# Test <br> Advanced Microeconomics: Part II (Uwe Jirjahn) 

Winter 2020/2021

Choose two questions out of the three questions Q1, Q2 and Q 3 .
Q. 1 Consider the following normal-form game:

| Player 1 | A | B |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| C | $2,-2$ | $-2,2$ |
| D | $-2,2$ | $2,-2$ |

Q.1.a Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
Q.1.b Find the mixed-strategy Nash equilibria and calculate the players' expected payoffs.
Q. 2 Consider the following normal-form game:

| Player 2 <br> Player 1 | a | b | c | d | e | f | g | h |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| T | 1,1 | 1,1 | 1,1 | 1,1 | 3,2 | 3,2 | 3,2 | 3,2 |
| M | 4,1 | 4,1 | 2,3 | 2,3 | 2,3 | 2,3 | 4,1 | 4,1 |
| B | 5,2 | 1,1 | 5,2 | 1,1 | 5,2 | 1,1 | 5,2 | 1,1 |

Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria by iterated elimination of dominated strategies.
Q. 3 Consider the following normal-form game:

| Player 2 | A | S | L |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| A | 3,3 | 1,4 | 0,0 |
| S | 4,1 | 0,0 | $-1,-1$ |
| L | 0,0 | $-1,-1$ | $-2,-2$ |

Write down the set of strategy profiles and find the strategy profiles that constitute pure-strategy Nash equilibria.

Note: If you answer all questions, we will only consider Q. 1 and Q.2.

