisions.

Figure 2: Vote choice and economic versus cultural dimension.



R^2 10,5%. Results of multinomial logistic regression see tab. A2 appendix.

When the respondents favour **climate protection** (over economic growth), then this increases the probability that they will vote in particular for the Green party. Their voters are guided to a greater extent by their ecological stance than by social topics. On the other hand, respondents who prioritize climate protection are not more likely to choose the Social Democratic Party.

The model explains 10.5 % of the variance in the data. The effects of the individual dimensions are small but highly significant for most parties.¹⁴ As the descriptive analysis has already shown, positions on immigration (and in part on climate) are more *polarized* than positions on the topic of taxes and benefits. In the case of the latter, many respondents placed themselves in the middle of the scale, which can be understood as an expression of supporting the status quo or simply of ambivalent opinions. This means that income distribution does not have the same weight as the other issues, thereby confirming the first hypothesis. This is in line with the findings by Hellwig (2014), who demonstrated a greater predictive power for the relatively “new” topics also when comparing different countries. To what extent the lower weighting for the topic of distribution is related to the voters’ convictions and to what extent it can be attributed to the greater politicization of the new topics cannot be determined from the data. What can be said, however, is that different issues increase the attractiveness of parties for different voters. Some parties are chosen due to left-right issues and others due to new political issues. The issues therefore have party-specific effects (Hellwig 2014:596).

Salience

The question of how much weight is given to individual lines of conflict when making voting decisions introduces the concept of salience. The literature views salience as an important method for voters to make decisions when they are faced with multiple issues. Empirically, however, respondents tend to describe all three issues as salient (see Chapter 3). In the dummy variable for saliency, the biggest group is made up of respondents who stated that the issues taxes and transfers and also migration are equally important (46 %). The group that places a higher priority on taxes and benefits than on immigration makes up 33 % of the respondents. For 20 %, the issue of immigration has priority.

Figure 3 shows the effects of the salience variables in the form of dummies on party choice (model with R^2 : 11.9%). The average marginal effects (AME) are greater than the effects of the issue positions, but the confidence intervals are wide and overlap due to insignificant effects. The additional predictor provides little additional insight (R^2 increases by 1%) and the effects of the issues remain largely constant as in the previous regression. This rather unsatisfactory result is likely due to the fact that the item is vague in terms of content. Respondents report high salience, but this assessment can mean both rejection and approval of, for example, higher taxes and social benefits.


If the issue of taxes and social benefits has higher salience than migration, voting for the Left is more likely (4%), but not for the Social Democrats or the Greens. The negative effect for conservative and right-wing populist parties needs no further explanation. The fact that

¹⁴ The choice to vote for the FDP is not explained by positions on immigration or ecology, or the effects are at least not significant.

respondents who prioritize the issue of taxes and social benefits are more likely to vote for the FDP is due to the fact that lower benefits are a central concern for this group of voters.

The results for the category “immigration is the most important topic” has little need for interpretation. It is apparent that this prioritization makes it more probable that respondents will choose the AfD on the one hand or the Green party on the other. As claimed in the methods section, this emphasizes that the salience construct also captures the mobilization of the electorate using new cultural topics that certain parties “own” (Hellwig 2017). In regard to varying policy contents, it is diffuse and sometimes correlates with the issue positions.¹⁵

Figure 3: Salience and party choice



The previous reference category “both are important” should now be examined specifically, as it can be assumed that the size of the group selecting this category also indicates a bias in response behavior: respondents avoid prioritizing between the issues of migration and the welfare state because they do not want to reveal their true preference for migration. This group with an undecided salience rating is therefore explicitly included in the analysis of voting behavior (the reference group is now “priority for taxes/social benefits,” see Figure A3 in the appendix). These respondents are more likely to vote for the Christian Democratic or right-wing populist parties. An undecided attitude leads to support for parties that want to avoid social spending and tax burdens. The effects are small (AME CDU/CSU .033, i.e., 3% higher probability), but significant. Ultimately, social issues have little influence on the voting behavior of respondents with undecided positions.

¹⁵An analysis carried out only with salience items explained merely an additional 4 % of the variance. Salience therefore does not replace the issue positions (as Stövsand et al. 2023 discuss).


4.3 How do cross-pressures influence voter behaviour?

In the previous section, the electoral consequences of multiple political issues could only be conjectured based on the varying effect strengths and predictive power of individual issue positions. However, the electoral consequences of multiple issues and the extent to which cross-pressures arise between them can be more accurately determined by examining interactions. These reveal “crowding-out effects” between issues. However, interactions must be implemented using logistic regression, which is only designed for a dependent variable. I therefore select parties for which a displacement effect in voting decisions can be expected due to competition between the issues of migration and the welfare state or climate change: Social Democrats and Greens.

Figure 4 shows how the *interaction* between the socioeconomic issue and immigration affects the probability of voting for the SPD. The *marginal effects* indicate the percentage by which the respective independent variable increases the electoral chances of Social Democracy. It is expected that preferences for higher taxes increase the probability of voting for the SPD. An additional preference for less immigration shifts the demand to a level that is not beneficial to the SPD. The marginal effects indicate the percentage by which the respective variable increases their electoral chances.

The marginal effects for are significantly lower than the effects for respondents who take a moderate position on immigration or who support migration. It is noteworthy that this is even the case among voters who support a strong welfare state (right half of the x-axis): the predicted probability of voting for the SPD is 25% among respondents who do not criticize migration, but only 17% among those who want to limit migration. The gap between supporters and opponents of migration (approx. 7-8%) is stable. In addition, the attractiveness of the SPD naturally declines the less respondents prefer higher taxes and social spending.

Figure 4: Cross-pressures for the SPD voters: Social benefits and immigration




Note: This figure shows marginal effects (predicted probability) from logistic regressions with the control variables of age, gender and wave/sample. N= 25868; R² 2.1 %; AIC 22212.397.

The consequence of cross-pressures is also particularly evident in the fact that those who are undecided on the issue of migration are particularly likely to scale back their intention to vote for social democrats. Thus, even among moderate centrists on migration policy, the basis for redistribution policy is being eroded by the second dimension of the political conflict. This group is likely to gravitate toward conservative and populist parties, the less they support higher taxes and social security contributions.

A similar analysis for voting for the *Green party* (die Grüne) shows the same pattern: The probability of voting for this party increases with the desire for higher taxes and benefits, particularly in the voter group that agrees with easing immigration restrictions (no figure).

The role of the new cultural issues is party-specific, as parties “own” topics or are considered particularly good representatives of the particular issue. For looking at the cross-pressures of Green party voters, I therefore analyse the interaction between immigration and ecology.

Figure 5: Cross-pressures for the Green voters: Climate and immigration



Notes: Predicted probability of voting for the Green party. Models with control variables age, gender, wave. R^2 7,6 %. For results in a table format, see the Appendix table A4.

As before, we examine how positions on climate protection policy versus economic growth interact with attitudes toward immigration (see Fig. 5). The greater the priority given to climate protection and if respondents also support migration, the higher the predicted probability of voting for the Greens (if both are at their maximum, the probability is 40%). However, when combined with the attitude that migration should be limited, the vote gain achieved by the climate protection issue is much lower at 17%. Reservations about migration cause a much more pronounced decline (to 23%) in the likelihood of voting for the Greens than citizens' critical attitudes toward migration cause a decline in votes for the Social Democrats. The migration issue limits the likelihood of voting green (difference between green and blue lines). Currently, the majority of respondents position themselves in the middle between prioritizing the economy


and climate protection (at scale points 5 and 6). With this compromise position, the dominant migration-sceptical attitude reduces the likelihood of voting for the Greens by about 9 percent.

The interactions show clear cross-pressures: If we also include the information that positions that are critical of migration now make up the majority (see Fig. 1), then the effect of the Green party's core topic is plausible. The Green party gets a larger "push" from its core topic than the Social Democrats (SPD) do from their core socioeconomic topic. Unfortunately, the "ecology versus economic growth" scales are not entirely comparable.

4.4 The role of long-term factors

Voters' decisions are of course not influenced solely by issue positions. According to the classic socio-psychological model of a funnel of causality (here: a funnel of voting behaviour), the issue positions are short-term factors while long-term dispositions include level of education, economic position, political ideology or religion (Campbell et al. 1960; Dasonville 2023: 100). From the perspective of the dealignment thesis, the explanatory power of long-term factors is weakened (Oesch 2015; Häusermann/Kriesi 2015; Elff/Roßteutscher 2022). However, the following openly examines the role that long-term dispositions play in relation to issues in voting decisions. It should be noted, however, that short-term and long-term factors cannot be cleanly separated. On topics such as immigration, social benefits or climate protection, the positions taken up by voters are often linked to long-term factors that have developed from their class, educational level or ideology. As this paper cannot carry out a comprehensive analysis of all of these cleavage factors, I will concentrate on education as an indicator of social anchoring and on political ideology, which is, unsurprisingly, correlated with issue positions.¹⁶

Figure 6: Issues and cleavage indicators



¹⁶ Limitations also arise from the data set, as factors such as class cannot be modelled because the necessary items are missing.

Figure 6 shows the average marginal effects (AMEs) of the multiple logistic regression on party choice (R^2 16.6 %). The following interpretation focuses on the particularly relevant group of voters who “should” vote for parties that support redistributive policies (low level of education, left political ideology). The reference groups have been selected such that conclusions can be drawn about the “broad centre” (mid-level education and centrist position for ideology) and lower class. What factors determine their voting behaviour? Which issues distract from parties that prefer higher social spending?

Respondents with a *primary school educational level* (tertiary education degree as reference) are more likely to vote for the Social Democrats (AME 8 % pp.) and the AfD (AME 5 % pp.), and they are less likely to vote for the Green party, Christian Democrats, or the Liberal party (all coefficients are highly significant).¹⁷ However, respondents with secondary education levels/intermediate school-leaving certificates are only slightly more likely than highly educated respondents to vote for parties that prefer higher levels of social spending. Especially among the middle class, there is little inclination to support parties that advocate for higher taxes and social spending. (All effects of education are significant, except those for secondary education and voting for the SPD).

The influence of political *ideology* is checked using a dummy variable with the categories left, right-conservative and centre. To look into the “distractions” faced by voters who would potentially support redistribution policies, we use the right-conservatives as a reference group, as this more clearly shows the voting behaviour of the centre and the group that positions itself on the left side of the political spectrum.

As expected, the left group votes for either the SPD or the Left party (AME approx. 15 %). The probability of voting for the CDU is 26 % lower than it is that the right-conservative group will vote for the CDU. Conversely, the AfD (AME 9 %) and CDU (17%) benefit from respondents having a conservative ideology (change in reference group, no figure). Among voters in the broad ideological centre, there is a tendency to vote for parties that support more social spending such as the SPD (7 %) and the Green party (8 %), but the effect is small. It is less probable that they will vote for the Christian Democrats (-8 %) and the AfD (-9 %) than it is among those with a right-conservative ideology.

In all, the *explained variance* increases from 10 % to 17 % when the model includes indicators for long-term determinants of voter behaviour compared to when it only includes the issue positions. When looking at the strength of the average marginal effects, the party choice is influenced to a greater extent by education and political ideology than by issue positions (results for mlogit request the author). In addition, the issue-position effects become smaller when the model includes ideology, suggesting that part of the influence seen from issues can be traced back to ideology.¹⁸ The phenomenon of correlating effect sizes is statistically undesirable, and attempts are made to avoid this *multicollinearity*. However, it cannot be excluded entirely. That is also the case here: The voters’ issue positions are partially rooted in their political

¹⁷ On the voting behaviour of the reference group with tertiary education: In these cases, the probability of voting for the Green party is the greatest and the Social Democrats the lowest.

¹⁸ However, models that only include issue items have greater explained variance than models that only use ideology and education. This suggests that issue positions are not equivalent to political ideology.

ideology. The correlation between ideology and issues varies among the waves, but it is always rather low on the topic of taxes/benefits and of mid-range size on the issue of immigration (Pearson's R .35 to .45). Political ideology is of course a meta-category that bundles specific orientations and attitudes. People who state that they are on the left have specific attitudes towards the market-state relationship (for example on tax increases) or towards immigration. Still, ideology does not negate the need to look at issue positions.

5. Conclusion

The puzzle described by research on redistributive policy—growing economic inequality, public opinion critical of income disparities, and broad support for reducing these disparities, but comparatively little actual redistribution achieved—was addressed in this paper using the concept of multiple political lines of conflict and cross-pressures in electoral decisions. Looking at new political lines of conflict around ecology or immigration avoids focusing on the socioeconomic dimension and the distribution issues anchored therein, which is the focus of research on inequality and redistribution. Voting decisions are by no means guided solely by economic issues, but increasingly by cultural issues. Cross-pressures among voters mean that redistribution policies have less chance of being implemented than survey results suggesting that the majority of citizens are in favor of equality would suggest. Research on the relationship between economic inequality and tax and social policy, which should respond to critical public opinion, can better explain the puzzle by integrating theories and data on political behavior (as well as other aspects of the political system).

Descriptive data on the development of issue positions (1996–2025) showed a “serene” attitude toward the socioeconomic dimension, i.e., issue positions predominantly chosen in the middle of the scale. In contrast, attitudes toward the question of restricting or facilitating immigration are polarized: the view that migration should be restricted has become increasingly dominant over time, with only a brief period (2015/16) when the lead of migration critics shrank to just 18%. On the conflict dimension of ecology versus economic growth, sympathy for ecology prevails until 2017; since then, more and more respondents have prioritized economic growth, so that parity between the positions is reached in 2024.

Multivariate analyses of the effect of the reconfiguration of conflict lines on party choice partly confirm the first hypothesis regarding the dominance of cultural issues in party choice/voting decisions. Economic issues have only a minor effect and therefore contribute little to explaining which party is voted for. Researchers explain this with the extensive institutionalization of distribution issues. The issues of migration and ecology have a comparatively stronger influence on voting behavior, which is very plausible given the polarization of attitudes. However, the explanatory power achieved by models with issue positions is limited at 10.5%. Other mechanisms of political competition for votes must be taken into account in future research. In addition, the relevance of the respective issues is party-specific: parties that “own” an issue are also voted for because of that issue: the Greens are voted for because of ecological attitudes, the AfD because of attitudes toward migration. There is no consistently influential master theme.

Salience (hypothesis 2) proved to be a difficult construct, as salience judgments are ambivalent, i.e., they can refer to both poles of the two-sided items (e.g., climate protection more important – economic growth more important). The salience of the issues had no significant influence on the voting decision. On the other hand, the assumption formulated in hypothesis three, that cross-pressures between economic and cultural issues reduce the likelihood of voting for parties that are favorable to tax and social spending, has been clearly confirmed. Cross-pressures due to preferences on the issue of migration divert the voting decision that would actually result from preferences on the socio-economic issue. The probability of voting for parties that are sympathetic to social spending, such as the Social Democrats or the Greens, decreases by approximately 6-10% for issue positions that are critical of migration.

Cross-pressures are therefore a key factor in the puzzle of redistribution research. The high relevance of the issues of migration and ecology and the balanced positions on the question of social spending vs. economic growth may change in the future. The data underlying the analyses reflect the past. Inflation, energy prices, and controversial social reforms may make questions of economic distribution relevant again.

As a contribution to the methodological debate, the paper records respondents' attitudes toward the distribution question with a GLES item that is formulated in a way that is closer to political discourse than the usual generic item on the role of government, according to which two-thirds of citizens want policies to reduce income inequality but apparently do not vote for them. The decision to vote for a particular party is certainly influenced by political communication, whose party-political frames activate concerns about social cuts or a weak economy. This conflict discourse (which is presumably determined by political ideology) is well reflected in the GLES item. Nevertheless, further research/development of items on political support for redistributive policies is necessary.

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Appendix

Table 1: Descriptives

	Mean		Std.deviation		N
Taxes/social transfers (1) less – (11) more	5.79		2.62		25869
Immigration (1) facilitate – (11) limit	7.38		3.02		26827
Priority (1) fight climate change – (11) economic growth	5.02		2.79		21185
Saliency (1 - 5 very important)					
- Taxes–social benefits	3.79		.876		27019
- Immigration	3.57		1.04		27025
- Climate protection	3.81		.949		21563
Age	44.1		14.7		28245
Gender (share women)	48.5		.5		28245
Vote intention (in %)*	2015	2017	2019	2021	2023
- CDU/CSU	32.2	31.9	18.5	22.7	23.3
- SPD	27.7	24.2	16.4	17.7	20.1
- Grüne	15	9.7	23	23.4	19.4
- FDP	6.3	10.9	10.8	10.4	8.4
- Linke	12	11.1	12.4	9.9	8.5
- AFD	7.1	11.6	18.8	15.9	20.3

* Note: The shares of single parties do not reflect the official election results. This is because, on the one hand, the „Sonntagfrage“ was used. On the other hand, certain parties are under- or over-represented in the survey, which cannot be corrected by using a weighting variable.

Table A2 : Impact of issue-positions on party choice (ref. CDU)

Reference CDU/CSU	Coeff. (Sign.)	Std.error	t-statistics
SPD			
- taxes-social benefits (11-more)	.098***	.011	8.69
- immigration (11-limit)	-.073***	.010	-7.29
- priority climate protection (11)	.086***	.011	8.08
- waves	.011***	.010	3.56
- age	.009***	.002	5.06
- gender (female)	.017	.056	0.29
cons.	-.171***	.208	-8.21
FDP			
- taxes-social benefits (11-more)	-0.83***	.014	-6.09
- immigration (11-limit)	.004	.012	.029
- priority climate protection (11)	-.013	.012	-.1.05
- waves	.032***	.004	8.73
- age	-.011***	.002	-4.72
- gender (female)	.011	.068	0.16
Cons	-.123***	.259	-4.73
Grüne			
- taxes-social benefits (11-more)	.129***	.012	10.9
- immigration (11-limit)	-.152***	.011	-14.5
- priority climate protection (11)	.300***	.014	22.1
- waves	.042***	.003	12.51
- age	-.012***	.002	-6.39
- gender (female)	.236***	.059	4.01
Cons	-3.62***	.236	-15.3
LINKE			
- taxes-social benefits (11-more)	.191***	.014	13.25
- immigration (11-limit)	-.063	.011	-5.29
- priority climate protection (11)	.167	.014	11.94
- waves	.014***	.004	3.99
- age	-.001	.002	-.021
- gender (female)	-.104	.067	-1.57
Cons	-3.10***	.242	-12.8
AFD			
- taxes-social benefits (11-more)	-.056***	.012	-4.82
- immigration (11-limit)	.461***	.018	25.1
- priority climate protection (11)	-.035**	.011	-3.19
- waves	.033***	.004	8.93
- age	-.011***	.002	-5.28
- gender (female)	-.338***	.062	-5.41
Cons	-4.69***	.275	-17.05
R-Sq.	11,1%		

*p <0,05, **p<0,01, *** p<0,001. N 25868

Table A3: Cross-pressures as interaktion. Logistic regression - SPD

	Coeff. (Sign.)	Std.error	t-Statistics
Taxes/social benefits more	.042 **	.014	3.03
Immigration (ref. facilitate)			
- partly/	-.364*	.206	-1.77
- limit	-.552***	.118	-4.66
Immigration x taxes/socben more			
- partly/	.036	.031	1.16
- limit	.020	.017	1.16
Waves	-.006***	.002	-3.29
Age	.015***	.001	11.4
Female	-.010	.042	-0.23
Constant	-2.07	.134	-15.5
R-Sq. 2%			

*p <0,05, **p<0,01, *** p<0,001. N = 25820

Table A4: Cross-pressures as interaction. Logistic regression – The Green Party.

	Coeff. (Sign.)	Std.error	t-Statistics
Taxes/social benefits more	.094***	.012	7.73
Immigration (ref. facilitate)			
- partly/	-.360	.217	-1.66
- limit	-1.35***	.119	-11.38
Immigration x taxes/socben more			
- partly/	-.023	.033	0.71
- limit	.015	.017	0.86
Waves	.018***	.002	9.07
Age	-.012***	.001	-8.56
Female	.284***	.042	6.76
Constant	-2.13***	.134	-16.0
R-Sq. 8%			

*p <0,05, **p<0,01, *** p<0,001. N=25868

Abbildung A3: Salienz und Wahlentscheidung




Abbildung A4: Einfluss auf die Wahlentscheidung: Issues, Ideologie und Bildung.

